plain meaning rule in Texas

2022Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 ). 13 There is an exception to the plain-meaning rule for technical meanings: “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011); see Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim.

2022Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 ). 13 There is an exception to the plain-meaning rule for technical meanings: “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011); see Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim.

2001Cail v. Service Motors, Inc. , 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. 1983); Borden, Inc. v. Sharp , 888 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, writ denied).

2000See Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983); El Paso Indep.

2009There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: “where application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally.” Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2009There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: "where application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally." Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2004Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

2003Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

2014Under the plain meaning rule, we begin with the text of the statute, and we must determine the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the words chosen “unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result.” Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013); Fresh Coat, Inc:, 318 S.W.3d at 901 ; Comyn v. Universe Life Ins.

2003See Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999).

2000For example, we should not ‘attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.’ Nor should we construe a statute in a way that leads to foolish or absurd consequences.” Meno v. Kitchens, 873 S.W.2d. 789,792 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994 writ denied) (citations omitted); see also Houston Chronicle Pub1 ‘g Co., 949 S.W.2d at 497 .

1999Kitchens, 873 S.W.2d at 792 .

1995For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

1994For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

1995For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

1995For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

1995For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

1995For example, we should not “attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.” State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634 , 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (1943); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361 , 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

2022Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 ). 13 There is an exception to the plain-meaning rule for technical meanings: “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011); see Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim.

2022Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 ). 13 There is an exception to the plain-meaning rule for technical meanings: “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Rhine, 297 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011); see Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim.

2019Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(L) (allowing a court to terminate a parent’s rights based on a finding the parent was criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child). 28 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.002 (West 2013). 29 See id. § 311.011(a) (West 2013) (providing that words and phrases used in statutes, unless defined by the Legislature, “shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage”); Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005) (relying on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to construe a word used in the Family Code);

2017In Texas Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Services v. Mega Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004), the Texas Supreme Court, in overruling a 25- year-long pattern of erroneous interpretation of administrative law by this court, made it clear that Texas embraces an unusually strong version of the plain meaning rule.

2009See id. ; see also Leland v. Brandal , 257 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. 2008) (stating that court may not judicially amend statute by adding words not contained in the statutory language).

2009See id.; see also Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. 2008) (stating that court may not judicially amend statute by adding words not contained in the statutory language).

2009See City of Rockwall v. Hughes , 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008); State v. Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).

2009See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008); State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).

2009See City of Rockwall v. Hughes , 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008); State v. Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).

2009See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008); State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).

2004Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

2003Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

2024Cross, 497 S.W.3d at 613 (citing Assignees of Best Buy v. Combs, 395 S.W.3d 847, 864 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied)).

2018Id. (citing Assignees of Best Buy v. Combs , 395 S.W.3d 847 , 864 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, pet. denied) ).

2016The plain meaning of the requirement would appear to be that the insured must have a claim against the tortfea-sor which could be reduced to judgment in a court of law.”); Williams v. Thomas, 187 Ga. App. 527 , 370 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1988) ("Accordingly, as appellant is barred by the exclusive rights and remedies provision of OCGA § 34-9-11 from obtaining judgment either against his employer or the co-employee who injured him, he cannot satisfy the condition precedent to an action against his insurer for recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy.”); State Farm Mut.

2016The plain meaning of the requirement would appear to be that the insured must have a claim against the tortfea-sor which could be reduced to judgment in a court of law.”); Williams v. Thomas, 187 Ga. App. 527 , 370 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1988) ("Accordingly, as appellant is barred by the exclusive rights and remedies provision of OCGA § 34-9-11 from obtaining judgment either against his employer or the co-employee who injured him, he cannot satisfy the condition precedent to an action against his insurer for recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy.”); State Farm Mut.

2015See Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6 , 22 n.82 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6 , 22 n.82 (Tex. Crim.App.2014). 22 .

2002See FlemingFoods, 6 S.W.3d at 284 ; see also Bridgestone/Firestone,lnc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1994).

1997See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994). *514 Looking at the language of the statute, we are to consider not just the disputed parts, but the statute as a whole.

2001The Plain Meaning of “Would Cause” and “Monetary Harm” “If the meaning of the statute is plain, we apply it as written.” Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex.1994) (citation omitted).

2001The Plain Meaning of "Would Cause" and "Monetary Harm" "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we apply it as written." Sorokolit v. Rhodes , 889 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted).

2000For example, we should not ‘attribute to the Legislature an intention to work an injustice.’ Nor should we construe a statute in a way that leads to foolish or absurd consequences.” Meno v. Kitchens, 873 S.W.2d. 789,792 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994 writ denied) (citations omitted); see also Houston Chronicle Pub1 ‘g Co., 949 S.W.2d at 497 .

1999Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 497-98 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1997, no writ) (quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1991): “This method [of applying the plain meaning rule] of statutory interpretation is of ancient origin and is, in fact, the only method that does not unnecessarily invade the lawmaking province of the Legislature.”).

1995Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983); Ex Parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.1974).

1994Cail v. Service Motors, Inc. , 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. 1983); Ex Parte Roloff , 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. 1974).

2025Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995); Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937).

2025In conducting our inquiry, we keep in mind that we are not writing on a clean slate; we must take into account prior cases.”). 50 Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Tex. Crim.

2025Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995); Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937).