plain meaning rule in Arizona

2025Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992)) (citation modified). ¶21 In Arizona, the statutory definition of a “residential structure” is “any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or temporary, that is adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.” § 13-1501(11).

2025Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992)).

2018“When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends.” State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145 , 147, ¶ 7 (2017) (citing Stambaugh, 242 Ariz. at 509, 511, ¶¶ 7, 17 ).

2018“When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends.” State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145 , 147, ¶ 7 (2017) (citing Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017)). ¶13 Before terminating a parent’s parental rights, the juvenile court must find at least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence, A.R.S. §§ 8-533, -537(B), and find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in a child’s best interests, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 5 After the filing of a timely notice of appeal, and “for good cause,” this court may suspend the appeal and re

2003Co., 180 Ariz. 342, 347 , 884 P.2d 228, 233 (App.1994). *550 ¶ 6 In this context, we are unable to discern a plain meaning of the rule and statute read in conjunction because it is not clear whether the four-month prison term mandated by § 28-1383(D) is a “sentence of imprisonment” for purposes of Rule 7.2(b)(1). 2 As noted above, the statute requires a prison term even when a person is granted probation.

2003Co., 180 Ariz. 342, 347 , 884 P.2d 228, 233 (App.1994). *550 ¶ 6 In this context, we are unable to discern a plain meaning of the rule and statute read in conjunction because it is not clear whether the four-month prison term mandated by § 28-1383(D) is a “sentence of imprisonment” for purposes of Rule 7.2(b)(1). 2 As noted above, the statute requires a prison term even when a person is granted probation.

2020See State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145 , 147, ¶ 7 (2017) (“When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends.”); see also Conrad v. State, 938 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that evidence alleging the victim may have been engaged in activities of a sexual nature earlier in the same evening as the assault was properly precluded as evidence of “past sexual conduct” under rape shield law); State v. Smith, 178 P.3d 672, 681 (Kan.

2020See State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145 , 147, ¶ 7 (2017) (“When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends.”); see also Conrad v. State, 938 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that evidence alleging the victim may have been engaged in activities of a sexual nature earlier in the same evening as the assault was properly precluded as evidence of “past sexual conduct” under rape shield law); State v. Smith, 178 P.3d 672, 681 (Kan.

2019The fact that the cats were being “maintained” by the renter, who actually “acknowledge[d] she knew there were cats doing damage” and “tried to prevent that whenever she was aware of it occurring,” id. at 1288, means the cats were so obviously domestic animals that the court’s additional plain-meaning analysis is of limited utility.

2018Id. at 302, ¶ 11 . “[T]he words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 296 (1966). ¶9 The fraudulent schemes and artifices statute, in relevant part, states: “Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions is guilty of [committing fraudulent schemes and artifices].” A.R.S. § 13-2310(A) (emphasis added).

2018Id. at 302, ¶ 11 . “[T]he words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 296 (1966). ¶9 The fraudulent schemes and artifices statute, in relevant part, states: “Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions is guilty of [committing fraudulent schemes and artifices].” A.R.S. § 13-2310(A) (emphasis added).

2018Cf. State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145 , 147 ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145 , 147 (2017) ("To determine a statute's meaning, we look first to its text ... [and] [w]hen the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends."); State v. Salazar-Mercado , 234 Ariz. 590 , 592 ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 996 , 998 (2014) ("We interpret court rules to effect the rule-makers' intent, using the same principles we apply when interpreting statutes.").

2018Cf. State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145 , 147 ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145 , 147 (2017) ("To determine a statute's meaning, we look first to its text ... [and] [w]hen the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends."); State v. Salazar-Mercado , 234 Ariz. 590 , 592 ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 996 , 998 (2014) ("We interpret court rules to effect the rule-makers' intent, using the same principles we apply when interpreting statutes.").

2012Frago-so v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7 , 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App.2005).

2012Frago-so v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7 , 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App.2005).

2012Div.2007); see also Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205 , 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 , 269 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (1971) (holding that the plain meaning of a clause covering “any and all liability” is coextensive with one covering liability “of whatsoever kind or nature” and that failure to interpret such a clause broadly would render it a nullity). ¶ 15 Similarly, “liability” broadly encompasses liability subject to a covenant not to execute.

2012Div.2007); see also Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205 , 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 , 269 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (1971) (holding that the plain meaning of a clause covering “any and all liability” is coextensive with one covering liability “of whatsoever kind or nature” and that failure to interpret such a clause broadly would render it a nullity). ¶ 15 Similarly, “liability” broadly encompasses liability subject to a covenant not to execute.

2008See Rineer, 194 Ariz. at 46, ¶ 7 , 977 P.2d at 768 .

2008See Rineer, 194 Ariz. at 46, ¶ 7 , 977 P.2d at 768 .

1998County of Apache v. Southwest Lumber Mills, Inc., 92 Ariz. 323, 327 , 376 P.2d 854, 856 (1962).

1998County of Apache v. Southwest Lumber Mills, Inc., 92 Ariz. 323, 327 , 376 P.2d 854, 856 (1962).

1997Co., 127 Ariz. 493, 495 , 622 P.2d 52, 54 (App.1980) (relying in part on the plain meaning of a rule of criminal procedure); Parsons v. Maricopa County, 176 Ariz. 307, 308-09 , 860 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Tax Ct.1993) (enforcing the plain meaning of the joinder rule in a tax appeal).

1997Co., 127 Ariz. 493, 495 , 622 P.2d 52, 54 (App.1980) (relying in part on the plain meaning of a rule of criminal procedure); Parsons v. Maricopa County, 176 Ariz. 307, 308-09 , 860 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Tax Ct.1993) (enforcing the plain meaning of the joinder rule in a tax appeal).

1997See, e.g., Matter of Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 249 , 589 P.2d 886, 892 (1979) (applying the plain meaning of “recommend” under a supreme court rule in a disciplinary proceeding); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-102981, 147 Ariz. 316, 318 , 709 P.2d 1375, 1377 (App.1985) (finding the trial court violated the plain meaning of a rule of juvenile procedure); State v. Surety Ins.

1997See, e.g., Matter of Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 249 , 589 P.2d 886, 892 (1979) (applying the plain meaning of “recommend” under a supreme court rule in a disciplinary proceeding); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-102981, 147 Ariz. 316, 318 , 709 P.2d 1375, 1377 (App.1985) (finding the trial court violated the plain meaning of a rule of juvenile procedure); State v. Surety Ins.

1997See, e.g., Matter of Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 249 , 589 P.2d 886, 892 (1979) (applying the plain meaning of “recommend” under a supreme court rule in a disciplinary proceeding); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-102981, 147 Ariz. 316, 318 , 709 P.2d 1375, 1377 (App.1985) (finding the trial court violated the plain meaning of a rule of juvenile procedure); State v. Surety Ins.

1997See, e.g., Matter of Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 249 , 589 P.2d 886, 892 (1979) (applying the plain meaning of “recommend” under a supreme court rule in a disciplinary proceeding); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-102981, 147 Ariz. 316, 318 , 709 P.2d 1375, 1377 (App.1985) (finding the trial court violated the plain meaning of a rule of juvenile procedure); State v. Surety Ins.

1997Co., 127 Ariz. 493, 495 , 622 P.2d 52, 54 (App.1980) (relying in part on the plain meaning of a rule of criminal procedure); Parsons v. Maricopa County, 176 Ariz. 307, 308-09 , 860 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Tax Ct.1993) (enforcing the plain meaning of the joinder rule in a tax appeal).

1997Co., 127 Ariz. 493, 495 , 622 P.2d 52, 54 (App.1980) (relying in part on the plain meaning of a rule of criminal procedure); Parsons v. Maricopa County, 176 Ariz. 307, 308-09 , 860 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Tax Ct.1993) (enforcing the plain meaning of the joinder rule in a tax appeal).

1976In discussing the plain meaning of this rule, we have recently said: “. . . [A] conviction on a plea of guilty cannot be sustained unless there is a factual basis to support each of the elements of the crime to which the plea is made. . . . ” State v. Carr, 112 Ariz. 453, 455 , 543 P.2d 441, 443 (1975).

1976In discussing the plain meaning of this rule, we have recently said: “. . . [A] conviction on a plea of guilty cannot be sustained unless there is a factual basis to support each of the elements of the crime to which the plea is made. . . . ” State v. Carr, 112 Ariz. 453, 455 , 543 P.2d 441, 443 (1975).