wrongful death claim in Florida

2025In Seifert, the supreme court addressed whether a wrongful death claim fell within the scope of a broad arbitration provision found in a home-purchase contract. 750 So. 2d at 635, 637 .

2013The Fifth District began its discussion by reviewing this Court’s decision in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla.1999), in which the Court held that a wrongful death claim was not arbitrable where the arbitration agreement contained in a homebuyer’s purchase and sale contract did not require the arbitration of personal injury tort claims.

2017Section; 768.20, Florida Statutes, provides guidance and states in part, “When a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate.” 6 When Mrs. Allen died, her personal injury case did not “self-destruct like the secret message on a rerun of ‘Mission Impossible.’ ” Niemi v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 862 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), Instead it abated until a personal representative was.appointed and the existing suit was amended to add the wrongful death claim.

2014The order stated “that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is Granted based on FS 768.20 and Capone v. Philip Morris, 56 So.3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)[sic] and Niemi v. Brown & Williamson, 862 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).” Roden appeals this order, raising two issues: (1) whether a wrongful death claim must be brought as a new and separate cause of action when a plaintiff dies during the pendency of a personal injury action, and (2) whether the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims bars Roden’s ability to amend the complaint in the instant case.

2021To the extent Mrs. Sheffield can be said to argue that a wrongful death action potentially involves causes of action of the enumerated survivors and of the decedent, see § 768.21(6), Fla. Stat. (listing the damages the “personal representative may recover for the decedent’s estate”), and even if we were to view a wrongful death action in that manner, the record nevertheless shows that this case involves only damages she sustained as a “survivor.” - 21 - In Capone, which involved an Engle progeny wrongful death action, the relevant issue was a procedural one, namely whether “a personal injury a

2018Id. at 377-78 ; accord Roden , 145 So.3d at 185 (allowing a personal representative a reasonable opportunity to amend complaint to add a wrongful death claim when the original plaintiff died after filing the lawsuit).

2018Id. at 377-78 ; accord Roden, 145 So. 3d at 185 (allowing a personal representative a reasonable opportunity to amend complaint to add a wrongful death claim when the original plaintiff died after filing the lawsuit).

2018Id. at 377-78 ; accord Roden , 145 So.3d at 185 (allowing a personal representative a reasonable opportunity to amend complaint to add a wrongful death claim when the original plaintiff died after filing the lawsuit).

2011Inc., 56 So.3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on [the plaintiff’s] death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extin guished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action-it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action.” See Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc. 314 So.2d 765, 770 (Fla.1975) (upholding section 768.20, and explaining that, “a separate lawsuit for death-resulting persona

2010The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on Frank’s death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action— it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action. 2 See § 768.20 (“[W]hen a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate”); Martin v. United Security Ser

2011Inc., 56 So.3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on [the plaintiff’s] death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extin guished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action-it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action.” See Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc. 314 So.2d 765, 770 (Fla.1975) (upholding section 768.20, and explaining that, “a separate lawsuit for death-resulting persona

2010The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on Frank’s death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action— it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action. 2 See § 768.20 (“[W]hen a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate”); Martin v. United Security Ser

2011See id. at 448 (noting that a single attorney may be able to represent the survivors when all of the survivors have a “commonality of interest” as to prosecuting a wrongful death claim and in distributing the recovery).

2004See Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.2003) (survivors cannot bring separate legal actions); Thompson v. Hodson, 825 So.2d 941, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA) ("By statute, a wrongful death claim is brought by one plaintiff — the personal representative of the estate of the deceased."), review denied, 835 So.2d 266 (Fla.2002).

2007See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 888 So.2d 102, 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(stating that only personal representatives have the authority to settle a wrongful death action); Thompson v. Hodson, 825 So.2d 941, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(explaining that, by statute, a wrongful death claim is brought by only one plaintiff โ€” the personal representative of the estate of the deceased).

2004See Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.2003) (survivors cannot bring separate legal actions); Thompson v. Hodson, 825 So.2d 941, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA) ("By statute, a wrongful death claim is brought by one plaintiff — the personal representative of the estate of the deceased."), review denied, 835 So.2d 266 (Fla.2002).

1983I agree with the majority’s handling of the wrongful death claim, but have other thoughts about disposition of the malpractice claim. 1 If the event which gave rise to the action for personal injuries is also the cause of death (which is actually a still-to-be-resolved issue of fact), 2 the personal injury cause of action does not survive. § 768.20, Fla.Stat. (1981); Perkins v. Variety Children’s Hospital, 413 So.2d 760, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1983I agree with the majority's handling of the wrongful death claim, but have other thoughts about disposition of the malpractice claim. [1] If the event which gave rise to the action for personal injuries is also the cause of death (which is actually a still-to-be-resolved issue of fact), [2] the personal injury cause of action does not survive. § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (1981); Perkins v. Variety Children's Hospital, 413 So.2d 760, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

2024An alternative wrongful death claim was asserted based on the nursing home’s “alleged negligence, specifically the failure ‘to render care, treatment and services in a reasonably prudent manner and in accordance with accepted standards of care and practice in the nursing home facilities industry.’” Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254, 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), approved, 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2013).

2013Because the wrongful death claim was based on alleged negligence, the Fifth District concluded that it fell “squarely within the language of the arbitration agreement.” Id.

2022To prevail on a wrongful death claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant caused the decedent’s death through some wrongful act that would have entitled the decedent to bring an action on their own behalf if they had survived. § 768.19, Fla. Stat.; see also Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A- Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 2002).

2013Since there was no right of action existing at the time of death, under the statute no wrongful death cause of action survived the decedent.” More recently, in Toombs , this Court barred recovery for a wrongful death claim predicated upon the dangerous instrumentality doctrine where the decedent had no right of action because she was a co-bailee of the vehicle. 833 So.2d at 118 .

2017Id. at 11-12 .

2003See id.

2016Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844, 846 (Fla.1954).

1967In Griffin v. Workman, Fla., 73 So.2d 844 , a wrongful death claim was brought in the name of the individual.

2021See Frazier, 508 So. 2d at 346 .

2019In Ard, a minor child was injured when his mother took him out of a car, placed him in dangerous position, and he was hit by a motor vehicle. 414 So. 2d at 1066.

2019Cf. Claire's Boutiques, 85 So. 3d at 1197 ("[P]ublic policy prohibits even a negligent parent from being compelled to contribute to his or her child's damages because of the strain it would place on the family relationship.").

2014Litig., 612 F.Supp. 1370, 1372 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (discussing cases where courts have found no relation back under rule 15, where amendments sought were distinct from the original pleadings, the facts set forth were separated by a significant amount of time, the claims sought to be added were based on facts of a different character, and the facts alleged led to different injuries); Velez v. Springer, 102 A.D.2d 823 , 476 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (1984) (“There can be no question that an amendment of a complaint to assert a cause of action for wrongful death, based upon the same acts which have already o

2014Just as the Third District held in Flores , “[although additional allegations of fact were inserted into the complaint as it progressed through its steps, and the legal theories of recovery were supplemented and modified, the substantive factual situation remained the same as that found in the original complaint.” 35 So.3d at 147 (emphasis added).