15 Virginia opinions name it 6 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caputo v. Holt, Administratrixgreen2 sentences1991Caputo v. Holt, 217 Va. 302, 305 , 228 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1976). 1991Caputo v. Holt, 217 Va. 302, 305 , 228 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1976). | 1 | 2 |
Griffin v. Shivelygreen1 sentence2020We have previously explained that “[w]illful and wanton negligence is acting consciously in disregard of another person’s rights or acting with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to another.” Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 581 (1990) (quoting Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.green1 sentence2020We have previously explained that “[w]illful and wanton negligence is acting consciously in disregard of another person’s rights or acting with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to another.” Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 581 (1990) (quoting Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Bentley Funding v. Sk & R Groupgreen2 sentences2020Green argues that judicial estoppel does not apply because the parties in Kentucky and Virginia are different, and there is “nothing inconsistent about the manner in which the Kentucky case was resolved and the pursuit of a wrongful death claim here.” Clinch Valley Surgery concedes that judicial estoppel does not apply. 5 We agree. “[J]udicial estoppel forbids parties from assuming successive positions in the course of a suit, or series of suits, in reference to the same fact or state of facts, which are inconsistent with each other, or mutually contradictory.” Bentley Funding Grp., L.L.C. v. 2020In Virginia, the doctrine of judicial estoppel only applies “when the parties to the disparate proceedings are the same.” Id. at 326 . | 1 | 1 |
Pinkhasov v. Petoczgreen1 sentence2017See Pinkhasov v. Petocz , 331 S.W.3d 285 , 294 (Ky.App. 2011) (construing a Kentucky marriage statute, which stated that "[n]o marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor," to require a license before solemnization (citation omitted)); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking , 46 Wash.App. 816 , 732 P.2d 1021 , 1023 (1987) (finding that a woman, who merely cohabitated with a man, was not the man's wife for the purposes of a wrongful death claim because "a marriage can be created only by compliance with the statutory provisions"); Kisla v. Kisla , 124 W.Va. 220 , 19 S.E.2d 609 , 609-11 (1942) (findi | 1 | 1 |
Dodson v. Potomac MacK Sales & Service, Inc.green2 sentences2006Specifically, in Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, Inc., 241 Va. 89, 95 , 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the 1984 version of Virginia Code § 8.01-244(B) 2 contained a specific tolling provision which trumped the provisions of Virginia Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) if a nonsuit was suffered to a wrongful death claim. 2006Specifically, in Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, Inc., 241 Va. 89, 95 , 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the 1984 version of Virginia Code § 8.01-244(B) 2 contained a specific tolling provision which trumped the provisions of Virginia Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) if a nonsuit was suffered to a wrongful death claim. | 1 | 1 |
Hathaway v. Warner-Lambert, Inc.green1 sentence2005Rather, the death “transmits or substitutes the right [of action], with certain limitations stated in the cognate statutes, to bring the [cause of] action which the decedent had at the time of his death.” Hathaway v. Warner-Lambert, Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 399, 400-01 (Richmond 1998) (citing Sherley, 200 Va. at 176 , 104 S.E.2d at 797 ). | 1 | 1 |
Fowler v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2005Fowler v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc., 266 Va. 131, 136 , 580 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2003). 2005Fowler v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc., 266 Va. 131, 136 , 580 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caputo v. Holt, Administratrixgreen2 sentences1991Caputo v. Holt, 217 Va. 302, 305 , 228 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1976). 1991Caputo v. Holt, 217 Va. 302, 305 , 228 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1976). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Thus, Mason “assum[ed] all risk of personal injury from defects therein.” See id. (quoting Isbell, 273 Va. at 611 ). 2 The Herndons’ pleadings are unclear as to which cause or causes of action they assert to be the basis for the wrongful death claim. 2024Thus, Mason “assum[ed] all risk of personal injury from defects therein.” See id. (quoting Isbell, 273 Va. at 611 ). 2 The Herndons’ pleadings are unclear as to which cause or causes of action they assert to be the basis for the wrongful death claim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017See Pinkhasov v. Petocz , 331 S.W.3d 285 , 294 (Ky.App. 2011) (construing a Kentucky marriage statute, which stated that "[n]o marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor," to require a license before solemnization (citation omitted)); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking , 46 Wash.App. 816 , 732 P.2d 1021 , 1023 (1987) (finding that a woman, who merely cohabitated with a man, was not the man's wife for the purposes of a wrongful death claim because "a marriage can be created only by compliance with the statutory provisions"); Kisla v. Kisla , 124 W.Va. 220 , 19 S.E.2d 609 , 609-11 (1942) (findi 2017See Pinkhasov v. Petocz , 331 S.W.3d 285 , 294 (Ky.App. 2011) (construing a Kentucky marriage statute, which stated that "[n]o marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor," to require a license before solemnization (citation omitted)); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking , 46 Wash.App. 816 , 732 P.2d 1021 , 1023 (1987) (finding that a woman, who merely cohabitated with a man, was not the man's wife for the purposes of a wrongful death claim because "a marriage can be created only by compliance with the statutory provisions"); Kisla v. Kisla , 124 W.Va. 220 , 19 S.E.2d 609 , 609-11 (1942) (findi | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kisla v. Kisla
neutral
2 sentences2017See Pinkhasov v. Petocz , 331 S.W.3d 285 , 294 (Ky.App. 2011) (construing a Kentucky marriage statute, which stated that "[n]o marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor," to require a license before solemnization (citation omitted)); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking , 46 Wash.App. 816 , 732 P.2d 1021 , 1023 (1987) (finding that a woman, who merely cohabitated with a man, was not the man's wife for the purposes of a wrongful death claim because "a marriage can be created only by compliance with the statutory provisions"); Kisla v. Kisla , 124 W.Va. 220 , 19 S.E.2d 609 , 609-11 (1942) (findi 2017See Pinkhasov v. Petocz , 331 S.W.3d 285 , 294 (Ky.App. 2011) (construing a Kentucky marriage statute, which stated that "[n]o marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor," to require a license before solemnization (citation omitted)); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking , 46 Wash.App. 816 , 732 P.2d 1021 , 1023 (1987) (finding that a woman, who merely cohabitated with a man, was not the man's wife for the purposes of a wrongful death claim because "a marriage can be created only by compliance with the statutory provisions"); Kisla v. Kisla , 124 W.Va. 220 , 19 S.E.2d 609 , 609-11 (1942) (findi | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Beavers v. Beavers
green
2 sentences2015In Beavers v. Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 423 , 39 S.E.2d 288 (1946), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, under the relevant statutes in effect at the time, an administrator qualified in the usual manner should not be removed except for cause. 2015In Beavers v. Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 423 , 39 S.E.2d 288 (1946), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, under the relevant statutes in effect at the time, an administrator qualified in the usual manner should not be removed except for cause. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Baer v. Broder
green
1 sentence2009Citing a New York case, Baer v. Broder, 447 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1982), the plaintiff claims the demurrer ought to be overruled because she is the “real party in interest.” The Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this argument in different contexts in wrongful death cases. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lucas v. HCMF Corp.
green
2 sentences2009Additionally, the administrators asserted that our decision in Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446 , 449-50, 384 S.E.2d 92 , 94 (1989), supported their position that a personal injury survival claim and a wrongful death claim could be presented to the trier of fact when the defendant contested the issue whether the alleged negligence that purportedly injured the decedent also contributed to the decedent's death. 2009Additionally, the administrators asserted that our decision in Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446 , 449-50, 384 S.E.2d 92 , 94 (1989), supported their position that a personal injury survival claim and a wrongful death claim could be presented to the trier of fact when the defendant contested the issue whether the alleged negligence that purportedly injured the decedent also contributed to the decedent's death. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning
green
2 sentences2008In Shenandoah Publishing, we stated that the legislative purpose underpinning Code § 8.01-55 served the public's "societal interest in learning whether compromise settlements are equitable and whether the courts are administering properly the powers conferred upon them." 235 Va. at 260 , 368 S.E.2d at 256 . 2008In Shenandoah Publishing, we stated that the legislative purpose underpinning Code § 8.01-55 served the public's "societal interest in learning whether compromise settlements are equitable and whether the courts are administering properly the powers conferred upon them." 235 Va. at 260 , 368 S.E.2d at 256 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Sherley v. Lotz
green
2 sentences2005Rather, the death “transmits or substitutes the right [of action], with certain limitations stated in the cognate statutes, to bring the [cause of] action which the decedent had at the time of his death.” Hathaway v. Warner-Lambert, Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 399, 400-01 (Richmond 1998) (citing Sherley, 200 Va. at 176 , 104 S.E.2d at 797 ). 2005Rather, the death “transmits or substitutes the right [of action], with certain limitations stated in the cognate statutes, to bring the [cause of] action which the decedent had at the time of his death.” Hathaway v. Warner-Lambert, Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 399, 400-01 (Richmond 1998) (citing Sherley, 200 Va. at 176 , 104 S.E.2d at 797 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Erie Ins. Co. Exchange v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995And, in Erie Insurance Company Exchange v. Jones, 248 Va. 437 , 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994), decided after the trial court’s ruling in the present case, we applied the Powell principles and held that two automobile liability insurers were not contractually bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage in a wrongful death claim because the damages were “merely incidental or tangential” to use of the truck in question, under the facts of that case. 1995And, in Erie Insurance Company Exchange v. Jones, 248 Va. 437 , 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994), decided after the trial court’s ruling in the present case, we applied the Powell principles and held that two automobile liability insurers were not contractually bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage in a wrongful death claim because the damages were “merely incidental or tangential” to use of the truck in question, under the facts of that case. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Morrison v. Bestler
green
2 sentences1992Additionally, Singh cites Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166 , 387 S.E.2d 753 (1991), for the proposition that Rahman could have filed suit prior to 90 days after giving notice of a medical malpractice claim. 1992Additionally, Singh cites Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166 , 387 S.E.2d 753 (1991), for the proposition that Rahman could have filed suit prior to 90 days after giving notice of a medical malpractice claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Horn v. Abernathy
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 235-36 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.