wrongful death claim in Kansas

2026Because Ingrid, as heir-at-law, was not specified as a party taking the appeal, and the estate cannot assert a wrongful-death claim, see Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 721 , 647 P.2d 1340 (1982), Textron contends this appeal should be dismissed.

2026Because Ingrid, as heir-at-law, was not specified as a party taking the appeal, and the estate cannot assert a wrongful-death claim, see Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 721 , 647 P.2d 1340 (1982), Textron contends this appeal should be dismissed.

2013Crockett, 247 Kan. at 441 .

1996In Crockett, 247 Kan. at 439 , we said: “Clark does not extend the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, but, instead, limits it to not more than two years from the date of death.” Crockett involved a wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice against a nursing home and a doctor.

2016He contends the phrase “loss of a complete family” in Instruction No. 19 was not legally appropriate, and he claims there was insufficient evidence to support the district courts decision to instruct the jury on the Burnettes’ claim for economic damages under Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, P.A., 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985).

2016He contends the phrase “loss of a complete family” in Instruction No. 19 was not legally appropriate, and he claims there was insufficient evidence to support the district courts decision to instruct the jury on the Burnettes’ claim for economic damages under Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, P.A., 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985).

2013Natalini, 278 Kan. at 143 .

2013Kan. 1982), aff'd 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984), and concluded: “Under Brubaker , the latest date the wrongful death claim could have accrued in the present case was not the date of [the decedent’s death], but . . . the date [the decedent] was discharged by” the defendants from their medical care.

2008Co., 951 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.D. 1997), involved a dispute over coverage in a claims-made liability policy for a wrongful death claim asserted approximately 2 years after the policy ended; Hunt v. Kling Motor Co., 841 F. Supp. 1098 (D.

2008Jeanes further points out that the Mason court relied on Flowers, Administratrix v. Marshall, Administrator, 208 Kan. 900 , 494 P.2d 1184 (1972), for tire rule when a particular cause of action survives the death of a party.

2008Jeanes further points out that the Mason court relied on Flowers, Administratrix v. Marshall, Administrator, 208 Kan. 900 , 494 P.2d 1184 (1972), for tire rule when a particular cause of action survives the death of a party.

2008Application of KS.A. 75-6104(e) The district court found the Wellhausens’ wrongful death claim to be barred by the discretionary function exception to the KTCA, K.S.A. 75-6104(e), which bars claims against a government entity or employee “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the level of discretion involved.” The Wellhausens point out that K.S.A. 75-6104(e) does not apply when “there is a clearly defined mandatory d

2008In Nero , our Supreme Court held that a university-landlord has a legal duty to use reasonable care to protect its student-tenants. 253 Kan. at 584 .

2008Co., 951 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.D. 1997), involved a dispute over coverage in a claims-made liability policy for a wrongful death claim asserted approximately 2 years after the policy ended; Hunt v. Kling Motor Co., 841 F. Supp. 1098 (D.

2008After the court in Katz held that the plaintiff decedent’s claim for loss of economic support survived her death, it went on to hold that her damages for that claim were limited to those which had accrued at the time of her death. 153 Ariz. at 606-07 .

2002The court found one aspect of Ling , which was the determination that there was no liability under K.S.A. 41-715, to be of particular significance in its consideration of the wrongful death claim. 251 Kan. at 438 .

2002The court also considered whether liability could be predicated on a violation of K.S.A. 21-3610 or K.S.A. 21-3610a and concluded that the legislature had not intended to impose civil liability for violations of the statute. 251 Kan. at 443 .

2001The legislature has spoken, however, by enacting the present statutes, and it is not the role of this court to speculate on possible improvements therein.” Johnson v. McArthur, 226 Kan. 128, 135 , 596 P.2d 148 (1979).

2001The legislature has spoken, however, by enacting the present statutes, and it is not the role of this court to speculate on possible improvements therein.” Johnson v. McArthur, 226 Kan. 128, 135 , 596 P.2d 148 (1979).

2001K.S.A. 8-222 provides: “Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of sixteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle.” *743 The district court read Smithson, Executor v. Dunham, 201 Kan. 455 , 441 P.2d 823 (1968), as indicating that K.S.A. 8-222 applies in circumstances like those in the present case.

2001K.S.A. 8-222 provides: “Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of sixteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle.” *743 The district court read Smithson, Executor v. Dunham, 201 Kan. 455 , 441 P.2d 823 (1968), as indicating that K.S.A. 8-222 applies in circumstances like those in the present case.

1999Cottengim’s Adm’r v. Adams’ Adm’x, 255 S.W.2d 637, 638-39 (Ky. App. 1953)(holding that applying different venue rules would “bring about an anomalous situation and fix the venue of an action where only personal injury resulted from another’s negligence different from the venue of one where death resulted therefrom, although both arose from the same facts”); Green v. North Arundel Hospital, 126 Md.

1999Railway Co. v. Lasca, 79 Kan. 311, 316 , 99 Pac. 616 (1909).

1999Railway Co. v. Lasca, 79 Kan. 311, 316 , 99 Pac. 616 (1909).

1992The trial court correctly noted that the personal injury action arose prior to the effective date of the statute, and therefore the statute, if applicable at all, could only apply to the wrongful death claim.” 245 Kan. at 358 .

1981In Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 226 Kan. 1 , 596 P.2d 446 (1979), the Supreme Court confronted a wrongful death claim brought by a plaintiff against the Kansas Turnpike Authority.

1981In Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 226 Kan. 1 , 596 P.2d 446 (1979), the Supreme Court confronted a wrongful death claim brought by a plaintiff against the Kansas Turnpike Authority.

1969(See In re Estate of Preston, 193 Kan. 145 , 392 P. 2d 922 .) He therefore concludes the plaintiff was required to obtain the appointment of an administrator for the MacHarg estate in Jackson county, Kansas, and file the wrongful death claim in the probate court.

1969(See In re Estate of Preston, 193 Kan. 145 , 392 P. 2d 922 .) He therefore concludes the plaintiff was required to obtain the appointment of an administrator for the MacHarg estate in Jackson county, Kansas, and file the wrongful death claim in the probate court.