127 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wells v. Travisgreen2 sentences2015App. 3d at 386 (when a wrongful death claim is predicated on a claim of medical malpractice that was not apparent to the plaintiff at the time of death, “the time for filing a wrongful death claim will be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions under section 13-212(a) of the Code”); Wells, 284 Ill. 2015App. 3d at 386 (when a wrongful death claim is predicated on a claim of medical malpractice that was not apparent to the plaintiff at the time of death, “the time for filing a wrongful death claim will be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions under section 13-212(a) of the Code”); Wells, 284 Ill. | 6 | 6 |
Limer v. Lymangreen2 sentences2016Notably, however, a wrongful-death claim, like a spoliation claim, is derivative: “derivative of the action [the] decedent had in his lifetime.” Limer v. Lyman, 220 Ill. 2015Notably, however, a wrongful-death claim, like a spoliation claim, is derivative: “derivative of the action [the] decedent had in his lifetime.” Limer v. Lyman, 220 Ill. | 5 | 5 |
Glenn v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2026The amount recovered “shall be distributed ‘to each of the surviving -17- No. 1-24-0371 spouse and next of kin of such deceased person in the proportion, as determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person.’ ” Carter, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 39 (quoting 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2006)). “[T]he personal representative in a wrongful- death claim is ‘merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the survivin 2020Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the personal representative in a wrongful death claim is “merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, who are the true parties in interest.” Glenn v. Johnson, 198 Ill. 2d 575, 583 (2002); see also Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 361 (1995) (statutory requirement that wrongful death action be brought by and in the name of the personal representative serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits by the next of kin, and ensures th | 4 | 4 |
Neade v. Engelgreen2 sentences2015App. 3d at 287 (statute of limitations for wrongful death action began to run when plaintiff learned of defendant’s negligence); Neade, 277 Ill. 2015App. 3d at 287 (statute of limitations for wrongful death action began to run when plaintiff learned of defendant’s negligence); Neade, 277 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Companygreen2 sentences2026The amount recovered “shall be distributed ‘to each of the surviving -17- No. 1-24-0371 spouse and next of kin of such deceased person in the proportion, as determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person.’ ” Carter, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 39 (quoting 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2006)). “[T]he personal representative in a wrongful- death claim is ‘merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the survivin 2026The amount recovered “shall be distributed ‘to each of the surviving -17- No. 1-24-0371 spouse and next of kin of such deceased person in the proportion, as determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person.’ ” Carter, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 39 (quoting 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2006)). “[T]he personal representative in a wrongful- death claim is ‘merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the survivin | 3 | 7 |
Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences2016Thus, the limitations period for a wrongful-death claim begins to run at the time of the death, but “only if the deceased had a claim that was not time barred on or before his death.” Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. 2015Thus, the limitations period for a wrongful-death claim begins to run at the time of the death, but “only if the deceased had a claim that was not time barred on or before his death.” Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. | 3 | 5 |
Ott Ex Rel. Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hospitalgreen2 sentences2018Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 273 Ill. 2018Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital , 273 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
Young v. McKieguegreen2 sentences2015Young, 303 Ill. 2015See Young, 303 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hallgreen2 sentences2011Cf. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 (finding that a wrongful death claim did not arise out of defendant's activities in Texas, where the helicopter crash occurred in Peru and not Texas). ¶ 30 In the case at bar, both parties cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), as the high court's most recent, relevant statement about minimum contacts, but they disagreed about what Asahi means, and how it should be applied to the facts of our case. 2011Cf. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 (finding that a wrongful death claim did not arise out of defendant's activities in Texas, where the helicopter crash occurred in Peru and not Texas). ¶ 30 In the case at bar, both parties cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), as the high court's most recent, relevant statement about minimum contacts, but they disagreed about what Asahi means, and how it should be applied to the facts of our case. | 3 | 4 |
Kanne v. Bulkley Modification of June 30, 1999green2 sentences2019Id. ¶ 31. ¶ 15 Section 13-212(a) of the Code provides: “Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whi 2018Id. ¶ 31. ¶ 15 Section 13-212(a) of the Code provides "Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whic | 3 | 3 |
Berard v. Eagle Air Helicopter, Inc.green2 sentences2012See Berard v. Eagle Air Helicopter, Inc., 257 Ill. 2009See Berard v. Eagle Air Helicopter, Inc., 257 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Williams v. Manchestergreen2 sentences2020Id. at 412 . ¶ 32 Addressing this claim, this court noted that a wrongful death claim is barred if the decedent, at the time of death, would not have been able to pursue an action for personal injuries. 2019See Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 415 (2008) (the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common-law negligence claim); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987). ¶ 34 The proximate cause element is a factual question for the jury to decide and has two components: cause in fact and legal cause. | 2 | 7 |
Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineeringgreen2 sentences2020Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the personal representative in a wrongful death claim is “merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, who are the true parties in interest.” Glenn v. Johnson, 198 Ill. 2d 575, 583 (2002); see also Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 361 (1995) (statutory requirement that wrongful death action be brought by and in the name of the personal representative serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits by the next of kin, and ensures th 2012See also Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 361 (1995) (statutory requirement that wrongful-death action be brought by and in the name of the personal representative serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits by the next of kin, and ensures that the interests of all the beneficiaries are protected). ¶ 34 A wrongful-death action is perhaps best understood when contrasted with an action under our so-called “Survival Act,” now section 27-6 of the Probate Act of 1975. 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2006). | 2 | 6 |
Kubian v. Alexian Bros. Medical Centergreen2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 23 We held that the trial court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the wrongful-death claim. 2015Id. ¶ 23 We held that the trial court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the wrongful-death claim. | 2 | 6 |
Baez v. Rosenberggreen2 sentences2018App. 3d 525 , 533, 350 Ill.Dec. 762 , 949 N.E.2d 250 (2011) ("the plain terms of section 2.1 of the Wrongful Death Act do not permit, in situations involving the absence of letters of administration, a special administrator to prosecute a wrongful death claim with other causes of action"). 3 Section 2-1008(a) provides in part that, after a substitution of a party, the cause or proceeding carries on "with or without a change in the title of the cause." 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(a) (West 2014). 2018App. 3d 525 , 533, 350 Ill.Dec. 762 , 949 N.E.2d 250 (2011) ("the plain terms of section 2.1 of the Wrongful Death Act do not permit, in situations involving the absence of letters of administration, a special administrator to prosecute a wrongful death claim with other causes of action"). 3 Section 2-1008(a) provides in part that, after a substitution of a party, the cause or proceeding carries on "with or without a change in the title of the cause." 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(a) (West 2014). | 2 | 4 |
Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, Inc.green2 sentences2008Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, Inc., 283 Ill. 2008Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, Inc., 283 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Cunningham v. Huffmangreen2 sentences2019Id. ¶ 31. ¶ 15 Section 13-212(a) of the Code provides: “Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whi 2018Id. ¶ 31. ¶ 15 Section 13-212(a) of the Code provides "Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whic | 2 | 3 |
Price v. Lunan Roberts, Inc.green2 sentences2025Price, 2023 IL App (1st) 220742, ¶¶ 30, 34 . 2025Price, 2023 IL App (1st) 220742, ¶¶ 30, 34 . | 2 | 2 |
| Kenyon v. Hammergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Cushing v. Greyhound Linesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridgegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Beetle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Giardina v. Bennettgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Cannon v. Commonwealth Edison Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Novander v. City of Morrisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| McGeehan v. Parke-Davisgreen | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Manchestergreen2 sentences2021“Aside from the additional element of the occurrence of death, the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common law negligence claim.” Williams v. Manchester, 372 Ill. 2008The appellate court began its analysis of that claim by observing that “[a]side from the additional element of the occurrence of death, the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common law negligence claim.” 372 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Centergreen2 sentences2019See Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 415 (2008) (the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common-law negligence claim); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987). ¶ 34 The proximate cause element is a factual question for the jury to decide and has two components: cause in fact and legal cause. 2018See Williams v. Manchester , 228 Ill. 2d 404 , 415, 320 Ill.Dec. 784 , 888 N.E.2d 1 (2008) (the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common-law negligence claim); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center , 117 Ill. 2d 507 , 525, 111 Ill.Dec. 944 , 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987). ¶ 34 The proximate cause element is a factual question for the jury to decide and has two components: cause in fact and legal cause. | 1 | 2 |
Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Center, LLC v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2018In Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Center, LLC v. Johnson, 650 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the plaintiff could amend a timely filed medical malpractice complaint to add a wrongful death claim, although the amendment was filed after the statute of repose had expired. 2017In Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Center, LLC v. Johnson , 286 Ga.App. 881 , 650 S.E.2d 387 (2007), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the plaintiff could amend a timely filed medical malpractice complaint to add a wrongful death claim, although the amendment was filed after the statute of repose had expired. | 1 | 2 |
| Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State of Illinois Department of Employment Securitygreen | 1 | 2 |
| Pelon v. Wallgreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re Estate of Mankowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodgers v. Cook County, Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nord v. Residential Alternatives of Illinois, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nagel v. Inmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wilmere v. Stiboltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Will v. Northwestern Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 416 . ¶ 19 The plain language of the Act required the plaintiff to file a wrongful death claim within two years of the date on which plaintiff knew of the death. 2015Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 416 . ¶ 19 The plain language of the Act required the plaintiff to file a wrongful death claim within two years of the date on which plaintiff knew of the death. | 5 | 1991–2015 |
Real v. Kim
green
2 sentences2016As to the wrongful death claim, the court noted that the plaintiff misapprehended the distinction between the two-year limitations period under section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act and “the fact that there is no liability under the Act unless the condition precedent specified by section 1 has been fulfilled.” Id. at 432 . 2016Accordingly, based on the holding in Real, section 1 of the Wrongful Death Act should not preclude Lawler from bringing a wrongful death claim for the same alleged malpractice because Prusak could have maintained a cause of action for damages “ ‘if death had not ensued.’ ” Id. at 432 (quoting Ill. | 4 | 1988–2018 |
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.
green
2 sentences2011Cf. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 (finding that a wrongful death claim did not arise out of defendant's activities in Texas, where the helicopter crash occurred in Peru and not Texas). ¶ 30 In the case at bar, both parties cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), as the high court's most recent, relevant statement about minimum contacts, but they disagreed about what Asahi means, and how it should be applied to the facts of our case. 2011Cf. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 (finding that a wrongful death claim did not arise out of defendant's activities in Texas, where the helicopter crash occurred in Peru and not Texas). ¶ 30 In the case at bar, both parties cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), as the high court's most recent, relevant statement about minimum contacts, but they disagreed about what Asahi means, and how it should be applied to the facts of our case. | 4 | 2011–2011 |
Moon v. Rhode
green
2 sentences2019Moon, 2016 IL 119572, ¶ 29 . 2018Moon , 2016 IL 119572 , ¶ 29, 409 Ill.Dec. 8 , 67 N.E.3d 220 . | 3 | 2018–2019 |
Sompolski v. Miller
green
2 sentences2016Id. ¶ 48 The Sompolski court reversed the trial court and ruled that the wrongful death claim related back to the original personal injury claim filed by the decedent. 2016According to the court, “the additional wrongful death claim filed by plaintiff arose from the same transaction or occurrence as that at issue in [the decedent’s] original complaint, i.e., the December 1985 automobile accident.” Id. at 1091 . ¶ 49 Citing Zeh, the Sompolski court stated that “[t]he right to amend does not depend on whether the cause of action set out in the amendment is substantially the same as that stated in the original pleading, but depends on whether the amendment relates back to the occurrence set out in the original pleading.” Id. at 1090 (citing Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 272- | 3 | 2016–2018 |
Hale v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2015The court refused to find that a decedent’s date of death triggered the start of the two-year statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s wrongful death claim because the “[p]laintiff could have reasonably believed [the decedent’s] death was the result of a nonnegligent factor.” Id. at 535 . 13 ¶ 37 Since 1987, Illinois courts have repeatedly and consistently applied the discovery rule to wrongful death claims. 2015The court refused to find that a decedent’s date of death triggered the start of the two-year statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s wrongful death claim because the “[p]laintiff could have reasonably believed [the decedent’s] death was the result of a nonnegligent factor.” Id. at 535 . 13 ¶ 37 Since 1987, Illinois courts have repeatedly and consistently applied the discovery rule to wrongful death claims. | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co.
green
2 sentences2024If the surviving spouse has remarried, the court is to include in the instruction that the “[Widow/widower] is not entitled to damages for loss of [decedent’s] society and sexual relations after [date of remarriage].” Id. ¶ 37 Dotson I, Dotson II, and Pfeifer ¶ 38 With that background in mind, we turn to the decisions of the appellate court addressing whether damages for loss of material services in a wrongful death claim terminate upon a plaintiff’s remarriage. 2023Id. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Hooper v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences2019Turcios v. The DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 23 ; -8- Hooper, 366 Ill. 2018Turcios v. The DeBruler Co. , 2015 IL 117962 , ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 541 , 32 N.E.3d 1117 ; Hooper , 366 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Turcios v. The DeBruler Company
green
2 sentences2019Turcios v. The DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 23 ; -8- Hooper, 366 Ill. 2018Turcios v. The DeBruler Co. , 2015 IL 117962 , ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 541 , 32 N.E.3d 1117 ; Hooper , 366 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
| Sisson v. Lhowe green | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| Lawler v. The University of Chicago Medical Center neutral | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| Evanston Insurance Company v. Riseborough green | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| Brooks v. McLean County District Unit No. 5 green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Green v. Rogers green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Estate of Poole green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| Mercado v. Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg green | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Institute of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Insurance green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Coveleski v. Bubnis green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Endresz v. Friedberg green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Chacon green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 531368 green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Foster v. Kanuri green | 2 | 1993–1996 |
| Holston v. Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Womick v. Jackson County Nursing Home green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Morris v. William L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Sturgill v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Stanphill v. Ortberg green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Merritt v. Hopkins Goldenberg, P.C. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Lambert v. Village of Summit green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1 green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Zeh v. Wheeler green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Simmons v. Hendricks green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Warsing v. Material Handling Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.