plain meaning rule in Florida

2014See Greenfield v. Daniels, 51 So.3d 421, 425 (Fla.2010) (“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984))).

1999See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1993); Drury v. Harding, 461 So.2d 104 (Fla.1984); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1983); United Auto.

2017See Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 369 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]e return to the plain meaning of the rule as specifically set forth in the words of the rule as discussed above.”); Chem-rock, 71 So.3d at 792 (“Our plain meaning interpretation of the rule in Wilson remains applicable to the current rule [as amended in 2006]”).

2017See Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 369 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]e return to the plain meaning of the rule as specifically set forth in the words of the rule as discussed above.”); Chemrock, 71 So.3d at 792 (“Our plain meaning interpretation of the rule in Wilson remains applicable to the current rule [as amended in 2006].”).

2024See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982 So. 2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Under the plain meaning rule, ‘may’ denotes a permissive term . . . .”); Progressive Select Ins.

2012See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982 So.2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Under the plain meaning rule, ‘may’ denotes a permissive term; however, if reading ‘may’ as permissive leads to ... [a result] contrary to legislative intent, courts may look to ... the legislature’s intent to determine whether ‘ma/ should be read as a mandatory term.”) (citations omitted); see also Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278 , 1281 (Fla.1992) (“[I]t is settled that the word ‘may1 is not always permissive, but may be a word of mandate in an appropriate context.”); Woodland v. Lindsey, 586 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th

2017Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (quoting Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993)).

2017Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (quoting Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993)).

2017See Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 369 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]e return to the plain meaning of the rule as specifically set forth in the words of the rule as discussed above.”); Chem-rock, 71 So.3d at 792 (“Our plain meaning interpretation of the rule in Wilson remains applicable to the current rule [as amended in 2006]”).

2017See Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 369 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]e return to the plain meaning of the rule as specifically set forth in the words of the rule as discussed above.”); Chemrock, 71 So.3d at 792 (“Our plain meaning interpretation of the rule in Wilson remains applicable to the current rule [as amended in 2006].”).

2005The enumerated categories of permissible nonfinal review stated in rule 9.130 must be limited to their plain meaning. 443 So.2d at 960 ("Petitioner's argument is contrary to the plain meaning of the rule....").

2002The enumerated categories of permissible nonfinal review stated in rule 9.130 must be limited to their plain meaning. 443 So.2d at 960 ("Petitioner's argument is contrary to the plain meaning of the rule....").

1999See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla.1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.

1988See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. 1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.

1999See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla.1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.

1988See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. 1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.

2008In reaching this conclusion, these cases rely on a "plain and ordinary meaning" analysis of the term "in custody." While such an analysis is normally warranted, the use of different terms in different clauses of the same statutory provision—"in custody" in Clause One, and "total confinement" in Clause Two—creates an inherent ambiguity requiring the court to look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "in custody." Further, even if this language could be construed to be unambiguous, the plain meaning analysis should not be used when to do so would clearly defeat the intent of the leg

1981Although we recognize these canons of construction, we believe the principle enunciated in State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981), governs here.

2025Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., 202 So. 3d 391, 396 (Fla. 2016) ("A procedural rule should not be strictly construed to defeat a statute it is designed to implement."); Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 228 (Fla. 2007) ("No confusion exists regarding the plain meaning of the rule's language.

2025Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., 202 So. 3d 391, 396 (Fla. 2016) ("A procedural rule should not be strictly construed to defeat a statute it is designed to implement."); Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 228 (Fla. 2007) ("No confusion exists regarding the plain meaning of the rule's language.

2022See City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008) (holding that if the language we are interpreting is clear, it must be given its plain meaning).

2019Cf. Stelmack v. State, 58 So. 3d 874, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("We do not mean to suggest that the possession of composite images of real children that simulate lewd [or] lascivious exhibition of the children's genitals should not be criminalized." (emphasis added)). 2"[I]t's not intentional.

2017Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (quoting Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993)).

2017Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (quoting Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993)).

2017The plain meaning of the rule requires the court on its own to immediately order a hearing regarding a defendant’s competence, but only if there exists a reasonable ground to believe appellant is not competent. “[T]he trial court has no independent obligation to hold a competency hearing if there is nothing to alert the court that the defendant may lack competency.” Blackmon v. State, 32 So.3d 148, 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

2015See N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC, 135 So.3d 274, 277-78 (Fla.2014) (turning to statutory history “to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory text,” after determining that the plain meaning rule was not dispositive); see also State v. Hackley, 95 So.3d 92, 93 (Fla.2012) (“[I]f the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.”).

2015See N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC, 135 So. 3d 274, 277-78 (Fla. 2014) (turning to statutory history “to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory text,” after determining that the plain meaning rule was not dispositive); see also State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 93 (Fla. 2012) (“[I]f the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.”).

2015See N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC, 135 So.3d 274, 277-78 (Fla.2014) (turning to statutory history “to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory text,” after determining that the plain meaning rule was not dispositive); see also State v. Hackley, 95 So.3d 92, 93 (Fla.2012) (“[I]f the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.”).

2015See N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC, 135 So. 3d 274, 277-78 (Fla. 2014) (turning to statutory history “to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory text,” after determining that the plain meaning rule was not dispositive); see also State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 93 (Fla. 2012) (“[I]f the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.”).

2014See Greenfield v. Daniels, 51 So.3d 421, 425 (Fla.2010) (“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984))).

2013Without even mentioning the plain meaning rule, this Court in Florida Sheriffs stated to the contrary that “to best understand the intent of the legislature,” it was necessary to fully discuss the “considerable Florida case law which established basic legal guidelines for governmental retirement systems in the state” that existed “[pjrior to the statutory enactment of the preservation of rights provision in 1974.” 408 So.2d at 1035 .

2013After improperly considering that case law, the Court in Florida Sheriffs held that the preservation of rights statute “vests all rights and benefits already earned under the present retirement plan so that the legislature may now only alter retirement benefits prospectively,” and that the statute “was not intended to bind future legislatures from prospectively altering benefits which accrue for future state service.” Id. at 1037 (emphasis in original).

2013See City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So.2d 192, 193 (Fla.1993) (a statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must be given effect unless it leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous result).

2012See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982 So.2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Under the plain meaning rule, ‘may’ denotes a permissive term; however, if reading ‘may’ as permissive leads to ... [a result] contrary to legislative intent, courts may look to ... the legislature’s intent to determine whether ‘ma/ should be read as a mandatory term.”) (citations omitted); see also Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278 , 1281 (Fla.1992) (“[I]t is settled that the word ‘may1 is not always permissive, but may be a word of mandate in an appropriate context.”); Woodland v. Lindsey, 586 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th

2012See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982 So.2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Under the plain meaning rule, ‘may’ denotes a permissive term; however, if reading ‘may’ as permissive leads to ... [a result] contrary to legislative intent, courts may look to ... the legislature’s intent to determine whether ‘ma/ should be read as a mandatory term.”) (citations omitted); see also Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278 , 1281 (Fla.1992) (“[I]t is settled that the word ‘may1 is not always permissive, but may be a word of mandate in an appropriate context.”); Woodland v. Lindsey, 586 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th

2008See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Sidky, M.D., 936 So.2d 715, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Comcoa v. Coe, 587 So.2d 474, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Allied Fidelity Ins.