121 California opinions name it 5 courts 1932–2026 30 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lungren v. Deukmejiangreen2 sentences2020“If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters).” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 ; see People v. Birkett 25. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231 [the plain meaning rule applies to unambiguous statutory language unless it would lead to absurd results].) Defendant states his position thusly: “On its face, the plain language of section 186.22, subdivisions [(b)(4)] [and] (b)(4)(B), indicates t 2018(See, e.g., People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106 , 1112, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 , 5 P.3d 176 ["If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [ ] If, however, the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can look to legislative history in aid of ascertaining legislative intent."].) But as Securitas points out, the plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 4 | 4 | 13 |
Delaney v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800 .) However, this plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a charter provision comports with its purpose, or whether construction of one charter provision is consistent with the charter’s other provisions. 2016(Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 789 P.2d 934 ].) However, this plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a charter provision comports with its purpose, or whether construction of one charter provision is consistent with the charter’s other provisions. | 3 | 4 |
Department of California Highway Patrol v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde 2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde | 3 | 3 |
Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of Californiagreen2 sentences2016This limitation cannot come into operation, however, unless the language at issue is "susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation." ( Ibid .) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then the plain meaning of the language governs." ( Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 575 , 581, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 ; see Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) The majority does not suggest that there is anything ambiguous about the language here under examination. 2016This limitation cannot come into operation, however, unless the language at issue is "susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation." ( Ibid .) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then the plain meaning of the language governs." ( Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 575 , 581, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 ; see Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) The majority does not suggest that there is anything ambiguous about the language here under examination. | 3 | 3 |
California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2019(California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [court lacks power to rewrite statute to make it ““conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed’”].) Here, it is not the defendant’s unsuccessful efforts to cause, induce, or persuade a minor to engage in a commercial sex act that prevents the act from being completed, it is the nonexistence of a minor, a necessary element of each prong. 2017Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1342, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 .) " 'Our first step [in determining the Legislature's intent] is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.' " ( California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627 , 633, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 , 927 P.2d 1175 .) "Where the words of a statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556 , 562, 7 Cal.Rptr | 2 | 4 |
Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Altogreen2 sentences2016(See *436 Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Alto (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1193 , 1203, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 , 310 P.3d 925 [proposed interpretation "would lead to absurd results the Legislature cannot have intended"]; Fireman's Fund Ins. 2016(See *436 Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Alto (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1193 , 1203, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 , 310 P.3d 925 [proposed interpretation "would lead to absurd results the Legislature cannot have intended"]; Fireman's Fund Ins. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2023A court is not required to follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or otherwise lead to absurd results. [Citations.] However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended 2022Cal.App.5th 116, 129 (Switzer); accord, People v. Popular (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 479, 484 .) “However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better.” (Switzer, at p. 129.) “Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not | 2 | 2 |
| United States National Bank v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Estelle v. McGuiregreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Local 21, International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bodell Construction Co. v. Trustees of the California State Universitygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Star Diamond, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, Londongreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Jerry M.green | 2 | 2 |
| Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadenagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| County of Sacramento v. Hickmangreen | 2 | 2 |
| Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundogreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lealgreen2 sentences2016(Ibid., italics omitted.) Also, in People v. Bucchierre (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 153, 166 [ 134 P.2d 505 ], the court held: “The words ‘as in this code provided’ (Penal Code, § 182) refer to the Penal Code.” In a similar vein, the court in People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007-1008 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 94 P.3d 1071 ], applied the plain meaning rule as follows: “The statutory language of the provision defining ‘duress’ in each of the rape statutes is clear and unambiguous. 2016Also, in People v. Bucchierre (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 153, 2 . 166, the court held: “The words ‘as in this code provided’ (Penal Code, § 182) refer to the Penal Code.” In a similar vein, the court in People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007-1008 , applied the plain meaning rule as follows: “The statutory language of the provision defining ‘duress’ in each of the rape statutes is clear and unambiguous. | 1 | 9 |
People v. Bucchierregreen2 sentences2016(Ibid., italics omitted.) Also, in People v. Bucchierre (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 153, 166 [ 134 P.2d 505 ], the court held: “The words ‘as in this code provided’ (Penal Code, § 182) refer to the Penal Code.” In a similar vein, the court in People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007-1008 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 94 P.3d 1071 ], applied the plain meaning rule as follows: “The statutory language of the provision defining ‘duress’ in each of the rape statutes is clear and unambiguous. 2016Also, in People v. Bucchierre (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 153, 2 . 166, the court held: “The words ‘as in this code provided’ (Penal Code, § 182) refer to the Penal Code.” In a similar vein, the court in People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007-1008 , applied the plain meaning rule as follows: “The statutory language of the provision defining ‘duress’ in each of the rape statutes is clear and unambiguous. | 1 | 8 |
Unzueta v. Ocean View School Districtgreen2 sentences2019(In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 ; L.G. v. M.B. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 211, 227 .) Rather, “[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 .) Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule “should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a ‘super-legislature.’ 2009Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘The plain meaning of words in a statute may be disregarded only when that meaning is “ ‘repugnant to the general purview of the act,’ or for some other compelling reason . . . . ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Courts must take a statute as they find it, and if its operation results in inequality or hardship in some cases, the remedy therefor lies with the legislative authority.’ ” (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1697 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ].) We apply the | 1 | 3 |
People v. David S.green2 sentences2026(People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166 .) In construing a statute, our role is to “ ‘divine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.’ ” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503 , 507–508.) “ ‘ “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.” ’ ” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 52 .) We may not add to or alter the words of the statute “to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 2025Courts are not a slave to the plain meaning rule and “ ‘should not give language of a statute its literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences unintended by the Legislature. [Citation.] In that case, the intent of the law prevails over the letter, and the letter, if possible, will be read so as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ ” (James v. State of California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 130 , 138–139, quoting In re David S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1164 .) In short, we cannot endorse a reading of Civil Code section 52.4 that, when applied to an obstetric provider, elimina | 1 | 2 |
People v. Snookgreen2 sentences2023The same care and scrutiny does not befall the committee reports, caucus analyses, authors’ statements, legislative counsel digests and other documents which make up a statute’s ‘legislative history.’ ” ’ ”].) “When looking to the words of the statute, a court gives the language its usual, ordinary meaning. [Citations.] If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citations.]” (People v. Snook, supra, at p. 1215 .) “An exception exists to the plain meaning rule. 2001“The court’s role in construing a statute is to ‘ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citations.] In determining the Legislature’s intent, a court looks first to the words of the statute. [Citation.] ‘[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.’ [Citation.] “When looking to the words of the statute, a court gives the language its usual, ordinary meaning. [Citations.] If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning *682 of the statu | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Roblesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Legislature v. Eugreen | 1 | 2 |
| Souza v. Lauppegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Regents of University of California v. East Bay Municipal Utility Districtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Silver v. Browngreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Anzalonered | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Averygreen | 1 | 2 |
| County of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arias v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bob Jones University v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merced Irrigation District v. Superior Court of Merced Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duty v. Abex Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marchmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeauxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cohn v. County Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Switzer v. Wood
green
2 sentences2025“Under the plain meaning rule, when the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. [Citation.] In that case, ‘no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 128 , quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260 .) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 .) The common and legal definitions of “duty” speak of obligations gener 2025(See California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 .) However, we find no absurdity in the plain meaning of section 27701. “[T]he absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly . . . and only in extreme cases else [courts] violate the separation of powers principle of government.’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 129 .) Absurd means “ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. | 9 | 2019–2025 |
Valencia v. Smyth
green
2 sentences2026(Rodriguez, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117 .) “Under the plain meaning rule, courts give the words of the contract or statute their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 162 .) 2. 2026For example, under the FAA, courts interpret arbitration agreements using the plain meaning rule.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 176 .) “ ‘ “[T]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] … ‘The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.’ ” ’ ” (Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 208 , 219, first bracketed insertion added.) 28. | 5 | 2020–2026 |
Burden v. Snowden
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166 .) In construing a statute, our role is to “ ‘divine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.’ ” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503 , 507–508.) “ ‘ “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.” ’ ” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 52 .) We may not add to or alter the words of the statute “to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 2017Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1342, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 .) " 'Our first step [in determining the Legislature's intent] is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.' " ( California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627 , 633, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 , 927 P.2d 1175 .) "Where the words of a statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556 , 562, 7 Cal.Rptr | 3 | 2017–2026 |
Green v. State
green
2 sentences2025“Under the plain meaning rule, when the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. [Citation.] In that case, ‘no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 128 , quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260 .) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 .) The common and legal definitions of “duty” speak of obligations gener 2025“Under the plain meaning rule, when the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. [Citation.] In that case, ‘no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 128 , quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260 .) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 .) The common and legal definitions of “duty” speak of obligations gener | 3 | 2019–2025 |
Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus
green
2 sentences2024(Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1027 .) The plain meaning rule is subject to exceptions. 2024(Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1027 .) The plain meaning rule is not absolute. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Younger v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde 2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County
green
2 sentences2016This limitation cannot come into operation, however, unless the language at issue is "susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation." ( Ibid .) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then the plain meaning of the language governs." ( Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 575 , 581, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 ; see Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) The majority does not suggest that there is anything ambiguous about the language here under examination. 2016This limitation cannot come into operation, however, unless the language at issue is "susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation." ( Ibid .) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then the plain meaning of the language governs." ( Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 575 , 581, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 ; see Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) The majority does not suggest that there is anything ambiguous about the language here under examination. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Foremost among them is that where statutory language is ambiguous, courts may consult various constructional aids to determine its intended meaning. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094 , 1103, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 155 P.3d 284 .) This is not a true exception to the plain meaning rule, but a limitation implicit in the rule itself: if statutory language is ambiguous, it has no plain meaning and a court has no choice but to go beyond the language in hopes of ascertaining its intended meaning and effect. 2016Foremost among them is that where statutory language is ambiguous, courts may consult various constructional aids to determine its intended meaning. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094 , 1103, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 155 P.3d 284 .) This is not a true exception to the plain meaning rule, but a limitation implicit in the rule itself: if statutory language is ambiguous, it has no plain meaning and a court has no choice but to go beyond the language in hopes of ascertaining its intended meaning and effect. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
May v. City of Milpitas
green
2 sentences2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde 2016The Absurd Consequences Exception A narrower exception to the plain meaning rule permits courts to depart from the meaning of statutory language, even if it is unambiguous, when its literal application would produce " ' " 'absurd consequences.' " ' " ( May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1333, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 726 , 736, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 ["The literal meaning of unambiguous statutory language 'may be disregarde | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026(Rodriguez, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117 .) “Under the plain meaning rule, courts give the words of the contract or statute their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 162 .) 2. 2026(Rodriguez, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117 .) “Under the plain meaning rule, courts give the words of the contract or statute their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 162 .) 25 2. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
California School Employees Ass'n. v. Governing Board of the Marine Community College District
green
2 sentences2025(See California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 .) However, we find no absurdity in the plain meaning of section 27701. “[T]he absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly . . . and only in extreme cases else [courts] violate the separation of powers principle of government.’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 129 .) Absurd means “ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. 2025(See California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 .) However, we find no absurdity in the plain meaning of section 27701. “[T]he absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly . . . and only in extreme cases else [courts] violate the separation of powers principle of government.’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 129 .) Absurd means “ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Young v. Cal. Fish & Game Comm'n
green
2 sentences2025“Under the plain meaning rule, when the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. [Citation.] In that case, ‘no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 128 , quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260 .) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 .) The common and legal definitions of “duty” speak of obligations gener 2025“Under the plain meaning rule, when the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. [Citation.] In that case, ‘no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]’” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 128 , quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260 .) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 .) The common and legal definitions of “duty” speak of obligations gener | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Morse v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, the plain meaning of the waiver of speedy trial language of section 1000.1 is that the defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the probation department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to the commencement of trial.” (Id. at p. 156.) The statute, we concluded, established an affirmative restriction on the timing of a diversion request: the “clear wording of the diversion provisions thus precludes a defendant from initiating diversion proceedings by tendering a consent after commencement of trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 157; see also id. at p. 160.)9 We interpret 2023Accordingly, the plain meaning of the waiver of speedy trial language of section 1000.1 is that the defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the probation department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to the commencement of trial.” (Id. at p. 156.) The statute, we concluded, established an affirmative restriction on the timing of a diversion request: the “clear wording of the diversion provisions thus precludes a defendant from initiating diversion proceedings by tendering a consent after commencement of trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 157; see also id. at p. 160.)9 We interpret | 2 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Frahs
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, the plain meaning of the waiver of speedy trial language of section 1000.1 is that the defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the probation department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to the commencement of trial.” (Id. at p. 156.) The statute, we concluded, established an affirmative restriction on the timing of a diversion request: the “clear wording of the diversion provisions thus precludes a defendant from initiating diversion proceedings by tendering a consent after commencement of trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 157; see also id. at p. 160.)9 We interpret 2023Accordingly, the plain meaning of the waiver of speedy trial language of section 1000.1 is that the defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the probation department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to the commencement of trial.” (Id. at p. 156.) The statute, we concluded, established an affirmative restriction on the timing of a diversion request: the “clear wording of the diversion provisions thus precludes a defendant from initiating diversion proceedings by tendering a consent after commencement of trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 157; see also id. at p. 160.)9 We interpret | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency
green
2 sentences2022In Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 , the Court of Appeal concurred with the Legislature’s view that ‘water service means more than just supplying water,’ based upon the definition of water provided by the Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act, and found that actions necessary to provide water can be funded through fees for water service. 2022In Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 , the Court of Appeal concurred with the Legislature’s view that ‘water service means more than just supplying water,’ based upon the definition of water provided by the Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act, and found that actions necessary to provide water can be funded through fees for water service. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Salinas
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2 sentences2022(City of Salinas, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 1356-1358.) The court of appeal determined the word “sewer” as used in article XIII D was ambiguous and could not be interpreted under the plain meaning rule. 2022(City of Salinas, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 1356-1358.) The court of appeal determined the word “sewer” as used in article XIII D was ambiguous and could not be interpreted under the plain meaning rule. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gomez
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2 sentences2021The Attorney General cites People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 to suggest that courts are amenable to the argument. 2021California courts “do not enjoy the freedom to restrict California’s [evidentiary privileges] based on notions of policy or ad hoc justification.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 209 .) “[W]e have no power to create such exceptions.” (Id. at p. 208.) We are aware of no published opinion where a California appellate court construing an evidentiary privilege has implied the existence of an exception to the privilege by exercising its authority recognized in California School Employees Assn. not to follow the plain meaning of the privilege’s statutory language where d | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.
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2 sentences2021California courts “do not enjoy the freedom to restrict California’s [evidentiary privileges] based on notions of policy or ad hoc justification.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 209 .) “[W]e have no power to create such exceptions.” (Id. at p. 208.) We are aware of no published opinion where a California appellate court construing an evidentiary privilege has implied the existence of an exception to the privilege by exercising its authority recognized in California School Employees Assn. not to follow the plain meaning of the privilege’s statutory language where d 2021California courts “do not enjoy the freedom to restrict California’s [evidentiary privileges] based on notions of policy or ad hoc justification.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 209 .) “[W]e have no power to create such exceptions.” (Id. at p. 208.) We are aware of no published opinion where a California appellate court construing an evidentiary privilege has implied the existence of an exception to the privilege by exercising its authority recognized in California School Employees Assn. not to follow the plain meaning of the privilege’s statutory language where d | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| Romano v. Mercury Insurance green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unif. School Dist. CA4/1 green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Jeanene Harlick v. Blue Shield of California green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Conley green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Derrick B. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. W.B. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Tran green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Jones v. Jacobson green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| James v. St. of CA green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| MRI Healthcare Center of Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Marriage of Nadkarni green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Cobb green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Harrison green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Robinson v. Crescent City Mill & Transportation Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Blackburn green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Estate of Griswold green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Weaver green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.