52 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cahoon v. Cummingsgreen2 sentences2012See id. (“Holding the defendant liable for the full value of the wrongful death claim is inconsistent with 8 the statutory requirement that the loss be caused by the defendant who only increased the risk of an already likely result.”). 2012See id. (“Holding the defendant liable for the full value of the wrongful death claim is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the loss be caused by the defendant who only increased the risk of an already likely result.”). | 5 | 8 |
Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Technologies, LLCgreen2 sentences2015It is therefore logical that our General Assembly would provide extra incentive—in the form of statutory fee awards—to personal representatives prosecuting such actions, in order to ensure that those who commit acts resulting in a wrongful death are held liable, which further encourages such actors to avoid that wrongful conduct in the future. 8 Moreover, it is well settled that Indiana adheres to the “American Rule,” under which each party is responsible for paying his or her legal expenses absent contrary statutory authority; thus, we “generally exclude[] the award of attorney fees from comp 2015It is therefore logical that our General Assembly would provide extra incentive—in the form of statutory fee awards—to personal representatives prosecuting such actions, in order to ensure that those who commit acts resulting in a wrongful death are held liable, which further encourages such actors to avoid that wrongful conduct in the future. 8 Moreover, it is well settled that Indiana adheres to the “American Rule,” under which each party is responsible for paying his or her legal expenses absent contrary statutory authority; thus, we “generally exclude[] the award of attorney fees from comp | 2 | 2 |
Southerland v. Hammondgreen2 sentences2014Citing Southerland v. Hammond, 693 N.E.2d 74, 78 (Ind. Ct.App.1998), in which a panel of our Court of Appeals stated that as to a wrongful death claim, “the fraudulent concealment exception does not establish a new date for the commencement of the statute of limitations, but rather creates an equitable exception” under which a “plaintiff must institute an action within a reasonable time after he discovers information which would lead to discovery of the cause of action,” the trial court concluded the plaintiffs had waited too long after learning the true cause of death: a year to open the esta 2007Because wrongful death is a statutory right of action, Indiana Code section 34-23-1-1 technically is not a statute of limitation, but a "non-claim statute.” Southerland v. Hammond, 693 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Heck Ex Rel. Heck v. Stoffergreen2 sentences2013Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law, Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 2003), and in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991), our Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine whether a duty exists. 2013Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law, Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind.2003), and in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991), our Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine whether a duty exists. | 2 | 2 |
Frady v. Hedgcockgreen2 sentences2008We said: If the death was caused by the malpractice, (a) the malpractice claim (whether brought by the patient or another as the representative of the patient) terminates at the patient’s death, Ind.Code § 34-9-3-l(a)(6) (2004); and (b) a wrongful death claim must be filed within two *301 years of the occurrence of the malpractice, see Frady [v. Hedgcock, 497 N.E.2d 620, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), tram, denied]. 2007Finally, the court noted that since Frady v. Hedgcock, 497 N.E.2d 620, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), tram, denied, where a panel of this court held that the MMA’s statute of limitation controls in a wrongful death claim based on medical malpractice, the legislature had not disturbed the Frady court’s holding. | 2 | 2 |
Community Hospital of Anderson v. McKnightgreen2 sentences2003Thus, our supreme court noted that "the specific issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment where neither plaintiffs nor any other person or entity has been appointed as a personal representative authorized to prosecute a wrongful death claim." Id. at 776 . 2003Thus, our supreme court noted that "the specific issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment where neither plaintiffs nor any other person or entity has been appointed as a personal representative authorized to prosecute a wrongful death claim." Id. at 776 . | 2 | 2 |
Cahoon v. Cummingsgreen2 sentences2000In Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) trans. pending, this court determined that a surviving spouse could pursue three causes of action simultaneously: a negligence claim under the survival statute, an individual loss of consortium claim, and a wrongful death claim. 2000In Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) trans. pending, this court determined that a surviving spouse could pursue three causes of action simultaneously: a negligence claim under the survival statute, an individual loss of consortium claim, and a wrongful death claim. | 2 | 2 |
Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkiangreen2 sentences2000See e.g., Cummings, 715 N.E.2d at 15 . [11] Alabama ( Young v. Bryan, 445 So.2d 234, 238 (Ala.1983) (only damages recoverable for wrongful death are punitive damages)); Alaska ( Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1048-49 (Alaska 1986)); Arizona ( Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 42 , 703 P.2d 1190, 1196 (1985)); Arkansas ( Vickery v. Ballentine, 293 Ark. 54, 56 , 732 S.W.2d 160, 162 (1987)); Connecticut ( Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 292 , 472 A.2d 306, 312 (1984)); Florida ( Martin v. United Sec. 1998See e.g., Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1048 (Alaska 1986) (it is unlikely that a legislature would intend that a person injured by a negligent defendant may recover punitive damages, but that the estate of one killed by such a person may not, when the purpose of awarding punitive damages is deterrence); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1185 (Utah 1983); Berenger v. Frink, 314 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1982); Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581 , 276 S.E.2d 539, 545 (1981) (the deterrence principle of punitive damages is perfectly compatible wit | 2 | 2 |
Warrick Hospital, Inc. v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2003Warrick, 435 N.E.2d at 267-269 . 2003Warrick, 435 N.E.2d at 267-269 . | 1 | 4 |
Ellenwine v. Fairleygreen2 sentences2016They direct our attention to El-lenwine, in which our Supreme Court held that when an adult patient is the victim of medical negligence and dies as a result of the negligence, a derivative action for consortium under a wrongful death claim must be filed within the MMA’s two-year limitations period rather than under the limitations period provided by the statutory scheme governing wrongful death actions. 846 N.E.2d at 664 . 2007Regarding the latter issue, the court concluded that if an adult victim of medical malpractice dies within two years of the occurrence of the malpractice, the victim’s personal representative must file a wrongful death claim within the MMA’s limitation period. 9 Id. at 665-66 . | 1 | 3 |
Hosler Ex Rel. Hosler v. Caterpillar, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Faris, 842 N.E.2d at 875 (setting forth a “rule that an amended complaint will relate back if the claimant gains the appropriate legal status within the statute of limitations and affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s survival claims where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite eighteen-month period); Hosler, 710 N.E.2d at 196 (explaining that Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) does not alter a party’s legal status and cannot be used to save a wrongful death claim from dismissal); Gen. 2018See Faris, 842 N.E.2d at 875 (setting forth a “rule that an amended complaint will relate back if the claimant gains the appropriate legal status within the statute of limitations and affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s survival claims where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite eighteen-month period); Hosler, 710 N.E.2d at 196 (explaining that Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) does not alter a party’s legal status and cannot be used to save a wrongful death claim from dismissal); Gen. | 1 | 2 |
Holmes v. ACandS, Inc.green2 sentences2007In Holmes v. ACandS, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 36, 43 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), aff 'd on reh’g, 711 N.E.2d 1289 , trans. denied, a panel of this court declined to extend the Frady court’s holding to a wrongful death claim based on product liability. 2003We determined that a products liability action for wrongful death resulting from asbestos exposure accrued upon the date of death. 709 N.E.2d at 38 . | 1 | 2 |
Hopster v. Burgesongreen2 sentences2004See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 237 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied; Hopster v. Burgeson, 750 N.E.2d 841, 853 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). 2003In support of their argument, the Breeces point to Ind.Code § 34-18-8-1 which states that "[a] patient or the representative of a patient who has a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice may ... file a complaint in any *227 court of law having requisite jurisdiction." Furthermore, they cite Miller v. Terre Haute Regional Hospital, 603 N.E.2d 861 (Ind.1992) and Hopster v. Burgeson, 750 N.E.2d 841 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) for the proposition that a wrongful death claim is properly brought under the Medical Malpractice Act. | 1 | 2 |
Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaffgreen2 sentences1999For this reason it is incorrect to view Williams as a "next of kin." In the context of the Wrongful Death Act, a next of kin is someone other than a "child." In Wiersma, supra, the wrongful death claim was made by a mother as a dependent next of kin, i.e., the deceased daughter did not leave surviving either a widower or a dependent child. 1999For this reason it is incorrect to view Williams as a “next of kin.” In the context of the Wrongful Death Act, a next of kin is someone other than a “child.” In Wiersma, supra, the wrongful death claim was made by a mother as a dependent next of kin, ie., the deceased daughter did not leave surviving either a widower or a dependent child. | 1 | 2 |
Angel Shores Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. John Crays and Megan Craysgreen1 sentence2025In addition to amplifying the relief available for child decedents under the GWDS, the CWDS “amplifies the scope of persons who can pursue a wrongful death claim[.]” Angel Shores Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Crays, 78 N.E.3d 718, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Faris v. AC AND S, INC.green2 sentences2018See Faris, 842 N.E.2d at 875 (setting forth a “rule that an amended complaint will relate back if the claimant gains the appropriate legal status within the statute of limitations and affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s survival claims where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite eighteen-month period); Hosler, 710 N.E.2d at 196 (explaining that Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) does not alter a party’s legal status and cannot be used to save a wrongful death claim from dismissal); Gen. 2018See Faris, 842 N.E.2d at 875 (setting forth a “rule that an amended complaint will relate back if the claimant gains the appropriate legal status within the statute of limitations and affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s survival claims where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite eighteen-month period); Hosler, 710 N.E.2d at 196 (explaining that Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) does not alter a party’s legal status and cannot be used to save a wrongful death claim from dismissal); Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. American Optical Co.green2 sentences2018Motors, 418 N.E.2d at 549 (holding that “[i]n an Indiana wrongful death action neither the belated appointment [as personal representative] itself nor an amended complaint can relate back to the date of the original filing” and explaining that Indiana Trial Rules 15(C) and 17(A) could not save the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite two-year period). [14] On appeal, Blackmon does not dispute the fact that she was not the personal representative during the relevant statutory filing period for the wrongful d 2018Motors, 418 N.E.2d at 549 (holding that “[i]n an Indiana wrongful death action neither the belated appointment [as personal representative] itself nor an amended complaint can relate back to the date of the original filing” and explaining that Indiana Trial Rules 15(C) and 17(A) could not save the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim where she was not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the requisite two-year period). [14] On appeal, Blackmon does not dispute the fact that she was not the personal representative during the relevant statutory filing period for the wrongful d | 1 | 1 |
Mary Alice Manley, and Gary Manley v. Ryan J. Sherer, M.D., and Sherer Family Medicine, P.C.green1 sentence2015Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind.2013). | 1 | 1 |
Newkirk v. Bethlehem Woods Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLCgreen1 sentence2011Ctr., LLC, 898 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Ind.2008). | 1 | 1 |
| Horn v. Hendricksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of O'Neal Ex Rel. Personal Representative Newkirk v. Bethlehem Wood Nursing & Rehabilation Center, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Levy v. Newellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carrow v. Streetergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ellenwine v. Fairleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Randolph v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Twin States Publishing Co. v. Indiana Unemployment Insurance Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Hutmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| American International Adjustment Co. v. Frank J. Galvin, Jr., and Galvin, Stalmack and Kirschnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bryant v. Silvermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vickery v. Ballentinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Young v. Bryangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dearing v. Perrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Pickens v. Pickensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Smith v. Greenegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. United Security Services, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Berenger v. Frinkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bond v. City of Huntingtonred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Durham Ex Rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul International
green
2 sentences2015In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. 5 Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” See Durham, 745 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2 ) (emphasis added). 2015In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. 5 Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since' the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” See Durham, 745 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2) (emphasis added). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Estate of Kuba Ex Rel. Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co.
green
2 sentences2015In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. 5 Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” See Durham, 745 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2 ) (emphasis added). 2015In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. 5 Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” See Durham, 745 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2 ) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Webb v. Jarvis
green
2 sentences2013Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law, Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 2003), and in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991), our Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine whether a duty exists. 2013Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law, Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind.2003), and in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991), our Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine whether a duty exists. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Elkhart Community Schools v. Yoder
green
2 sentences2012To further illustrate, in Elkhart Comm. Schools v. Yoder, 696 N.E.2d 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the parents were awarded a single, joint verdict in the amount of $450,000, that arose from personal injuries that their daughter sustained, which was reduced to the “per person” limit under the Tort Claims Act at the time of $300,000. 2012To further illustrate, in Elkhart Comm. Schools v. Yoder, 696 N.E.2d 409 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the parents were awarded a single, joint verdict in the amount of $450,000, that arose from personal injuries that their daughter sustained, which was reduced to the “per person” limit under the Tort Claims Act at the time of $300,000. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
General Motors Corp. v. Arnett
green
2 sentences1982It is, therefore, crystal clear that unless this present action for wrongful death is outside the purview of IC 34-1-1-2, and not governed by General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted as to the wrongful death claim. 1982It is, therefore, crystal clear that unless this present action for wrongful death is outside the purview of IC 34-1-1-2, and not governed by General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra , defendants' motion for summary judgment should have been granted as to the wrongful death claim. | 2 | 1982–1999 |
Johnson v. Parkview Health Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Among other things, we found Trial Rule 15(C) “inapplicable” because the person sought to “relate back her [legal] status” as personal representative, not some aspect of her “underlying claims.” Id. at 370 . [27] By contrast, in Johnson v. Parkview Health Sys., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), a person filed a wrongful death claim in her capacity as personal representative of the decedent’s estate within two years of the decedent’s death. 2025This Court permitted the amendment, observing that it would “not change her legal status” but “only the designation of her legal status, with which she was appropriately endowed at the time she initiated the action.” Id. at 1287 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
King v. King
green
2 sentences2024We know of no authority supporting the bald proposition that a parent or guardian automatically asserts a wrongful death claim merely by being named a defendant, and [the mother] offers no authority for the assertion.” Id. [29] The mother also argued that the damages subsection of the CWDS 9 required the trial court to apportion damages between the parents and that the CWDS does not specifically require a parent to file an answer. 2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 16 of 19 wishing to assert either a wrongful death claim or an interest in any proceeds recovered from actually asserting the appropriate pleading in the first instance and in a timely fashion.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bornstein v. Watson's of Indianapolis, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023For Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023 Page 7 of 15 example, in Bornstein, defensive issue preclusion barred the plaintiff’s wrongful-death claim against the later-sued defendant because 100 percent of the fault had been apportioned in a prior suit the plaintiff brought for the same underlying incident, leaving no fault to apportion to the subsequent defendant. 771 N.E.2d at 666 . 2023In suits brought under the Act, “a plaintiff is obliged to name all alleged joint tortfeasors as defendants in one suit or face the possibility of being estopped from pursuing a remedy against the unnamed tortfeasor in a subsequent lawsuit.” Id. at 667 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. Hoosier Enterprises III, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 550-51 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dillon v. Glover
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ledbetter v. Ball Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence2010In Ledbetter v. Ball Memorial Hospital, 724 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), the parents brought a wrongful death claim following the death of their twenty-year-old daughter, Trenda. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Hillebrand v. Supervised Estate of Large green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Thomas v. Eads green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Tri-Etch, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Holmes v. ACandS, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Small v. Centocor, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Miller v. Terre Haute Regional Hospital green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc. v. Smith green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Durham Ex Rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul International green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Dearborn Fabricating & Engineering Corp. v. Wickham green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Hauer v. BRDD of Indiana, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mary E. Fisk, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence J. Fisk, Deceased v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Thompson v. Communications Technology, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Andis v. Hawkins green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Vollmar Ex Rel. Vollmar v. Rupright green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Brown v. Kemp neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.