wrongful death claim in Pennsylvania

2025A wrongful death claim “has as its basis the same tortious act which would have supported the injured party’s own cause of action.” Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

2019The trial court in Pisano overruled the nursing home’s preliminary objections, and determined that while “a wrongful death action ‘lies in the tortious act which would support a survival action,’ [the wrongful death claim] ‘is independent of the decedent’s estate’s rights to an action against the tortfeasor.’” Id. at 654 (citation omitted).

2018In Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d at 915 (Pa. Super. 2010), defendant hospital contended that the jury's award of $2.5 million for the wrongful death claim was excessive where decedent was unmarried, had no children or dependents and provided only limited services in his parents' home on weekends.

2018In Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d at 915 (Pa. Super. 2010), defendant hospital contended that the jury's award of $2.5 million for the wrongful death claim was excessive where decedent was unmarried, had no children or dependents and provided only limited services in his parents' home on weekends.

1995However, the actions for damages are cumulative and are not to overlap or result in duplication of damages.” Kiser v. Schulte, 538 Pa. 219, 226-27 , 648 A.2d 1, 4 (1994). (citations omitted) It is well-settled that one seeking to procure a share of wrongful death proceeds must prove both a “family relationship and pecuniary loss before he may be included in the distributional schedule.” Manning v. Capelli, 270 Pa. Super. 207, 213 , 411 A.2d 252, 256 (1979). (emphasis added) Pecuniary loss in the context of a wrongful death claim “is not a matter of guess or conjecture, but must be grounded on

1995However, the actions for damages are cumulative and are not to overlap or result in duplication of damages.” Kiser v. Schulte, 538 Pa. 219, 226-27 , 648 A.2d 1, 4 (1994). (citations omitted) It is well-settled that one seeking to procure a share of wrongful death proceeds must prove both a “family relationship and pecuniary loss before he may be included in the distributional schedule.” Manning v. Capelli, 270 Pa. Super. 207, 213 , 411 A.2d 252, 256 (1979). (emphasis added) Pecuniary loss in the context of a wrongful death claim “is not a matter of guess or conjecture, but must be grounded on

2017Further, the panel determined Rule 213 and the Wrongful Death Act4 were not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).5 Therefore, we were compelled to conclude the trial court did not abuse its ____________________________________________ 3 Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) provides: “A cause of action for the wrongful death of a decedent and a cause of action for the injuries of the decedent which survives his or her death may be enforced in one action, but if independent actions are commenced they shall be consolidated for trial.” Pa.R.C.P. 213(e). 4 The panel found additional support for consolidati

2016Taylor, 113 A.3d at 325 . 5 Section 8301(a) provides as follows: (a) General rule.--An action may be brought, under procedures prescribed by general rules, to recover damages for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another if no recovery for the same damages claimed in the wrongful death action was obtained by the injured individual during his lifetime and any prior actions for the same injuries are consolidated with the wrongful death claim so as to avoid a duplicate recovery. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301(a). [J-43-2016] - 7 Attempting t

2010Plumsteadville Family Practice Inc., 589 Pa. 183, 210-11 , 907 A.2d 1061, 1077-78 (2006) (holding that Superior Court’s erred in granting judgment n.o.v on a wrongful death claim and remanding for new trial on that claim and on damages); McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 545 Pa. 209, 216 , 680 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1996) (holding that the Superior Court’s erred to the extent that it allowed a new trial on a lung cancer claim and affirming the grant of a new trial limited to non-cancer injury claims); Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 507 Pa. 592, 598 , 493 A.2d 669, 672-74 (1985) (hold

2010Plumsteadville Family Practice Inc., 589 Pa. 183, 210-11 , 907 A.2d 1061, 1077-78 (2006) (holding that Superior Court’s erred in granting judgment n.o.v on a wrongful death claim and remanding for new trial on that claim and on damages); McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 545 Pa. 209, 216 , 680 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1996) (holding that the Superior Court’s erred to the extent that it allowed a new trial on a lung cancer claim and affirming the grant of a new trial limited to non-cancer injury claims); Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 507 Pa. 592, 598 , 493 A.2d 669, 672-74 (1985) (hold

2024Therefore, Appellant posits that Mr. Cooper’s underlying personal injury action was timely filed, remained viable at the time of his death, and, it follows, capable of sustaining Appellant’s wrongful death action filed after his passing.4 ____________________________________________ 4 “Although a third party's right of action in a wrongful death claim is an independent statutory claim of a decedent's heirs and is not derivative of a decedent's right of action, . . . ‘a wrongful death claim still requires a tortious injury to succeed.’” Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, 209 A.3d 941, 94

2024Therefore, Appellant posits that Mr. Cooper’s underlying personal injury action was timely filed, remained viable at the time of his death, and, it follows, capable of sustaining Appellant’s wrongful death action filed after his passing.4 ____________________________________________ 4 “Although a third party's right of action in a wrongful death claim is an independent statutory claim of a decedent's heirs and is not derivative of a decedent's right of action, . . . ‘a wrongful death claim still requires a tortious injury to succeed.’” Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, 209 A.3d 941 , 9

2015Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Iowa 2000), the insurer, faced with a wrongful death claim brought against its insured, defended its insured subject to a reservation of rights, asserting that the employee exclusion provision of the policy resulted in a lack of coverage because the victim was alleged to be an employee of the insured.

2015Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Iowa 2000), the insurer, faced with a wrongful death claim brought against its insured, defended its insured subject to a reservation of rights, asserting that the employee exclu sion provision of the policy resulted in a lack of coverage because the victim was alleged to be an employee of the insured.

2022Thereafter, in Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016), the main issue was whether survival and wrongful death claims should be tried together in court when the survival claim implicated an arbitration agreement, but the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration.

2022Thereafter, in Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016), the main issue was whether survival and wrongful death claims should be tried together in court when the survival claim implicated an arbitration agreement, but the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration.

2015Id. -4- J-A11016-15 Sunderland, 791 A.2d at 390-391 (emphasis added; parallel citations omitted).2 Applying these settled principles in the present case, I would hold that a decedent’s actions or agreements that support substantive defenses asserting that the defendant’s actions were not tortious can be asserted in defense of claims brought by third party wrongful death claimants.

2004In the context of this reform, we again limit venue to the location of the alleged negligent care by declining to expand venue to include any county where a patient happens to ingest a medication she alleges is negligently prescribed by a physician. ¶ 12 Our conclusion is further bolstered by our holding in Sunderland, supra. In Sunderland , we were faced with the question of whether, when a decedent is fatally injured in one county but dies in another, a wrongful death claim arises in the county of the initial tortious conduct or in the county of death.

2022Kohlman I, 228 A.3d at 926-27.

2022Kohlman I, 228 A.3d at 926-27 .

2021See id. at 53-55 (relying on this Court’s decision in MacPherson v. Magee Mem’l Hosp. for Convalescence, 128 A.3d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)).

2021See id. at 53-55 (relying on this Court’s decision in MacPherson v. Magee Mem’l Hosp. for Convalescence, 128 A.3d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)).

2020See Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1034 (authorizing the computation of lost future earnings to include inflation and productivity); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Estate of Wilson, 383 A.2d 808, 812-13 (Pa. 1978) (stating that the exact amount of breach of contract damages are generally difficult to prove, but the net profit percentage is able to be determined with some specificity); Gordon v. Trovato, 338 A.2d 653, 657 (Pa. Super. 1975) (holding a plaintiff must prove lost wages with specific evidence).

2020See Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1034 (authorizing the computation of lost future earnings to include inflation and productivity); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Estate of Wilson, 383 A.2d 808, 812-13 (Pa. 1978) (stating that the exact amount of breach of contract damages are generally difficult to prove, but the net profit percentage is able to be determined with some specificity); Gordon v. Trovato, 338 A.2d 653, 657 (Pa. Super. 1975) (holding a plaintiff must prove lost wages with specific evidence).

2020See Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1034 (authorizing the computation of lost future earnings to include inflation and productivity); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Estate of Wilson, 383 A.2d 808, 812-13 (Pa. 1978) (stating that the exact amount of breach of contract damages are generally difficult to prove, but the net profit percentage is able to be determined with some specificity); Gordon v. Trovato, 338 A.2d 653, 657 (Pa. Super. 1975) (holding a plaintiff must prove lost wages with specific evidence).

2020Lafage, 766 A.2d at 1073 (citation omitted).

2019See Brown v. D. & P. Willow Inc., 454 Pa. Super. 539 , 686 A.2d 14 , 15 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1996) (order directing fee dispute to binding arbitration was appealable and not interlocutory because it contained “sufficient trappings of finality” in that appellant was required to have dispute heard by local bar association, not court of record, and arbitrators’ decision was non- -8- J-A12022-18 Next, Fox claims the trial court erred in its application of Taylor v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1375 (U.S. 2017) (“Taylor II”), because Son is a benef

2019See Brown v. D. & P. Willow Inc., 454 Pa. Super. 539 , 686 A.2d 14 , 15 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1996) (order directing fee dispute to binding arbitration was appealable and not interlocutory because it contained “sufficient trappings of finality” in that appellant was required to have dispute heard by local bar association, not court of record, and arbitrators’ decision was non- -8- J-A12022-18 Next, Fox claims the trial court erred in its application of Taylor v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1375 (U.S. 2017) (“Taylor II”), because Son is a benef

2019See Brown v. D. & P. Willow Inc., 454 Pa. Super. 539 , 686 A.2d 14 , 15 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1996) (order directing fee dispute to binding arbitration was appealable and not interlocutory because it contained “sufficient trappings of finality” in that appellant was required to have dispute heard by local bar association, not court of record, and arbitrators’ decision was non- -8- J-A12022-18 Next, Fox claims the trial court erred in its application of Taylor v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1375 (U.S. 2017) (“Taylor II”), because Son is a benef

2017See id. ⅜ ⅜ * We vacate the judgment on the arbitration award, vacate the arbitration award to the extent it resolved Del Ciotto’s wrongful death claim, remand for further proceedings on the wrongful death claim (including trial, if deemed necessary), vacate the order granting ManorCare’s motion for judgment on the arbitration award, and affirm in part and reverse in part the order sustaining ManorCare’s preliminary objections regarding arbitration.

2017Because the claims are separate and distinct, and because the wrongful death action “bears no relation to the damages recoverable by a decedent who sues for the injury while living,” Stegner v. Fenton, 351 Pa. 292 , 40 A.2d 473, 475 (1945), we cannot agree that the Deceased’s contractual obligation to the Welfare Fund transferred to the wrongful-death claim. 6 Relatedly, we also reject applicability of McCutchen.

2017Because the claims are separate and distinct, and because the wrongful death action “bears no relation to the damages recoverable by a decedent who sues for the injury while living,” Stegner v. Fenton, 351 Pa. 292 , 40 A.2d 473, 475 (1945), we cannot agree that the Deceased’s contractual obligation to the Welfare Fund transferred to the wrongful-death claim. 6 Relatedly, we also reject applicability of McCutchen.