38 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Huebner v. Deuchlegreen2 sentences2022See DeCamacho, 234 Ariz. at 24-25, ¶¶ 24-27 (statutory beneficiary independently holds the wrongful death claim); Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 549-50 (1973); A.R.S. §§ 12-611, -612. ¶10 Any express language in an arbitration agreement purporting to bind non-signatory statutory beneficiaries to arbitrate is unenforceable as to a wrongful death claim. 2014The superior court concluded that because the arbitration agreements pui-port-ed to bind “heirs,” Aspeitia’s children — who were not parties to the agreements — were required to arbitrate their wrongful-death claim. ¶ 25 A wrongful-death claim is “an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by named statutory benefieiaries[; i]t is not derived from nor is it a continuation of claims which formerly existed in a decedent.” Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 549-50 , 514 P.2d 470, 470-71 (1973). | 3 | 4 |
In Re the Estate of Millimangreen2 sentences1993In In re Estate of Milliman, 101 Ariz. 54 , 415 P.2d 877 (1966), the court observed that the surviving spouse, *472 acting as a statutory trustee for the other beneficiaries, may compromise a wrongful death claim without bringing suit. 4 The court cautioned, however, that the surviving spouse must obtain the consent of the other beneficiaries to settle the action and, if any of the beneficiaries “were minors, a guardian would have to be appointed, and the court would have to approve the compromise.” Id. at 63 , 415 P.2d at 886 . 1993In In re Estate of Milliman, 101 Ariz. 54 , 415 P.2d 877 (1966), the court observed that the surviving spouse, *472 acting as a statutory trustee for the other beneficiaries, may compromise a wrongful death claim without bringing suit. 4 The court cautioned, however, that the surviving spouse must obtain the consent of the other beneficiaries to settle the action and, if any of the beneficiaries “were minors, a guardian would have to be appointed, and the court would have to approve the compromise.” Id. at 63 , 415 P.2d at 886 . | 2 | 4 |
EDONNA v. Heckmangreen2 sentences2023Edonna concluded that an adoption eliminated a child’s standing to pursue a wrongful death claim for the death of a biological parent. 227 Ariz. 108, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5-6 . 2021Because the wrongful death claim is statutorily based, and because the statute’s plain language creates “a limited class of beneficiaries who may sue,” the question was whether the plaintiff was among them, and specifically whether he was the decedent’s “child.” Id. at 110 , ¶¶ 9–12. | 2 | 3 |
Gipson v. Kaseygreen2 sentences2017Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9 (2007). 1Ella’s children brought a wrongful-death claim against BNSF. 2008Other tort claims ¶ 20 We next address Vasquez's claims for wrongful handling of a dead body and infliction of emotional distress based on alleged negligence in "inspect[ing] or investigat[ing] the scene and related facts of the accident and the person of Angel Romo." In granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants on those claims, the trial court ruled the county and state "owed no legal duty to [Vasquez] to identify the human remains of [the] decedent." Contrary to that ruling, Vasquez argues, the county and state "owed a duty of care to Angel Romo and to [her]." "On appeal from a s | 2 | 3 |
The ESTATE OF JOSEFA U. DeCAMACHO v. LA SOLANA CARE AND REHAB, INC.green2 sentences2022Guthrie v. La Solana Care and Rehab, Inc., 234 Ariz. 18 (App. 2014) that a non- signatory to an arbitration agreement is not bound to arbitrate a wrongful death claim. 2022See DeCamacho, 234 Ariz. at 24-25, ¶¶ 24-27 (statutory beneficiary independently holds the wrongful death claim); Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 549-50 (1973); A.R.S. §§ 12-611, -612. ¶10 Any express language in an arbitration agreement purporting to bind non-signatory statutory beneficiaries to arbitrate is unenforceable as to a wrongful death claim. | 2 | 2 |
Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty.green2 sentences2011See Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 470-73 , 698 P.2d at 715-18 (concluding, “at a minimum, that statute and precedent have combined to produce a [wrongful death] cause of action with common law attributes”). 2011See Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 470-73 , 698 P.2d at 715-18 (concluding, “at a minimum, that statute and precedent have combined to produce a [wrongful death] cause of action with common law attributes”). | 2 | 2 |
Solomon v. Harmangreen2 sentences2011See AR.S. § 12-612(A); Solomon, 107 Ariz. at 430 , 489 P.2d at 240 (finding that the estate may bring and benefit from a claim when none of the other beneficiaries named in A.R.S. § 12-612 survive). 2011See AR.S. § 12-612(A); Solomon, 107 Ariz. at 430 , 489 P.2d at 240 (finding that the estate may bring and benefit from a claim when none of the other beneficiaries named in A.R.S. § 12-612 survive). | 2 | 2 |
DEER VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. v. Housergreen2 sentences2008This latter requirement ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that constitute "quick unrealistic exaggerated demands." In tandem, these two statutory mandates ensure that government entities will be able to realistically consider a claim. 214 Ariz. 293, ¶ 9 , 152 P.3d at 493 (citation omitted). ¶ 14 According to the state, the Deer Valley court found, albeit in dicta, the claim letter in that case lacked " any facts supporting the claimed amounts for emotional distress and for damages to [plaintiff's] reputation," id. n. 3, even though her claim letter was more detailed and 2008Id. ¶ 29. ¶ 19 As the court held in Backus, we similarly hold that, "[i]n the context of the wrongful death claim[ ] being advanced here," Vasquez's "notice[ ] of claim w[as] sufficient to meet any requirement implied by Deer Valley with respect to `a factual foundation' supporting the proposed settlement amount." Id. ¶ 28, quoting Deer Valley, 214 Ariz. 293, ¶ 9 , 152 P.3d at 493 . [5] Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Vasquez's wrongful death claim against *760 the state based on the allegedly deficient notice of claim under § 12-821.01(A). [6] II. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Winngreen2 sentences2014A wrongful death claim is a statutory cause of action for "damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative or a continuation of a claim originating with the decedent." Winn, 225 Ariz. at 278 n. 7, ¶ 16, 237 P.3d at 631 n. 7 (citation omitted). . 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395 to 1395kkk-l (West, West-law through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L. 113-76, 113-79, and 113-89)). 2014A wrongful death claim is a statutory cause of action for "damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative or a continuation of a claim originating with the decedent." Winn, 225 Ariz. at 278 n. 7, ¶ 16, 237 P.3d at 631 n. 7 (citation omitted). . 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395 to 1395kkk-l (West, West-law through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L. 113-76, 113-79, and 113-89)). | 1 | 4 |
Yollin v. City of Glendalegreen2 sentences2008According to the state, Vasquez was required to include a "description of the nature and quality of her relationship with her son and the emotional impact of his death on her." Section 12-821.01(A), however, does not expressly require any such facts, but rather merely requires "a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount." And, unlike the second sentence of subsection A, which pertains to liability claims, the third sentence addressing the amount of damages claimed does not require such facts to be "sufficient to permit the public entity or public 2008According to the state, Vasquez was required to include a "description of the nature and quality of her relationship with her son and the emotional impact of his death on her." Section 12-821.01(A), however, does not expressly require any such facts, but rather merely requires "a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount." And, unlike the second sentence of subsection A, which pertains to liability claims, the third sentence addressing the amount of damages claimed does not require such facts to be "sufficient to permit the public entity or public | 1 | 2 |
Dueñas v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.green2 sentences2022Dueñas, 236 Ariz. at 138-39, ¶ 25 . 2022Dueñas, 236 Ariz. at 139, ¶¶ 27-29 ; DeCamacho, 234 Ariz. at 25-26, ¶¶ 27-33 . | 1 | 1 |
Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Arizona, Inc.green1 sentence2022See A.R.S. § 12-611; see also Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Ariz., Inc., 148 Ariz. 548, 551 (App. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc.green1 sentence2021Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, 201, ¶ 3 (App. 2007). ¶6 Arizona’s wrongful death statute authorizes a surviving “child” of the deceased to bring a wrongful death claim. | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Stategreen2 sentences2016A. Workers’ Compensation: Exclusive Remedy ¶ 7 Generally, a plaintiff may bring a wrongful death claim as an “independent claim for damages sustained by the decedent’s survivors.” Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 190 Ariz. 544, 549 , 950 P.2d 1165 (App. *381 1997); see also Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 310, ¶ 16 , 206 P.3d 753 (App. 2008). 2016A. Workers’ Compensation: Exclusive Remedy ¶ 7 Generally, a plaintiff may bring a wrongful death claim as an “independent claim for damages sustained by the decedent’s survivors.” Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 190 Ariz. 544, 549 , 950 P.2d 1165 (App. *381 1997); see also Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 310, ¶ 16 , 206 P.3d 753 (App. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Hutton v. Davisgreen2 sentences2014Hutton v. Davis, 26 Ariz.App. 215, 216 , 547 P.2d 486, 487 (1976). 2014Hutton v. Davis, 26 Ariz.App. 215, 216 , 547 P.2d 486, 487 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Woodall v. AVALON CARE CENTER-FEDERAL WAYgreen1 sentence2014Woodall, 231 P.3d 1252, ¶¶ 27, 29 (second and sixth alterations in Woodall) (internal quotations omitted). *25 ¶27 We conclude that an APSA claim is derivative of the decedent’s rights, whereas a wrongful death claim is independently held by the decedent’s statutory beneficiaries. | 1 | 1 |
Frongillo v. Grimmettgreen2 sentences2014Rather, “the phrase relied upon by [La Solana] is merely descriptive of the nature of the wrong committed to determine if a cause of action exists as a matter of substantive law for the alleged wrongful conduct.” Frongillo v. Grimmett, 163 Ariz. 369, 370 , 788 P.2d 102, 103 (App.1989). *26 ¶ 33 We therefore conclude that although the APSA claim falls under the terms of the admission agreement and is subject to arbitration, the statutory beneficiaries are not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against La Solana pursuant to the arbitration clause of the admission agreement. 2014Rather, “the phrase relied upon by [La Solana] is merely descriptive of the nature of the wrong committed to determine if a cause of action exists as a matter of substantive law for the alleged wrongful conduct.” Frongillo v. Grimmett, 163 Ariz. 369, 370 , 788 P.2d 102, 103 (App.1989). *26 ¶ 33 We therefore conclude that although the APSA claim falls under the terms of the admission agreement and is subject to arbitration, the statutory beneficiaries are not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against La Solana pursuant to the arbitration clause of the admission agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Jennings v. Listergreen2 sentences2011In re Lister’s Estate, 22 Ariz. 185, 187 , 195 P. 1113, 1113 (1921) (“Under the common law there was no right of action for damages for wrongful death. 2011In re Lister’s Estate, 22 Ariz. 185, 187 , 195 P. 1113, 1113 (1921) (“Under the common law there was no right of action for damages for wrongful death. | 1 | 1 |
Bowslaugh v. Bowslaughgreen2 sentences2011Bowslaugh v. Bowslaugh, 126 Ariz. 517, 519 , 617 P.2d 25, 27 (1979) (“A cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory in origin and we must adhere to the plain language of the statute, leaving any deficiencies or inequities to be corrected by the legislature.”); see also In re Estate of Winn, 225 Ariz. 275, 277, ¶ 12 , 237 P.3d 628, 630 (App.2010) (“It is for the legislature to make policy decisions about the scope of recoverable damages in a statutory cause of action.”). 2011Bowslaugh v. Bowslaugh, 126 Ariz. 517, 519 , 617 P.2d 25, 27 (1979) (“A cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory in origin and we must adhere to the plain language of the statute, leaving any deficiencies or inequities to be corrected by the legislature.”); see also In re Estate of Winn, 225 Ariz. 275, 277, ¶ 12 , 237 P.3d 628, 630 (App.2010) (“It is for the legislature to make policy decisions about the scope of recoverable damages in a statutory cause of action.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Sluder v. Marplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Stanley v. McCarvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Backus v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital for Magma Copper Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gomez v. Levertongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pacheco v. Delgardogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cornerstone Hospital of Southeast Arizona v. Ernest H. Blackburn
green
2 sentences2014Ariz., L.L.C. v. Marner, 231 Ariz. 67 , 290 P.3d 460 (App.2012), which was decided after the trial court’s decision in this case. 2014Ariz., L.L.C. v. Marner, 231 Ariz. 67 , 290 P.3d 460 (App.2012), which was decided after the trial court’s decision in this case. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Deer Valley Unified School District No. 97 v. Houser
green
2 sentences2008This latter requirement ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that constitute "quick unrealistic exaggerated demands." In tandem, these two statutory mandates ensure that government entities will be able to realistically consider a claim. 214 Ariz. 293, ¶ 9 , 152 P.3d at 493 (citation omitted). ¶ 14 According to the state, the Deer Valley court found, albeit in dicta, the claim letter in that case lacked " any facts supporting the claimed amounts for emotional distress and for damages to [plaintiff's] reputation," id. n. 3, even though her claim letter was more detailed and 2008Id. ¶ 29. ¶ 19 As the court held in Backus, we similarly hold that, "[i]n the context of the wrongful death claim[ ] being advanced here," Vasquez's "notice[ ] of claim w[as] sufficient to meet any requirement implied by Deer Valley with respect to `a factual foundation' supporting the proposed settlement amount." Id. ¶ 28, quoting Deer Valley, 214 Ariz. 293, ¶ 9 , 152 P.3d at 493 . [5] Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Vasquez's wrongful death claim against *760 the state based on the allegedly deficient notice of claim under § 12-821.01(A). [6] II. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Fernandez v. Romo
green
2 sentences1983In light of our supreme court's recent decision in Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447 , 646 P.2d 878 (1982), we find that the trial court did err. 1983In light of our supreme court's recent decision in Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447 , 646 P.2d 878 (1982), we find that the trial court did err. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Wheeler v. Hannerkam
neutral
2 sentences1970"Dockery v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 45 Ariz. 434 , 45 P.2d 656 , and Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447 , 77 P.2d 814 , cited by Farmers, wherein it was held that wrongful-death action is one pertaining to the estate of deceased, were decided under the statute as it existed prior to 1956. 1970"Dockery v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 45 Ariz. 434 , 45 P.2d 656 , and Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447 , 77 P.2d 814 , cited by Farmers, wherein it was held that wrongful-death action is one pertaining to the estate of deceased, were decided under the statute as it existed prior to 1956. | 2 | 1966–1970 |
Dockery v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co.
green
2 sentences1970"Dockery v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 45 Ariz. 434 , 45 P.2d 656 , and Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447 , 77 P.2d 814 , cited by Farmers, wherein it was held that wrongful-death action is one pertaining to the estate of deceased, were decided under the statute as it existed prior to 1956. 1970"Dockery v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 45 Ariz. 434 , 45 P.2d 656 , and Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447 , 77 P.2d 814 , cited by Farmers, wherein it was held that wrongful-death action is one pertaining to the estate of deceased, were decided under the statute as it existed prior to 1956. | 2 | 1966–1970 |
Quevedo v. Union Pac. R.
neutral
2 sentences1965Co., 115 F.Supp. 25 (N.D.Ill.1953), it was held that an order of the -probate- court approving a settlement was not binding upon the court entertaining the death action, on the ground that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the wrongful death claim or its settlement, but merely jurisdiction of the distribution of the proceeds thereof. 1965Co., 115 F. Supp. 25 (N.D.Ill. 1953), it was held that an order of the probate court approving a settlement was not binding upon the court entertaining the death action, on the ground that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the wrongful death claim or its settlement, but merely jurisdiction of the distribution of the proceeds thereof. | 2 | 1965–1965 |
Quinn v. Cardenas
green
1 sentence2025Quinn, 256 Ariz. at 84 ¶ 29. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co.
green
2 sentences2016A. Workers’ Compensation: Exclusive Remedy ¶ 7 Generally, a plaintiff may bring a wrongful death claim as an “independent claim for damages sustained by the decedent’s survivors.” Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 190 Ariz. 544, 549 , 950 P.2d 1165 (App. *381 1997); see also Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 310, ¶ 16 , 206 P.3d 753 (App. 2008). 2016A. Workers’ Compensation: Exclusive Remedy ¶ 7 Generally, a plaintiff may bring a wrongful death claim as an “independent claim for damages sustained by the decedent’s survivors.” Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 190 Ariz. 544, 549 , 950 P.2d 1165 (App. *381 1997); see also Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 310, ¶ 16 , 206 P.3d 753 (App. 2008). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jeanes v. Arrow Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2014Conversely, the wrongful death claim, brought by Guthrie on behalf of herself, Ramiro Camacho, and Candelario Camacho, is not subject to the terms of the admission agreement’s arbitration clause. 5 ¶ 28 Citing Jeanes v. Arrow Insurance Co., 16 ArizApp. 589, 494 P.2d 1334 (1972), La Solana nevertheless argues that the statutory beneficiaries are bound by the arbitration clause because they are third-party beneficiaries. 2014The issue in Jeanes was whether an automobile passenger injured in a vehicle collision was subject to the arbitration clause of the driver’s uninsured motorist insurance policy. 16 Ariz.App. at 589 , 494 P.2d at 1334-35 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Phraner v. Cote Mart, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011But in those eases, the statutory right to bring an action was “grounded in the right to inherit from decedents.” Phraner, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d at 742 . 5 ¶ 22 Finally, Edonna notes that our supreme court has not conclusively determined whether a wrongful death claim is purely statutory or whether it existed at common law. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
White v. Greater Arizona Bicycling Association
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 141-42, ¶¶ 29-30, 163 P.3d at 1091-92 . ¶ 20 The majority in White agreed that damages were not an element of a wrongful death claim: “[Ujnlike in a traditional negligence case, damage to the plaintiff is not an element of liability in a wrongful death action.” Id. at 138, ¶ 16, 163 P.3d at 1088 . 2011Id. at 141-42, ¶¶ 29-30, 163 P.3d at 1091-92 . ¶ 20 The majority in White agreed that damages were not an element of a wrongful death claim: “[Ujnlike in a traditional negligence case, damage to the plaintiff is not an element of liability in a wrongful death action.” Id. at 138, ¶ 16, 163 P.3d at 1088 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Greenwald v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Pennington green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Landgraff v. Wagner green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Salinas v. Kahn green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.