plain meaning rule in Ohio

2021In other words, when the statutory language is unambiguous, courts should not rely on extrinsic information to discern the meaning of the statute, but should instead conduct a “careful examination of the 46 January Term, 2021 ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” Food Marketing Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2356, 2364 , 204 L.Ed.2d 742 (2019). {¶ 120} This does not mean that a court is forbidden from using intrinsic linguistic tools to understand a statute’s plain meaning.

2021In other words, when the statutory language is unambiguous, courts should not rely on extrinsic information to discern the meaning of the statute, but should instead conduct a “careful examination of the 46 January Term, 2021 ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” Food Marketing Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2356, 2364 , 204 L.Ed.2d 742 (2019). {¶ 120} This does not mean that a court is forbidden from using intrinsic linguistic tools to understand a statute’s plain meaning.

2019Clay v. Cuyahoga Co. Medical Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2017-Ohio-8714, ¶26 , quoting Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv.L.Rev. 2387, 2476 (2003).

2019Clay v. Cuyahoga Co. Medical Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2017-Ohio-8714, ¶26 , quoting Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv.L.Rev. 2387, 2476 (2003).

2019Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534 , 543– 544 (1940). {¶27} “The absurd-result exception to the plain-meaning rule of construction ‘entails the imputation of legislative intent based on the judge’s perception’ and ‘vastly expands the [c]ourt’s authority.’” State ex rel.

2019The Eighth District relied on our statement in Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2003-Ohio-3048 , 789 N.E.2d 1094, at ¶ 34 , that common words in a contract should “be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results * * *.” Although we have repeated this statement on numerous occasions, e.g., Aultman, 46 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 544 N.E.2d 920 ; Alexander, at paragraph two of the syllabus, this exception to the plain- meaning rule is narrow in scope and is necessarily limited by the meaning of the term “manifest absurdity” itself.

2019The Eighth District relied on our statement in Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2003-Ohio-3048 , 789 N.E.2d 1094, at ¶ 34 , that common words in a contract should “be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results * * *.” Although we have repeated this statement on numerous occasions, e.g., Aultman, 46 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 544 N.E.2d 920 ; Alexander, at paragraph two of the syllabus, this exception to the plain- meaning rule is narrow in scope and is necessarily limited by the meaning of the term “manifest absurdity” itself.

2019The Eighth District relied on our statement in Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2003-Ohio-3048 , 789 N.E.2d 1094, at ¶ 34 , that common words in a contract should “be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results * * *.” Although we have repeated this statement on numerous occasions, e.g., Aultman, 46 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 544 N.E.2d 920 ; Alexander, at paragraph two of the syllabus, this exception to the plain- meaning rule is narrow in scope and is necessarily limited by the meaning of the term “manifest absurdity” itself.

2019The Eighth District relied on our statement in Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2003-Ohio-3048 , 789 N.E.2d 1094, at ¶ 34 , that common words in a contract should “be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results * * *.” Although we have repeated this statement on numerous occasions, e.g., Aultman, 46 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 544 N.E.2d 920 ; Alexander, at paragraph two of the syllabus, this exception to the plain- meaning rule is narrow in scope and is necessarily limited by the meaning of the term “manifest absurdity” itself.

2015Blair v. Bd. of Trustees of Sugarcreek Twp., 132 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012- Ohio-2165, 970 N.E.2d 884 , ¶ 19. {¶29} Applying a plain-meaning analysis, ingress is defined as “[a] means or place of entering,” and egress is defined as “[a] path or opening for going out; an exit.” American Heritage Dictionary 901, 571 (4th Ed.2000).

2012Gravillis v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 143 Cal.App.4th 761, 774-775 , 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 (2d Dist. 2006).

2012Gravillis v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 143 Cal.App.4th 761, 774-775 , 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 (2d Dist. 2006).

2007For instance, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry * * * because the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ * * * [Thus] [t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Watt v. Alaska (1981), 451 U.S. 259, 265-266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 .

2007For instance, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry * * * because the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ * * * [Thus] [t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Watt v. Alaska (1981), 451 U.S. 259, 265-266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80 .

1992Local Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 208, 209 , 18 OBR 271, 272, 480 N.E.2d 476, 477 , this court stated that under the plain-meaning rule stipulated in R.C. 1.42, the foregoing statutory provision 1 must be viewed as mandating written notice whenever the board of education chooses not to reemploy administrators.

1992Local Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 208, 209 , 18 OBR 271, 272, 480 N.E.2d 476, 477 , this court stated that under the plain-meaning rule stipulated in R.C. 1.42, the foregoing statutory provision 1 must be viewed as mandating written notice whenever the board of education chooses not to reemploy administrators.

1985Lee, supra, and the plain-meaning rule stipulated in R.C. 1.42, to hold the written notice provision in R.C. 3319.02 to be mandatory.

1984Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly." (Emphasis added.) The majority correctly states, “ ‘[t]he General Assembly will not be presumed to have intended to enact a law producing unreasonable or absurd consequences. * * *’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St. 2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Yet, it is difficult to conceive of any reason for the legislature to have intended for Muny Light to erect poles next to existing CEI poles to serve iden

1984Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly." (Emphasis added.) The majority correctly states, “ ‘[t]he General Assembly will not be presumed to have intended to enact a law producing unreasonable or absurd consequences. * * *’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St. 2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Yet, it is difficult to conceive of any reason for the legislature to have intended for Muny Light to erect poles next to existing CEI poles to serve iden