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19 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences2003Justice Blackmun observed in Bagley that the test "may as easily be stated as a materiality standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 473 U.S. at 679-80 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 . 2003Justice Blackmun observed in Bagley that the test "may as easily be stated as a materiality standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 473 U.S. at 679-80 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 . | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Agursgreen2 sentences1990The United States Supreme Court refined the materiality standard in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 [ 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ] (1976), holding that `(t)he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense." 427 U.S. at 109 [ 96 S.Ct. at 2400 ] The Court explained that the proper test was whether the suppressed information creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist. 1990The United States Supreme Court refined the materiality standard in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 [ 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ] (1976), holding that `(t)he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense." 427 U.S. at 109 [ 96 S.Ct. at 2400 ] The Court explained that the proper test was whether the suppressed information creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Jorge Luis Alzategreen2 sentences2003As we stated in Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1991), relying expressly on Giglio , "[i]f there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence may have affected the judgment of the jury, a new trial is required." More recently, in Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 563 (Fla.2001), we reaffirmed our statement in Routly and held that in denying a Giglio claim, the trial court "incorrectly relied on the materiality standard appropriate to Brady claims." In explaining the differences between the Brady and Giglio *439 standards, we cited to United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th C 2001See United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1109-10 (11th Cir.1995) ("Where there has been a suppression of favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, the nondisclosed evidence is material: `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ... | 1 | 2 |
Way v. Stategreen1 sentence2011“Rather, the question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)); see also Rivera v. State, 995 So.2d 191, 203 (Fla.2008) (same); Way, 760 So.2d at 913 (same). | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Stategreen1 sentence2011“Rather, the question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)); see also Rivera v. State, 995 So.2d 191, 203 (Fla.2008) (same); Way, 760 So.2d at 913 (same). | 1 | 1 |
Ponticelli v. Stategreen1 sentence2008For example, in Ponticelli v. State, 941 So.2d 1073, 1085-86 (Fla.2006), this Court found that an allegedly undisclosed note assuring an inmate witness that "his cooperation would be remembered with favor before mitigating judge" was not material given the "significant amount of evidence impeaching [the inmate's] credibility as well as the State's credibility in calling him to testify." In that case, the inmate testified that he had previously worked undercover for the State, that he had contacted the local sheriff's department with incriminating information on his fellow prisoners, that he ha | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Hurstgreen1 sentence2006See Murphy v. Hurst, 881 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (providing a compilation of cases where Florida courts have found materiality present or lacking). | 1 | 1 |
Routly v. Stategreen1 sentence2003As we stated in Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1991), relying expressly on Giglio , "[i]f there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence may have affected the judgment of the jury, a new trial is required." More recently, in Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 563 (Fla.2001), we reaffirmed our statement in Routly and held that in denying a Giglio claim, the trial court "incorrectly relied on the materiality standard appropriate to Brady claims." In explaining the differences between the Brady and Giglio *439 standards, we cited to United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th C | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Statered1 sentence2003A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted). [20] It is understandable that the trial court was misled as to the correct legal standard by our statement in Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629, 635 (Fla.2000), that the materiality standard under Giglio was the same as under Brady . | 1 | 1 |
Ventura v. Stategreen1 sentence2003As we stated in Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1991), relying expressly on Giglio , "[i]f there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence may have affected the judgment of the jury, a new trial is required." More recently, in Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 563 (Fla.2001), we reaffirmed our statement in Routly and held that in denying a Giglio claim, the trial court "incorrectly relied on the materiality standard appropriate to Brady claims." In explaining the differences between the Brady and Giglio *439 standards, we cited to United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th C | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Id. at 821 (footnote omitted). [5] In De La Rosa the materiality test was clearly met. | 1 | 1 |
M'lanahan v. the Universal Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1998Co., 1 Pet. 170, 188-189, 191 , 7 L.Ed. 98 (1828) (materiality of false statements in insurance applications). .... 1998Co., 1 Pet. 170, 188-189, 191 , 7 L.Ed. 98 (1828) (materiality of false statements in insurance applications). .... | 1 | 1 |
Arnold L. King v. Joseph Pontegreen1 sentence1985See Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344 (10th Cir.1984) (citing King v. Ponte, 717 F.2d 635, 640 (1st Cir.1983) and United States ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Larry Leon Chaney v. John N. Brown, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, McAlester Oklahomagreen1 sentence1985See Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344 (10th Cir.1984) (citing King v. Ponte, 717 F.2d 635, 640 (1st Cir.1983) and United States ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickler v. Greene
green
2 sentences2004In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Court explained, As we made clear in Kyles, [v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , [ 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1995) ] the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. 2004In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Court explained, As we made clear in Kyles, [v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , [ 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1995) ] the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. | 4 | 2004–2019 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2004In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Court explained, As we made clear in Kyles, [v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , [ 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1995) ] the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. 2004In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Court explained, As we made clear in Kyles, [v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , [ 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1995) ] the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. | 2 | 2004–2011 |
Guzman v. State
green
2 sentences2006Guzman, 868 So.2d at 506-08 . 2005Guzman, 868 So.2d at 507 . | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2003A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted). [20] It is understandable that the trial court was misled as to the correct legal standard by our statement in Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629, 635 (Fla.2000), that the materiality standard under Giglio was the same as under Brady . 2003A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted). [20] It is understandable that the trial court was misled as to the correct legal standard by our statement in Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629, 635 (Fla.2000), that the materiality standard under Giglio was the same as under Brady . | 2 | 1995–2003 |
De La Rosa v. Zequeira
green
2 sentences2002First, as I read the district court’s opinion, it determined that the concealed information was not material, and therefore, the materiality requirement of De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla.1995), was not met. 2000In that case the jury foreperson failed to disclose that he was a defendant in six prior lawsuits. 659 So.2d at 240 n. 1. | 2 | 2000–2002 |
Roberts Ex Rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada
green
1 sentence2002Second, I hope Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So.2d 334 (Fla.2002), was not intended to eliminate the due diligence requirement of De La Rosa altogether. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Indeed, our cases have recognized in other contexts that the materiality inquiry, involving as it does "delicate assessments of the inferences a `reasonable [decisionmaker]' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him, ... [is] peculiarly on[e] for the trier of fact." TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 , 96 S.Ct. 2126 , 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976) (securities fraud); McLanahan v. Universal Ins. 1998Indeed, our cases have recognized in other contexts that the materiality inquiry, involving as it does "delicate assessments of the inferences a `reasonable [decisionmaker]' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him, ... [is] peculiarly on[e] for the trier of fact." TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 , 96 S.Ct. 2126 , 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976) (securities fraud); McLanahan v. Universal Ins. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence1986NOTES [1] Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(a)(1)(i) & (iii). [2] The materiality requirement set forth in Brady was further refined in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and United States v. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985). [3] In Richardson we also took note of Florida's harmless error statute, § 924.33, Fla. Stat. (1969), which prohibits the appellate courts of this state from reversing judgments in criminal proceedings solely because of errors that do not affect the substantive rights of the parties involved. 246 So.2d at 774 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.