plain meaning rule in New York

1999Viewed as a whole, the court’s charge properly instructed the jury on the permissive nature of the presumption, and emphasized that the burden of proving every element of the crimes charged, including intent, remained with the prosecution (see, People v Hodja, 216 AD2d 415 , lv denied 86 NY2d 796 ).

1999Viewed as a whole, the court’s charge properly instructed the jury on the permissive nature of the presumption, and emphasized that the burden of proving every element of the crimes charged, including intent, remained with the prosecution (see, People v Hodja, 216 AD2d 415 , lv denied 86 NY2d 796 ).

1999Since the plain meaning of the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (4) renders the presumption applicable to felony gun possession charges, the court properly instructed the jury thereon (see, People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d 695 ; People v Williams, 235 AD2d 267 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 ).

1999Since the plain meaning of the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (4) renders the presumption applicable to felony gun possession charges, the court properly instructed the jury thereon (see, People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d 695 ; People v Williams, 235 AD2d 267 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 ).

1999Since the plain meaning of the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (4) renders the presumption applicable to felony gun possession charges, the court properly instructed the jury thereon (see, People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d 695 ; People v Williams, 235 AD2d 267 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 ).

1999Since the plain meaning of the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (4) renders the presumption applicable to felony gun possession charges, the court properly instructed the jury thereon (see, People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d 695 ; People v Williams, 235 AD2d 267 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 ).

2006We note, however, that while no “particular litany” is required (People v Callahan, supra at 283 ), it is preferable for the sentencing court to ascertain on the record that defendant had discussed the appeal waiver with counsel, or for the court to provide defendant with an opportunity to ask questions or an explanation of the plain meaning of a waiver of appeal, and to explicitly ask the defendant if he or she agreed to waive his or her appeal rights (see People v Phillips, 28 AD3d 939, 939 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 761 [2006]; People v Evans, 27 AD3d 905, 905-906 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 847

2006We note, however, that while no “particular litany” is required (People v Callahan, supra at 283 ), it is preferable for the sentencing court to ascertain on the record that defendant had discussed the appeal waiver with counsel, or for the court to provide defendant with an opportunity to ask questions or an explanation of the plain meaning of a waiver of appeal, and to explicitly ask the defendant if he or she agreed to waive his or her appeal rights (see People v Phillips, 28 AD3d 939, 939 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 761 [2006]; People v Evans, 27 AD3d 905, 905-906 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 847

2006Indeed, “Because only a few reviewable issues survive a valid appeal waiver, it is all the more important for trial courts to ensure that defendants understand what they are surrendering when they waive the right to appeal” (People v Lopez, supra at 256 ).

1999Indeed, in its most recent major preemption case, Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr ( 518 US 470 ), the Court expressly rejected exclusive reliance on a plain meaning approach.

1999Indeed, in its most recent major preemption case, Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr ( 518 US 470 ), the Court expressly rejected exclusive reliance on a plain meaning approach.

1998Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98, 106-107 [1997], citing Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 , 208; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669 [1988].) The highest Court of our State has long applied and consistently used the plain meaning doctrine in fulfilling its judicial role in deciding statutory construction that it reviews.

1997In my view, applying the plain meaning doctrine here as a basis for rejecting the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Stafford v International Harvester Co. ( 668 F.2d 142 ) is problematical ( see , majority opn, at 186).

1997Although, to be sure, our Court has employed plain-meaning arguments in the past ( see, e.g. , Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v City of New York , 41 N.Y.2d 205 , 208; *108 Bender v Jamaica Hosp. , 40 N.Y.2d 560, 561-562 ), our prevailing view has been, wisely, that the overarching duty of the courts in statutory interpretation is always to ascertain the legislative intent through examination of all available legitimate sources.

1997Although, to be sure, our Court has employed plain-meaning arguments in the past {see, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn, v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 , 208; Bender v Jamaica Hosp., 40 NY2d 560, 561-562 ), our prevailing view has been, wisely, that the overarching duty of the courts in statutory interpretation is always to ascertain the legislative intent through examination of all available legitimate sources.

1993Corp., 46 AD2d 861 .) Such provisions, however, will not be enforced to impose a restriction on the subrogee’s rights beyond the plain meaning of the waiver clause.

1988Without directly addressing the question whether the statute requires released parties to be named or specifically identified, the District Judge in Sellon considered the effect of language discharging third-party defendant and her "agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships." As the opinion indicates, Delaware courts may be reluctant to apply the plain meaning rule to exclude evidence of intent when someone who was not a party to a release seeks the benefit of its general language, but only if the lan

1988This ambiguity, "which might otherwise appear slight," may justify admission of extrinsic evidence. ( Sellon v General Motors Corp. , 521 F Supp, at 984 , supra .) From the statute and cases, we conclude that Delaware neither requires absolute specificity nor deems every general, nonspecific release inherently ambiguous.

1988(Zeevi & Sons v Grindlays Bank, 37 NY2d 220, 225 , cert denied 423 US 866 .) Moreover, even if the special Customs invoice requirement did contain ambiguity and the plain meaning doctrine were inapplicable, in accordance with well-settled principles, the phrase at issue would have to be construed against the drafter.

1988(Zeevi & Sons v Grindlays Bank, 37 NY2d 220, 225 , cert denied 423 US 866 .) Moreover, even if the special Customs invoice requirement did contain ambiguity and the plain meaning doctrine were inapplicable, in accordance with well-settled principles, the phrase at issue would have to be construed against the drafter.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1987(See, e.g., McCluskey v Cromwell, 11 NY 593, 601-602 ; Meltzer v Koenigsberg, 302 NY 523, 525 ; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 ; Matter of Barton v Lavine, 38 NY2d 785, 787 ; Matter of Shea v Falk, 10 AD2d 142 , affd 8 NY2d 1071 .) Its salutary purpose is, of course, to prevent courts from prohibitively intruding upon the legislative function.

1977Co., 46 AD2d 242 ).