wrongful death claim in Maryland

2025The decedent was survived by 25 To be sure, in Mummert, we stated: “We hold that the [General Assembly] did not intend to define ‘wrongful act’ so as to render a wrongful death claim contingent on the decedent’s ability to file timely a tort claim prior to death.” 435 Md. at 210 (emphasis added).

2025Mummert, 435 Md. at 210 (“We hold that the Legislature did not intend to define ‘wrongful act’ so as to render a wrongful death claim contingent on the decedent’s ability to file timely a tort claim prior to death”).

2016On the other hand, it is incorrect to say that a wrongful death claim is “derivative” of a decedent’s claim in the sense that “all defenses applicable to the decedent’s claim prior to her death would preclude necessarily maintenance of a wrongful death claim after the decedent’s death.” Id.; accord Eagan, 347 Md. at 82 , 698 A.2d 1097 (explaining that a wrongful death claim “derives” from the decedent’s underlying injury in the sense that it is “based on the death of another person” but not in the sense that it is “brought in a derivative or representative capacity to recover for a loss or inj

2016On the other hand, it is incorrect to say that a wrongful death claim is “derivative” of a decedent’s claim in the sense that “all defenses applicable to the decedent’s claim prior to her death would preclude necessarily maintenance of a wrongful death claim after the decedent’s death.” Id.; accord Eagan, 347 Md. at 82 , 698 A.2d 1097 (explaining that a wrongful death claim “derives” from the decedent’s underlying injury in the sense that it is “based on the death of another person” but not in the sense that it is “brought in a derivative or representative capacity to recover for a loss or inj

2016“Conversely, a number of those jurisdictions holding that a wrongful death claim is contingent on the decedent’s bringing or ability to bring a timely negligence claim prior to death have less distinct and comparable wrongful death statute.” Mummert, 435 Md. at 225 -26 (citing Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1992)).

2016“Conversely, a number of those jurisdictions holding that a wrongful death claim is contingent on the decedent’s bringing or ability to bring a timely negligence claim prior to death have less distinct and comparable wrongful death statute.” Mummert, 435 Md. at 225-26 , 77 A.3d 1049 (citing Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.1992)).

2018See Goss v. Estate of Jennings, 207 Md.

2018See Goss v. Estate of Jennings , 207 Md.

2022Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that an independent contractor’s employee was not a “third person” under § 411 for purposes of a wrongful death claim); Urena, 930 A.2d at 878 (“[W]e hold that the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 411 19 With the exception of the fifth point referenced in Carney, we find the rationale of those courts persuasive.

2022Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that an independent contractor’s employee was not a “third person” under § 411 for purposes of a wrongful death claim); Urena, 930 A.2d at 878 (“[W]e hold that the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 411 19 With the exception of the fifth point referenced in Carney, we find the rationale of those courts persuasive.

2017See, e.g., *622 **139 Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556 , 565, 510 A.2d 562 , 566 (1986) (stating that "this Court's established policy is to decide constitutional issues only when necessary.").

2017See, e.g., *622 **139 Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556 , 565, 510 A.2d 562 , 566 (1986) (stating that "this Court's established policy is to decide constitutional issues only when necessary.").

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614 - 15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[a]lthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dispensing with bas

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614-15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 364 Ill.Dec. 66 , 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[ajlthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dis

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614 - 15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[a]lthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dispensing with bas

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614-15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 364 Ill.Dec. 66 , 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[ajlthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dis

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614 - 15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[a]lthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dispensing with bas

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614-15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 364 Ill.Dec. 66 , 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[ajlthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dis

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614 - 15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[a]lthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dispensing with bas

2016See Decamacho, 316 P.3d at 614-15 (reasoning that language in wrongful death statute describing the nature of the wrong “does not specify that a wrongful death claim must be pursued in exactly the same manner, such as through arbitration, as one brought by the decedent”); Carter, 364 Ill.Dec. 66 , 976 N.E.2d at 359 (“[ajlthough a wrongful-death action is dependent upon the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor this court’s case law suggests that this limitation on the cause of action provides a basis for dis

2024Because the CQE lacks any opinion that Mr. Robinson’s death was proximately caused by Canton Harbor’s breaches in the standards of nursing care, however, there is no proximate causation attestation to support Mrs. Robinson’s wrongful death claim. 8 In apparent recognition of that insufficiency, plaintiffs’ counsel stated at the motion hearing that Mrs. Robinson was no longer pursuing a wrongful death claim, but instead limited her damages claim to the ulcer injuries Mr. Robinson allegedly suffered while he was at Canton Harbor. 9 8 “Maryland’s wrongful death statute allows the maintenance of a

2024Because the CQE lacks any opinion that Mr. Robinson’s death was proximately caused by Canton Harbor’s breaches in the standards of nursing care, however, there is no proximate causation attestation to support Mrs. Robinson’s wrongful death claim. 8 In apparent recognition of that insufficiency, plaintiffs’ counsel stated at the motion hearing that Mrs. Robinson was no longer pursuing a wrongful death claim, but instead limited her damages claim to the ulcer injuries Mr. Robinson allegedly suffered while he was at Canton Harbor. 9 8 “Maryland’s wrongful death statute allows the maintenance of a

2013The original limitation in the 1852 enactment was twelve months, but it was extended later to eighteen months, then to two years, and eventually to three years to bring it “in uniformity with that of other negligence actions.” Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52 , 55-56 & n. 4, 626 A.2d 353 , 354-55 & n. 4 (1993).

2013The original limitation in the 1852 enactment was twelve months, but it was extended later to eighteen months, then to two years, and eventually to three years to bring it “in uniformity with that of other negligence actions.” Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52 , 55-56 & n. 4, 626 A.2d 353 , 354-55 & n. 4 (1993).

2011See Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp., 162 Md.App. 173, 203 , 873 A.2d 463 (2005) (“For a survival action to lie, there is no requirement that the injuries sustained by the decedent be the cause of death, thus, death is irrelevant to the cause of action.”).

2011See Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp., 162 Md.App. 173, 203 , 873 A.2d 463 (2005) (“For a survival action to lie, there is no requirement that the injuries sustained by the decedent be the cause of death, thus, death is irrelevant to the cause of action.”).

2025The facts of Taylor were cabined to the Act itself: the decedent was killed by a third party, 233 Md. at 407 , and the law permitted the dependents in Taylor—even after an award under the Act—to file a wrongful death claim, L&E § 9-902(c); the law simply would have required the dependents to reimburse any funds previously paid under the Act, id. § 9- 902(e), (g).

2025See Taylor, 233 Md. at 413 (“Thus, if the[] . . . children [born out of wedlock] . . . had not been entitled to sue as dependents under the . . .

2025Med., 371 Md. 188, 206 (2002), and preclusion of a non-dependent adult child’s wrongful death claim would not constitute such a restriction.” At first glance, the Majority appears to adopt the General Assembly’s position, e.g., “Article 19 generally prohibits unreasonable restrictions upon [1] traditional remedies or [2] access to the courts[,]” and concludes that Article 19 protects against unreasonable impediments to the pursuit of a recognized “common law right of action” and unreasonable restrictions on - 17 - access to courts where “fundamental rights” are concerned.

2021In corporate law, in order “to determine whether a ( . . . continued) standard to a pecuniary damage claim for lost household services in a wrongful death claim. 19 majority shareholder's misconduct vis-a-vis a minority shareholder has been so severe as to trigger the possible demise of the corporation, a court measures that conduct against the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the minority shareholder when the minority shareholder obtained his or her interest in the company.” Bontempo v. Lare, 444 Md. 344, 365 (2015).