16 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1982–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
People v. Rathgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
State v. Eilergreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hopkinsgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
State v. Big Crowgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Henry Harold Parker, United States of America v. David Joe Greengreen2 sentences2026We stress, however, that plan evidence should show that the crime being charged and the other acts are part of the same grand design by the defendant.”); United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884, 890 (10th Cir. 1972) (“If the defendants hired or caused the two [J-8A-C-2025] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 28 felons to make the forbidden bombs and molotov cocktails–(as the jury found by its verdict)–evidence of their having caused other forbidden destructive devices to be made, without registering or paying the required taxes, and the use of them to ‘burn down’ or ‘blow up’ other buildings of defendants’ co 2026We stress, however, that plan evidence should show that the crime being charged and the other acts are part of the same grand design by the defendant.”); United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884, 890 (10th Cir. 1972) (“If the defendants hired or caused the two [J-8A-C-2025] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 28 felons to make the forbidden bombs and molotov cocktails–(as the jury found by its verdict)–evidence of their having caused other forbidden destructive devices to be made, without registering or paying the required taxes, and the use of them to ‘burn down’ or ‘blow up’ other buildings of defendants’ co | 3 | 3 |
State v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Kinggreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
People v. Sabingreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
State v. McClellangreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 2026See, e.g., State v. Big Crow, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 2009) (“In interpreting the ‘plan’ exception in the statute, this Court has followed those authorities allowing other acts not only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, design or scheme to sexually abuse different victims.” (emphasis original)); State v. McClellan, 323 S.E.2d 772, 774 (S.C. 1984) (concluding that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of | 3 | 3 |
Steuart v. McChesneygreen2 sentences2010The Supreme Court summarized the plain meaning rule as follows: “[T]he rationale for interpreting contractual terms in accord with the plain meaning of the language expressed is multifarious, resting in part upon what is viewed as the appropriate role of the courts in the interpretive process: ‘ [T]his court long ago emphasized that “[t]he parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this court to re-write it, or to give it a construction in conflict with . . . the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.” ’” Steuart, 498 Pa. at 50 , 444 A.2d at 66 2010The Supreme Court summarized the plain meaning rule as follows: “[T]he rationale for interpreting contractual terms in accord with the plain meaning of the language expressed is multifarious, resting in part upon what is viewed as the appropriate role of the courts in the interpretive process: ‘ [T]his court long ago emphasized that “[t]he parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this court to re-write it, or to give it a construction in conflict with . . . the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.” ’” Steuart, 498 Pa. at 50 , 444 A.2d at 66 | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Mummagreen2 sentences1986To read the aforementioned sections of the Code and the Charter Law otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which provides that statutes should be read according to the plain meaning of their words. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) (Supp.1986); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 328 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mumma, 489 Pa. 547 , 414 A.2d 1026 (1980). 1986To read the aforementioned sections of the Code and the Charter Law otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which provides that statutes should be read according to the plain meaning of their words. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) (Supp.1986); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 328 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mumma, 489 Pa. 547 , 414 A.2d 1026 (1980). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Shifflergreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189-90 (Pa. 2005) (“Notwithstanding the primacy of the plain meaning doctrine as best representative of legislative intent, the rules of construction offer several important qualifying precepts. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen1 sentence2024See Jones, 772 A.2d at 443 (“[T]he key to [Section] 8522(b)(4) [of the Sovereign Immunity Act]’s meaning lies in the polestar of legislative intent, the plain meaning of the exception’s “dangerous condition of” language. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921.”). 13 Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10. | 1 | 1 |
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2009See Madison Construction, 735 A.2d at 106 , citing Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45 , 444 A.2d 659, 663 (1982) (discussing the importance of adhering to the plain meaning rule of contract interpretation). | 1 | 1 |
Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995Boston Sand and Gravel Co v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 [ 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 ] (1928) (Holmes, J.). 1995Boston Sand and Gravel Co v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 [ 49 S.Ct. 52, 54 , 73 L.Ed. 170 ] (1928) (Holmes, J.). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Florida Bar v. Sperrygreen1 sentence1993See e.g., The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (1962), The Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So.2d 1132 (1981), and The Florida Bar v. Lucille E. | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Kaisergreen1 sentence1993See e.g., The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (1962), The Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So.2d 1132 (1981), and The Florida Bar v. Lucille E. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Munoz, F. v. The Children's Hospital
green
1 sentence2024This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s reasoning. “[A]fter giving [A]ppellant the benefit of all reasonable inferences of fact, [this Court] find[s] that the fact[-]finder could not reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the cause of action were established.” Munoz, 265 A.3d at 806 (quoting Rolon, 232 A.3d at 776 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rolon, F. v. Davies, T.
green
1 sentence2024This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s reasoning. “[A]fter giving [A]ppellant the benefit of all reasonable inferences of fact, [this Court] find[s] that the fact[-]finder could not reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the cause of action were established.” Munoz, 265 A.3d at 806 (quoting Rolon, 232 A.3d at 776 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hagarty v. Wm. Akers, Jr., Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2010The Supreme Court summarized the plain meaning rule as follows: “[T]he rationale for interpreting contractual terms in accord with the plain meaning of the language expressed is multifarious, resting in part upon what is viewed as the appropriate role of the courts in the interpretive process: ‘ [T]his court long ago emphasized that “[t]he parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this court to re-write it, or to give it a construction in conflict with . . . the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.” ’” Steuart, 498 Pa. at 50 , 444 A.2d at 66 2010The Supreme Court summarized the plain meaning rule as follows: “[T]he rationale for interpreting contractual terms in accord with the plain meaning of the language expressed is multifarious, resting in part upon what is viewed as the appropriate role of the courts in the interpretive process: ‘ [T]his court long ago emphasized that “[t]he parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this court to re-write it, or to give it a construction in conflict with . . . the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.” ’” Steuart, 498 Pa. at 50 , 444 A.2d at 66 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2009In case of any confusion concerning the plain meaning of the rule, the drafters included a note clarifying that “[wjhile the prothonotary may enter a default judgment in an action legal or equitable, only the court may grant equitable relief.” Id., note (emphasis added). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wynnewood Development, Inc. v. Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2003Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). ¶ 17 Recently, our Supreme Court explained the plain meaning of this rule in Wynnewood Development, Inc. v. Bank and Trust Co. of Old York Road, 551 Pa. 552 , 711 A.2d 1003 (1998). 2003Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). ¶ 17 Recently, our Supreme Court explained the plain meaning of this rule in Wynnewood Development, Inc. v. Bank and Trust Co. of Old York Road, 551 Pa. 552 , 711 A.2d 1003 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Snyder v. Queen Cutlery Co.
green
1 sentence1994Snyder, supra at 460-61 , 516 A.2d at 74 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Stanley
green
2 sentences1986To read the aforementioned sections of the Code and the Charter Law otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which provides that statutes should be read according to the plain meaning of their words. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) (Supp.1986); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 328 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mumma, 489 Pa. 547 , 414 A.2d 1026 (1980). 1986To read the aforementioned sections of the Code and the Charter Law otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which provides that statutes should be read according to the plain meaning of their words. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) (Supp.1986); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 328 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mumma, 489 Pa. 547 , 414 A.2d 1026 (1980). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fidler v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
green
2 sentences1986In Fidler v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 260 , 182 A.2d 692 (1962), we had occasion to discuss the definition of agriculture. 1986In Fidler v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 260 , 182 A.2d 692 (1962), we had occasion to discuss the definition of agriculture. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.