5 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kyle v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011If the language in a statute is unambiguous, we must apply the plain meaning with the presumption that “the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.” Kyle v. Williams, 98 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Tenn. 2003). 2007If the language is unambiguous, then we must apply the plain meaning with the presumption that “the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.” Parker, 2005 WL 1377839 , at *2 (quoting Kyle v. Williams, 98 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Tenn. 2003)). -6- Turning back to the statute in question, Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109 reads as follows: The appointment of a conservator for a disabled person does not automatically terminate the duty of the disabled person to support such disabled person's spouse or dependent minor children. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York
green
2 sentences2019In Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York , 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), the New York court refused to consider witness testimony on custom associated with a contract, stating that the witness's testimony was "not competent evidence at all, since it in effect usurps the court's function." Hotchkiss , 200 F. at 293 . 2019In Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York , 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), the New York court refused to consider witness testimony on custom associated with a contract, stating that the witness's testimony was "not competent evidence at all, since it in effect usurps the court's function." Hotchkiss , 200 F. at 293 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
green
2 sentences2004Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 , 123 S.Ct. 518, 526 , 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). 2004Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 , 123 S.Ct. 518, 526 , 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Further, we note that the plain-meaning rule is “an axiom of experience [rather than] a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928) (Holmes, J.), quoted with approval in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). 1992Further, we note that the plain-meaning rule is “an axiom of experience [rather than] a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928) (Holmes, J.), quoted with approval in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Watt v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1992Further, we note that the plain-meaning rule is “an axiom of experience [rather than] a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928) (Holmes, J.), quoted with approval in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). 1992Further, we note that the plain-meaning rule is “an axiom of experience [rather than] a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928) (Holmes, J.), quoted with approval in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.