materiality standard in Ohio

2022Moreover, “[t]his standard of materiality does not 55. require that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in the defendant’s acquittal.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2007-Ohio-4837 , 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 39 , citing United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 111 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

1988In reviewing appellee’s motion for a new trial, the court of appeals analyzed the materiality of the evidence in question under the standards set forth by the court in United States v. Agurs, supra. In Agurs , the United States Supreme Court pro vided a different materiality test to be applied depending on whether the case involved perjured testimony, a specific request by the defense for exculpatory evidence, or a general or no request by the defense for exculpatory evidence.

2002Applying the materiality test as set forth in Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419 , suppression of the impeachment evidence in this case may have constituted a Brady violation, and as such, the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a postconviction evidentiary hearing.

2002The court added, "A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. {¶ 59} This concept of materiality was explored and narrowed further by the court in Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419 .

2025Because of the degree of culpability associated with perjured testimony and the difficulty of extricating its effects on proceedings, this materiality standard is demonstrably less onerous for the claimant than the more familiar “reasonable probability” standard applied to claimed violations of the rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2022Importantly, “the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions.” Id. at 290 .

2022Moreover, “[t]his standard of materiality does not 55. require that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in the defendant’s acquittal.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2007-Ohio-4837 , 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 39 , citing United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 111 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

2022Moreover, “[t]his standard of materiality does not 55. require that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in the defendant’s acquittal.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2007-Ohio-4837 , 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 39 , citing United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 111 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

2021Relying on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959),2 the Giglio court set forth the following materiality standard for determining whether a new trial was required under Brady: We do not[] [] automatically require a new trial whenever a combing of the prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict.

2020Likewise, for the materiality requirement, we explained: Although the R.C. 1345.02 does not explicitly state that misrepresentations must be material to the transaction, it is well established that a deceptive act or practice under the CSPA is one that “‘has the tendency or capacity to mislead consumers concerning a fact or circumstance material to a decision to purchase the product or service offered for sale.’” (Emphasis added.) Richards v. Beechmont Volvo, 127 Ohio App.3d 188 , 711 N.E.2d 1088 (1st Dist.1998), quoting Cranford v. Joseph Airport Toyota, Inc., 2d Dist.

2020Likewise, for the materiality requirement, we explained: Although the R.C. 1345.02 does not explicitly state that misrepresentations must be material to the transaction, it is well established that a deceptive act or practice under the CSPA is one that “‘has the tendency or capacity to mislead consumers concerning a fact or circumstance material to a decision to purchase the product or service offered for sale.’” (Emphasis added.) Richards v. Beechmont Volvo, 127 Ohio App.3d 188 , 711 N.E.2d 1088 (1st Dist.1998), quoting Cranford v. Joseph Airport Toyota, Inc., 2d Dist.

2016“The materiality standard * * * means that in addition to being technically false, a statement would tend to mislead or confuse the reasonable unsophisticated consumer.” Id., citing Wallace at 326-327 . {¶ 89} The OCSPA is similar: [R.C.] Section 1345.02(A) provides that “[n]o supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.

2013Id. at 1195 . {¶ 36} The court held that the “pivotal inquiry is whether proof of materiality is needed to ensure that questions of law or fact common to the class will ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members’ as the litigation progresses.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 1195 . {¶ 37} The court found that the plaintiffs did not need to prove materiality at the certification stage for two reasons.

2013Id. at 1195 . {¶ 36} The court held that the “pivotal inquiry is whether proof of materiality is needed to ensure that questions of law or fact common to the class will ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members’ as the litigation progresses.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 1195 . {¶ 37} The court found that the plaintiffs did not need to prove materiality at the certification stage for two reasons.

1999The Ohio Supreme Court adopted this materiality test in State v. Johnston (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 48 , 61 .

1987See State v. Wilkinson (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 308, 315-316 , 18 O.O. 3d 482, 487, 415 N.E. 2d 261, 268 ; Snowden, supra, at 12-13 , 3 O.O. 3d at 95, 359 N.E. 2d at 92 .