92 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2025 28 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Courchesnegreen2 sentences2009The majority opinion in Miller is of limited precedential value in this context because it was released after this court discarded the plain meaning rule in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78 , 816 A.2d 562 (2003), but before the legislature responded to Courchesne by passing § 1-2z. 2009The majority opinion in Miller is of limited precedential value in this context because it was released after this court discarded the plain meaning rule in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78 , 816 A.2d 562 (2003), but before the legislature responded to Courchesne by passing § 1-2z. | 18 | 29 |
Hummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd.green2 sentences2017See Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd. , 282 Conn. 477 , 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (rejecting claim that legislature "intended to overrule every ... case in which our courts, prior to the passage of § 1-2z, had interpreted a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning rule"). 9 Rather, the ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to this court's interpretations of statutory provisions that predate the enactment of § 1-2z. 2017See Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd. , 282 Conn. 477 , 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (rejecting claim that legislature "intended to overrule every ... case in which our courts, prior to the passage of § 1-2z, had interpreted a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning rule"). 9 Rather, the ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to this court's interpretations of statutory provisions that predate the enactment of § 1-2z. | 5 | 9 |
Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z. 2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z. | 3 | 3 |
Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381 , 400–401, 941 A.2d 868 (2008) (‘With respect to the construction and applica- tion of federal statutes, principles of comity and consis- tency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. . . . 2021See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381 , 400–401, 941 A.2d 868 (2008) (‘With respect to the construction and applica- tion of federal statutes, principles of comity and consis- tency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. . . . | 2 | 4 |
Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway Associates, LLCgreen2 sentences2025See Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway Associates, LLC, 340 Conn. 115, 126 , 263 A.3d 87 (2021). ‘‘In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . 2022See, e.g., Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway Associates, LLC, 340 Conn. 115, 126 , 263 A.3d 87 (2021). | 2 | 2 |
Springfield Hosp., Inc., Springfield Med. Care Sys., Inc. v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 422 (2d Cir. 2022). 2023See, e.g., Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 , 422 (2d Cir. 2022). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 776751green2 sentences2005In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir.2002). 2003Under the plain meaning rule, “[legislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied upon only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2002). | 2 | 2 |
Conway v. Town of Wiltongreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 664-65 , 680 A.2d 242 (1996); State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744-45 , 613 A.2d 804 (1992). 2003See, e.g., Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 664-65 , 680 A.2d 242 (1996); State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744-45 , 613 A.2d 804 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.green2 sentences2022This court fol- lows ‘‘the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Stat- utes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 696 , 258 A.3d 1268 (2021). 2022See, e.g., Boisvert v. Gavis, 332 Conn. 115, 141 , 210 A.3d 1 (2019). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 696 , 258 A.3d 1268 (2021). | 1 | 3 |
LaFrance v. Lodmellgreen2 sentences2022The resolution of whether § 52-572h (o) allows for apportionment as to the plaintiff’s claims under § 52- 557n (b) (8) presents an issue of statutory construction. ‘‘In conducting this analysis, we are guided by the well established principle that [i]ssues of statutory construc- tion raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828 , 833–34, 144 A.3d 373 (2016). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule in General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the app 2022The resolution of whether § 52-572h (o) allows for apportionment as to the plaintiff’s claims under § 52- 557n (b) (8) presents an issue of statutory construction. ‘‘In conducting this analysis, we are guided by the well established principle that [i]ssues of statutory construc- tion raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828 , 833–34, 144 A.3d 373 (2016). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule in General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the app | 1 | 2 |
Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valenciagreen2 sentences2025See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valen- cia, 145 Conn. App. 682, 687 , 76 A.3d 694 (2013); see also Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta, 161 Conn. App. 668 , 673, 129 A.3d 730 (2015); Athena Holdings, LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470 , 475, 125 A.3d 290 , cert. denied, 320 Conn. 908 , 128 A.3d 952 (2015).7 We follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Stat- utes § 1-2z when construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. 2025See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valen- cia, 145 Conn. App. 682, 687 , 76 A.3d 694 (2013); see also Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta, 161 Conn. App. 668 , 673, 129 A.3d 730 (2015); Athena Holdings, LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470 , 475, 125 A.3d 290 , cert. denied, 320 Conn. 908 , 128 A.3d 952 (2015).7 We follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Stat- utes § 1-2z when construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Rader v. Valeri, 223 Conn. App. 243 , 257, 308 A.3d 66 (construc- tion of court’s judgment is question of law subject to plenary review), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 959 , 312 A.3d 37 (2024); see also Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 343 Conn. 31 , 41–42, 272 A.3d 150 (2022) (statutory construction raises question of law subject to plenary review). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Wi | 1 | 1 |
Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ.green2 sentences2025We begin with the text of § 14-63-36c of the regula- tions,8 which provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a licensed wrecker service shall not charge the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, having a [gross vehicle weight rating] of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or more, for nonconsensual towing or transporting services . . . any fees in excess of the fees computed on the basis of the hourly rate published by the commissioner.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 14-63-36c (b); see also id., § 14- 63-36b (5) (defining ‘‘hourly rate’’ as ‘ 2025We begin with the text of § 14-63-36c of the regula- tions,8 which provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a licensed wrecker service shall not charge the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, having a [gross vehicle weight rating] of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or more, for nonconsensual towing or transporting services . . . any fees in excess of the fees computed on the basis of the hourly rate published by the commissioner.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 14-63-36c (b); see also id., § 14- 63-36b (5) (defining ‘‘hourly rate’’ as ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Rader v. Valerigreen1 sentence2025See Rader v. Valeri, 223 Conn. App. 243 , 257, 308 A.3d 66 (construc- tion of court’s judgment is question of law subject to plenary review), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 959 , 312 A.3d 37 (2024); see also Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 343 Conn. 31 , 41–42, 272 A.3d 150 (2022) (statutory construction raises question of law subject to plenary review). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Wi | 1 | 1 |
777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commissiongreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., 777 Residen- tial, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission, 336 Conn. 819 , 827–28, 251 A.3d 56 (2020). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23 0 Conn. 483 ,0 25 Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. plaintiff’s request to consider a foreclosure by sale, inquire into the actual intent of the Appellate Court as revealed in its decision as a whole, including the facts and procedural history of the case, the nature of the claims made by the plaintiff on appeal and whether there was any evidence that the Appellate Court intended that the trial court should deviate from stan- dard operating pr | 1 | 1 |
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLCgreen2 sentences2024If the meaning of the text is not plain, however, we must look to the statute as a whole and construct an interpretation that comports with its pri- mary purpose and does not lead to anomalous or unrea- sonable results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Highland Street Associates v. Commissioner of Trans- portation, 213 Conn. App. 426 , 432, 278 A.3d 30 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 917 , 284 A.3d 628 (2022); see also Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC, 331 Conn. 53 , 117–18, 202 A.3d 262 , cert. denied sub nom. 2024If the meaning of the text is not plain, however, we must look to the statute as a whole and construct an interpretation that comports with its pri- mary purpose and does not lead to anomalous or unrea- sonable results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Highland Street Associates v. Commissioner of Trans- portation, 213 Conn. App. 426 , 432, 278 A.3d 30 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 917 , 284 A.3d 628 (2022); see also Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC, 331 Conn. 53 , 117–18, 202 A.3d 262 , cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Egangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Pamela Lawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Panekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boisvert v. Gavisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Callaghan v. Car Parts Int'l, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re NBgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Charles R. Dauraygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Lawrence Petersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mayfield v. GOSHEN VOLUNTEER FIRE CO., INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Department of Public Utility Controlgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Veilleux v. Complete Interior Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Lawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Orrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Picco v. Town of Voluntowngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. Froweingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule in General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes ‘‘to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45 , 213 A.3d 1110 (2019); see, e.g., id., 45–46 (setting forth plain meaning rule). 2021It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in construing stat- utes ‘‘to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45 , 213 A.3d 1110 (2019); see id., 45–46 (setting forth plain meaning rule). | 5 | 2021–2022 |
Szewczyk v. Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences2019Thus, our interpretive process will begin by inquiring whether the plain language of [each] statute, when given its ordinary, common meaning . . . is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services, 275 Conn. 464, 476 , 881 A.2d 259 (2005). ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629, 634 , 148 A.3d 1052 (2016); see also, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 105 (2d 2019Thus, our interpretive process will begin by inquiring whether the plain language of [each] statute, when given its ordinary, common meaning . . . is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services, 275 Conn. 464, 476 , 881 A.2d 259 (2005). ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629, 634 , 148 A.3d 1052 (2016); see also, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 105 (2d | 4 | 2006–2019 |
Secured Environmental Management, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). ‘‘Under the [federal] plain meaning rule, [l]egislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied [on] only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Web- ster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 555 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S. Ct. 1 2005With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, "principles of comity and consistency" require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes "because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." [10] Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 554-55 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003) (construing federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004). | 3 | 2005–2019 |
Jones v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). ‘‘Under the [federal] plain meaning rule, [l]egislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied [on] only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Web- ster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 555 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S. Ct. 1 2005With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, "principles of comity and consistency" require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes "because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." [10] Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 554-55 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003) (construing federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004). | 3 | 2005–2019 |
Kang v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). ‘‘Under the [federal] plain meaning rule, [l]egislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied [on] only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Web- ster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 555 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S. Ct. 1 2005With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, "principles of comity and consistency" require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes "because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." [10] Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 554-55 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003) (construing federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004). | 3 | 2005–2019 |
Webster Bank v. Oakley
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). ‘‘Under the [federal] plain meaning rule, [l]egislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied [on] only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Web- ster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 555 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S. Ct. 1 2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). ‘‘Under the [federal] plain meaning rule, [l]egislative history and other tools of interpretation may be relied [on] only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Web- ster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 555 , 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S. Ct. 1 | 3 | 2005–2019 |
CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc. , 327 Conn. 114 , 140, 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). 2019With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc. , 327 Conn. 114 , 140, 172 A.3d 1228 (2017). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, we first ‘‘consider the text of the . . . [rule] itself and its relationship to other . . . [rules].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mead- owbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594 , 181 A.3d 550 (2018). 2025Accordingly, we first ‘‘consider the text of the . . . [rule] itself and its relationship to other . . . [rules].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mead- owbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594 , 181 A.3d 550 (2018). | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept.
green
2 sentences2024We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar- ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta- tion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cough- Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Esposito v. Stamford lin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857 , 862–63, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020). ‘‘In addition, we are mindful of the proposition that all workers’ compensation legislation, becaus 2024We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar- ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta- tion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cough- lin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857 , 862–63, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020). ‘‘In addition, we are mindful of the proposition that all workers’ compensation legislation, because of its remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor of disable | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept.
green
2 sentences2024We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar- ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta- tion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cough- Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Esposito v. Stamford lin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857 , 862–63, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020). ‘‘In addition, we are mindful of the proposition that all workers’ compensation legislation, becaus 2024We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar- ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta- tion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cough- lin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857 , 862–63, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020). ‘‘In addition, we are mindful of the proposition that all workers’ compensation legislation, because of its remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor of disable | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Peters
green
2 sentences2021Second, the petitioner argues that any potential claim of actual innocence ‘‘should have been sufficient to delay or overcome the good cause stage.’’ According to the petitioner, because of the representation of his counsel that it was possible that she would pursue an actual innocence claim in an amended petition in the future, the court was obligated to delay the timing of the hearing and to afford counsel ‘‘sufficient time to determine whether they have a good faith basis to pres- ent such a weapon to survive possible dismissal.’’9 This argument presents an issue of statutory interpre- tati 2021Second, the petitioner argues that any potential claim of actual innocence ‘‘should have been sufficient to delay or overcome the good cause stage.’’ According to the petitioner, because of the representation of his counsel that it was possible that she would pursue an actual innocence claim in an amended petition in the future, the court was obligated to delay the timing of the hearing and to afford counsel ‘‘sufficient time to determine whether they have a good faith basis to pres- ent such a weapon to survive possible dismissal.’’9 This argument presents an issue of statutory interpre- tati | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
green
2 sentences2008“With respect *401 to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 571 , 887 A.2d 848 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 , 127 S. Ct. 347 , 166 L. 2008“With respect *401 to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 571 , 887 A.2d 848 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 , 127 S. Ct. 347 , 166 L. | 2 | 2008–2014 |
French v. Liebmann
green
2 sentences2014Dark- Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 571 , 887 A.2d 848 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 , 127 S. Ct. 347 , 166 L. 2008“With respect *401 to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 571 , 887 A.2d 848 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 , 127 S. Ct. 347 , 166 L. | 2 | 2008–2014 |
Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp.
green
2 sentences2011Rather, I look for interpretive guidance to "the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7 , 882 A.2d 597 (2005). 2011Rather, I look for interpretive guidance to "the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7 , 882 A.2d 597 (2005). | 2 | 2010–2011 |
| Hayes v. Smith green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Highland Street Associates v. Commissioner of Transportation neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Omar neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Bischoff green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Agron green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Mayer v. Historic Dist. Comm'n of Groton green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Oakley v. Commission On Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Oakley v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Spilke v. Spilke green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Red 11, LLC v. Conservation Commission of Town of Fairfield green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Opotzner v. Bass green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Fields v. Housing Authority neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Fields v. Housing Authority of Stamford neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Red 11, LLC v. Conservation Commission green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Department of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Olivieri v. City of Bridgeport green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Denby green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Player green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.