plain meaning rule in South Carolina

2026Comm'n v. Chen, 403 S.C. 509, 519 , 846 S.E.2d 861 , 866 (2020))); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not [an appellate] court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and [an appellate] court has no right to impose another meaning."); Rule 5(d), SCRCP ("The summons and complaint shall be filed before service."); McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360

2026Comm'n v. Chen, 403 S.C. 509, 519 , 846 S.E.2d 861 , 866 (2020))); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not [an appellate] court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and [an appellate] court has no right to impose another meaning."); Rule 5(d), SCRCP ("The summons and complaint shall be filed before service."); McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360

2023Comm'n, 388 S.C. 486, 491 , 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.

2023Comm'n, 388 S.C. 486, 491 , 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.

2019Under the plain meaning rule, Gould's interpretation of section 41-10-30(A) cannot stand because it would require adding the word "may" (or "will") to the language "[a]ny changes in these terms must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they become effective" to read, "[a]ny changes in these terms must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they may/will become effective." See Johnson, 396 S.C. at 188 , 720 S.E.2d at 520 ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning[] and will not resort to forced construction that woul

2019Under the plain meaning rule, Gould's interpretation of section 41-10-30(A) cannot stand because it would require adding the word "may" (or "will") to the language "[a]ny changes in these terms must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they become effective" to read, "[a]ny changes in these terms must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they may/will become effective." See Johnson, 396 S.C. at 188 , 720 S.E.2d at 520 ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning[] and will not resort to forced construction that woul

2020The Court concluded, "It would be difficult to conceive of a common scheme or plan more within the plain meaning of the exception than that presented by this evidence." Id. at 392 , 323 S.E.2d at 774 .

2020The Court concluded, "It would be difficult to conceive of a common scheme or plan more within the plain meaning of the exception than that presented by this evidence." Id. at 392 , 323 S.E.2d at 774 .

2008Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 198 , 547 S.E.2d 869, 870 (2001); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 122 , 542 S.E.2d at 739 .

2008Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 198 , 547 S.E.2d 869, 870 (2001); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 122 , 542 S.E.2d at 739 .

2004See Ferguson v. Charleston Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 349 S.C. 558, 563 , 564 S.E.2d 94, 97 (2002) (“When the statute’s terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for an alternate construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning.”).

2004See Ferguson v. Charleston Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 349 S.C. 558, 563 , 564 S.E.2d 94, 97 (2002) (“When the statute’s terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for an alternate construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning.”).

2026Comm'n v. Chen, 403 S.C. 509, 519 , 846 S.E.2d 861 , 866 (2020))); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not [an appellate] court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and [an appellate] court has no right to impose another meaning."); Rule 5(d), SCRCP ("The summons and complaint shall be filed before service."); McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360

2026Comm'n v. Chen, 403 S.C. 509, 519 , 846 S.E.2d 861 , 866 (2020))); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not [an appellate] court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and [an appellate] court has no right to impose another meaning."); Rule 5(d), SCRCP ("The summons and complaint shall be filed before service."); McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360

2023"Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85 , 533 S.E.2d at 581 . "[T]he Court generally gives deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of an applicable statute or its own regulation." Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 354 S.C. 436, 440 , 581 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2003).

2023"Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85 , 533 S.E.2d at 581 . "[T]he Court generally gives deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of an applicable statute or its own regulation." Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 354 S.C. 436, 440 , 581 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2003).

2022Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487, 489 , 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981) ("As a general rule, tax exemption statutes are strictly construed against the taxpayer."); id. ("This rule of strict construction simply means that constitutional and statutory language will not be strained or liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor."); id. ("It does not mean that [an appellate court] will search for an interpretation in [an assessor's] favor where the plain and unambiguous language leaves no room for construction."); id. at 489-90 , 280 S.E.2d at 58 ("Only when the literal application of a statute produces an absur

2022Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487, 489 , 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981) ("As a general rule, tax exemption statutes are strictly construed against the taxpayer."); id. ("This rule of strict construction simply means that constitutional and statutory language will not be strained or liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor."); id. ("It does not mean that [an appellate court] will search for an interpretation in [an assessor's] favor where the plain and unambiguous language leaves no room for construction."); id. at 489-90 , 280 S.E.2d at 58 ("Only when the literal application of a statute produces an absur

2022Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73 , 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2011) ("Tax appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)."); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (stating an appellate court reviews the ALC's decision for errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which [an appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the [ALC]."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature."); id. ("Under the plain meaning rul

2022Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73 , 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2011) ("Tax appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)."); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (stating an appellate court reviews the ALC's decision for errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which [an appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the [ALC]."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature."); id. ("Under the plain meaning rul

2022Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73 , 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2011) ("Tax appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)."); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (stating an appellate court reviews the ALC's decision for errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which [an appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the [ALC]."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature."); id. ("Under the plain meaning rul

2021Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342 , 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) (explaining that under the plain meaning rule, this Court has no right to search for or impose another meaning or resort to subtle or forced construction to change the scope of a clear and unambiguous statute); see also S.C.

2021Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342 , 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) (explaining that under the plain meaning rule, this Court has no right to search for or impose another meaning or resort to subtle or forced construction to change the scope of a clear and unambiguous statute); see also S.C.

2019Id. ("The language of a tax statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of an ambiguity therein."); Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85 , 533 S.E.2d at 581 ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.").

2019As to Issue 2: Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110 , 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) ("Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); S.C.

2019As to Issue 2: Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110 , 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) ("Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); S.C.

2014Dep't of Revenue, 399 S.C. 313, 320-21 , 731 S.E.2d 869, 873 (2012) ("'Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.'" (quoting S.C.

2014Dep't of Revenue, 399 S.C. 313, 320-21 , 731 S.E.2d 869, 873 (2012) ("'Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.'" (quoting S.C.

2012Tax Comm’n, 292 S.C. 411, 413 , 357 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1987).

2012Tax Comm’n, 292 S.C. 411, 413 , 357 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1987).

2009Co. v. Barlow , 301 S.C. 502, 508 , 392 S.E.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1990) (excusing failure to have notarized Department of Transportation officer’s signature on Form FR-9 because to hold otherwise would amount to a sacrifice of substance to form). “Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court’s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.” Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).

2009Co. v. Barlow , 301 S.C. 502, 508 , 392 S.E.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1990) (excusing failure to have notarized Department of Transportation officer’s signature on Form FR-9 because to hold otherwise would amount to a sacrifice of substance to form). “Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court’s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.” Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).

2008Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 198 , 547 S.E.2d 869, 870 (2001); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 122 , 542 S.E.2d at 739 ; see also Shealy v. Doe, 370 S.C. 194, 199-200 , 634 S.E.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.2006), cert. denied, Aug. 9, 2007. *497 In construing a statute, the court looks to the language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.

2008Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 198 , 547 S.E.2d 869, 870 (2001); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85 , 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 122 , 542 S.E.2d at 739 ; see also Shealy v. Doe, 370 S.C. 194, 199-200 , 634 S.E.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.2006), cert. denied, Aug. 9, 2007. *497 In construing a statute, the court looks to the language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.

2000There is no safer nor better rule of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly says."); see also McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113 , 352 S.E.2d at 473 (In holding that oral sworn testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of a statute that required an affidavit, the supreme court stated: "The mandate of the statute is clear.

2000There is no safer nor better rule of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly says."); see also McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113 , 352 S.E.2d at 473 (In holding that oral sworn testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of a statute that required an affidavit, the supreme court stated: "The mandate of the statute is clear.

2000Co., 298 S.C. 151 , 378 S.E.2d 613 (Ct.App.1989) (wherein the court of appeals applied the plain-meaning rule to section 38-77-170 as the statute existed prior to its amendment in 1989). [5] See Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 247 S.C. 132, 136 , 146 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1966) ("The first rule of construction in the interpretation of statutes is that of intention on the part of the legislature and where the terms of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, there is no room for construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning....

2000Co., 298 S.C. 151 , 378 S.E.2d 613 (Ct.App.1989) (wherein the court of appeals applied the plain-meaning rule to section 38-77-170 as the statute existed prior to its amendment in 1989). [5] See Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 247 S.C. 132, 136 , 146 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1966) ("The first rule of construction in the interpretation of statutes is that of intention on the part of the legislature and where the terms of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, there is no room for construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning....

2000See Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454 , 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996) (wherein the supreme court noted the conclusion of the court of appeals that "form should not be elevated over substance” applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction to hold that the unambiguous wording of the arbitration statute required notice that a contract is subject to arbitration be typed in underlined capital letters or rubber-stamped on the contract’s first page, and found that the technical requirements of the statute were not met where the arbitration notice on the contract was not und

2000See Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454 , 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996) (wherein the supreme court noted the conclusion of the court of appeals that "form should not be elevated over substance” applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction to hold that the unambiguous wording of the arbitration statute required notice that a contract is subject to arbitration be typed in underlined capital letters or rubber-stamped on the contract’s first page, and found that the technical requirements of the statute were not met where the arbitration notice on the contract was not und

2000Co. v. Hoffmann, 258 S.C. 282, 292 , 188 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1972) (wherein the supreme court stated, construing a prior version of the uninsured motorist law, "the procedural obligations that the insured must discharge in order to recover, since they are prescribed by statute, are viewed by the courts as mandatory, and strict compliance with them is a prerequisite to recover”). .

2000Co. v. Hoffmann, 258 S.C. 282, 292 , 188 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1972) (wherein the supreme court stated, construing a prior version of the uninsured motorist law, "the procedural obligations that the insured must discharge in order to recover, since they are prescribed by statute, are viewed by the courts as mandatory, and strict compliance with them is a prerequisite to recover”). .