plain meaning rule in Utah

2013Dist., 1999 UT App 136, ¶ 11 , 979 P.2d 363 (noting that “as unincorporated associations such as social clubs, religious organizations, environmental societies, athletic organizations, condominium owners, lodges, stock exchanges and veterans began to proliferate, courts recognize[d] that . . . [s]uch groups must . . . [face] liability to suit.” (first alteration in original)(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 WEBER CO. v. OGDEN TRECE Opinion of the Court to pay for lawyers, to support families, and to pay for other general expenses. ¶38 This evidence satisfies the requir

2013Dist., 1999 UT App 136, ¶ 11 , 979 P.2d 363 (noting that “as unincorporated associations such as social clubs, religious organizations, environmental societies, athletic organizations, condominium owners, lodges, stock exchanges and veterans began to proliferate, courts recognize[d] that . . . [s]uch groups must . . . [face] liability to suit.” (first alteration in original)(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 WEBER CO. v. OGDEN TRECE Opinion of the Court to pay for lawyers, to support families, and to pay for other general expenses. ¶38 This evidence satisfies the requir

2012"In conducting this plain meaning analysis, '[wle read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters'" Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 17 , 66 P.3d 592 ); see also Iverson v. State Form Mut.

2012"In conducting this plain meaning analysis, '[wle read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters'" Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 17 , 66 P.3d 592 ); see also Iverson v. State Form Mut.

2012“In conducting this plain meaning analysis, ‘[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.’” Li v. Enterprise Rent‐A‐Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17 , 66 P.3d 592 ); see also Iverson v. State Farm Mut.

2012"In conducting this plain meaning analysis, '[wle read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters'" Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 17 , 66 P.3d 592 ); see also Iverson v. State Form Mut.

2007The absurd results canon of statutory construction recognizes that although "the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said." FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 , 102 S.Ct. 2054 , 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ¶ 12 In defining the parameters of what constitutes an absurd result, we note the inherent tension in this canon of construction between refraining from blind obedience to the letter of th

2007The absurd results canon of statutory construction recognizes that although "the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said." FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 , 102 S.Ct. 2054 , 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ¶ 12 In defining the parameters of what constitutes an absurd result, we note the inherent tension in this canon of construction between refraining from blind obedience to the letter of th

2024And that is what Paternal Grandmother contends here—that 20230120-CA 8 2024 UT App 149 In re adoption of R.P. applying the plain meaning of the Intervention Provision leads to an absurd and unsupportable result. 3 ¶14 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine and read a statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28 .

2020In criminal cases, however, “we do not strictly adhere to the plain meaning rule” to interpret 20180024-CA, 20180250-CA 11 2020 UT App 84 State v. Harper a plea agreement; rather, “courts are particularly willing to identify ambiguities in plea agreements because of the significant constitutional rights the defendant waives by entering a guilty plea.” See State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT App 229, ¶ 27 , 336 P.3d 594 (quotation simplified). ¶25 If the plain language of a contract is unambiguous, it may be interpreted as a matter of law by the court, without resort to extrinsic evidence as to its mean

2020In criminal cases, however, “we do not strictly adhere to the plain meaning rule” to interpret 20180024-CA, 20180250-CA 11 2020 UT App 84 State v. Harper a plea agreement; rather, “courts are particularly willing to identify ambiguities in plea agreements because of the significant constitutional rights the defendant waives by entering a guilty plea.” See State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT App 229, ¶ 27 , 336 P.3d 594 (quotation simplified). ¶25 If the plain language of a contract is unambiguous, it may be interpreted as a matter of law by the court, without resort to extrinsic evidence as to its mean

2020In criminal cases, however, “we do not strictly adhere to the plain meaning rule” to interpret 20180024-CA, 20180250-CA 11 2020 UT App 84 State v. Harper a plea agreement; rather, “courts are particularly willing to identify ambiguities in plea agreements because of the significant constitutional rights the defendant waives by entering a guilty plea.” See State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT App 229, ¶ 27 , 336 P.3d 594 (quotation simplified). ¶25 If the plain language of a contract is unambiguous, it may be interpreted as a matter of law by the court, without resort to extrinsic evidence as to its mean

2015We interpret statutes according to the plain meaning of their test-the meaning the words "would have to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the language in question." Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9 , 248 P.3d 465 .

2015We interpret statutes according to the plain meaning of their test-the meaning the words "would have to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the language in question." Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9 , 248 P.3d 465 .

2012"In conducting this plain meaning analysis, '[wle read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters'" Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 17 , 66 P.3d 592 ); see also Iverson v. State Form Mut.

2011So I acknowledge that the legislature could have said "mineral deposits, including oil and gas." But it also might have said "mines, quarries, coal mines, or solid ore deposits." It said neither, and it helps us not at all to imagine an easier case in which the legislature spoke more clearly. [22] See also Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18 , 104 P.3d 1242 ("An equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is `unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant

2011So I acknowledge that the legislature could have said "mineral deposits, including oil and gas." But it also might have said "mines, quarries, coal mines, or solid ore deposits." It said neither, and it helps us not at all to imagine an easier case in which the legislature spoke more clearly. [22] See also Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18 , 104 P.3d 1242 ("An equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is `unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant

2011In other words, we interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences."); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 , 1045 n. 39 (Utah 1991) ("When dealing with unclear statutes, this court renders interpretations that will avoid absurd consequences." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2009State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 10 , 203 P.3d 1000 .

2009State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 10 , 203 P.3d 1000 .

2005State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ¶ 24 , 84 P.3d 841 .

2005State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ¶ 24 , 84 P.3d 841 .

1997The court reasoned that if “the provision of the rule under consideration is unambiguous, we must apply the plain meaning rule of statutory construction and construe the rule as written.” Id.

1990Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); Utah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061 .