34 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Ottomeiergreen2 sentences2015Id. at 579-80 . ¶23 Johnson , a more recent Washington Supreme Court decision, involves a limitation on a wrongful death claim in the context of a disability to bringing suit, rather than a limitation based on the decedent’s actions or inaction dur ing his lifetime. 45 Wn.2d at 421 . 2015Deggs argues that case stands for the proposition that a personal representative’s wrongful death claim can accrue and persist even without a viable underlying claim in the decedent at the time of death. ¶24 In Johnson , a husband murdered his wife, Anna, and then committed suicide. 45 Wn.2d at 420 . | 4 | 6 |
Criscuola v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2016See Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 70-71 , 507 P.2d 149 (1973) (refusing to disallow overlapping survival and wrongful death actions, and instead avoiding double recovery by limiting lost income in survival action to net accumulations); WPI 31.01 cmt. at 336 (recognizing that same recovery may be allowed under survival and wrongful death statutes and “[c]are must be taken to avoid allowing a double recovery’’). 2016See Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 70-71 , 507 P.2d 149 (1973) (refusing to disallow overlapping survival and wrongful death actions, and instead avoiding double recovery by limiting lost income in survival action to net accumulations); WPI 31.01 cmt. at 336 (recognizing that same recovery may be allowed under survival and wrongful death statutes and “[c]are must be taken to avoid allowing a double recovery’’). | 2 | 2 |
Tait v. Wahlgreen2 sentences2016See Tait v. Wahl. 97 Wn. 2016See Tait v. Wahl. 97 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Aranda v. Cardenasgreen2 sentences2016Aranda. 159 P.3d at 212 . 2016See Aranda. 159 P.3d at 215 ("[The trial court] relied heavily on the absence of the types of proof acceptable in paternity actions in granting the defendants' motion and in so doing applied an incorrect standard in deciding the motion for summary judgment." (Emphasis added)). | 2 | 2 |
Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co.green2 sentences2016See Grant, 181 Wash. at 580 . 2016Id. at 581-82 . | 2 | 2 |
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperativegreen2 sentences2013The Herskovits plurality recognized a lost chance of survival as an "actionable injury"a under the wrongful death statute, actionable through a wrongful death claim based on medical negligence. 99 Wn.2d at 634 (Pearson, J., concurring). 2013The Herskovits plurality recognized a lost chance of survival as an “actionable injury” 8 under the wrongful death statute, actionable through a wrongful death claim based on medical negligence. 99 Wn.2d at 634 (Pearson, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.green2 sentences2013See Ralph Williams', 87 Wn.2d at 315 . 2013See Ralph Williams’, 87 Wn.2d at 315 . | 2 | 2 |
Beal v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences2017Kommavongsa, 149 Wn.2d at 317 (substituting a motorist as the real party plaintiff in interest in legal malpractice action rather than the guardians ad litem for a motorist’s wife and daughter who originally brought the legal malpractice action); and see Beal, 134 Wn.2d at 781 (allowing a plaintiff to bring a wrongful death claim in the capacity of a personal representative of a decedent, rather than in the capacity of a guardian ad litem for children of the decedent as in the original filing); Miller, 164 Wn.2d at 536 (allowing a bankruptcy debtor to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the r 2015FILED: November 9, 2015 Verellen, J. — "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."1 The real party in interest for a wrongful death claim is the personal representative of the estate, not a child of the decedent.2 The lack of a real party in interest is a basis to dismiss an action unless, within a reasonable time after an objection to the lack of a real party in interest, there is a motion to substitute the real party in interest.3 If the substitution is a change only in representative capacity and the 1CR 17(a). 2 Beal v. City of Seattle. 134 Wn.2d 769, 776 | 1 | 2 |
Dennick v. Scheiwergreen2 sentences2023In Dennick v. Scheiwer, 381 Pa. 200 , 113 A.2d 318, 319 (1955), the plaintiff sued under a death statute and brought a survival action, and the court held he was “a competent witness generally.” The trial court had observed, “‘To tell the jury to listen to the defendant in one claim and close its ear in the other might possibly be technically correct but practically senseless.’” Id. 22 No. 37545-5-III Murphy v. Medical Oncology Assoc., PS loss of enjoyment of life until her death. 2023In Dennick v. Scheiwer, 381 Pa. 200 , 113 A.2d 318, 319 (1955), the plaintiff sued under a death statute and brought a survival action, and the court held he was “a competent witness generally.” The trial court had observed, “‘To tell the jury to listen to the defendant in one claim and close its ear in the other might possibly be technically correct but practically senseless.’” Id. 22 No. 37545-5-III Murphy v. Medical Oncology Assoc., PS loss of enjoyment of life until her death. | 1 | 1 |
Fite v. Leegreen1 sentence2018Fite v. Lee, 11 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
Kommavongsa v. Haskellgreen1 sentence2017Kommavongsa, 149 Wn.2d at 317 (substituting a motorist as the real party plaintiff in interest in legal malpractice action rather than the guardians ad litem for a motorist’s wife and daughter who originally brought the legal malpractice action); and see Beal, 134 Wn.2d at 781 (allowing a plaintiff to bring a wrongful death claim in the capacity of a personal representative of a decedent, rather than in the capacity of a guardian ad litem for children of the decedent as in the original filing); Miller, 164 Wn.2d at 536 (allowing a bankruptcy debtor to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the r | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2017Kommavongsa, 149 Wn.2d at 317 (substituting a motorist as the real party plaintiff in interest in legal malpractice action rather than the guardians ad litem for a motorist’s wife and daughter who originally brought the legal malpractice action); and see Beal, 134 Wn.2d at 781 (allowing a plaintiff to bring a wrongful death claim in the capacity of a personal representative of a decedent, rather than in the capacity of a guardian ad litem for children of the decedent as in the original filing); Miller, 164 Wn.2d at 536 (allowing a bankruptcy debtor to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the r | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. New York Cotton Exchangegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wills v. Kirkpatrick
green
2 sentences2016Instead, it analyzed the question of “whether ‘damages for injury’ should be interpreted broadly to apply to injury to statutory beneficiaries in a wrongful death claim or should be limited to injury suffered by the patient.” Id. at 761 . 2015Id. ¶22 On appeal, the Wills court identified the issue before it as “whether the medical malpractice statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.350, which measures the period from the act or omission causing the injury, embraces a wrongful death claim based on medical malpractice.” 56 Wn. | 3 | 2015–2016 |
Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp.
green
2 sentences2025In the 1976 tort case Johnson, we rejected the lex loci delicti rule in favor of applying Restatement (Second) to determine whether Washington or Kansas law provided the applicable law on damages in a wrongful death claim. 87 Wn.2d at 580 . 1994In Johnson , the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether Kansas’s limitation on damages in wrongful death *246 actions should be applied by a Washington court hearing a Kansas resident’s wrongful death claim arising out of the collapse of scaffolding alleged to have been negligently manufactured by a Washington corporation. 87 Wn.2d at 580 . | 2 | 1994–2025 |
Deggs v. Asbestos Corp.
green
2 sentences2020The court noted that it had reached this very result—barring a wrongful death claim under the statute of limitations because the underlying claim lapsed during the deceased’s life—in Deggs v. Asbestos Corp., 186 Wn.2d 716, 732 , 381 P.3d 32 (2016). 2020The court noted that it had reached this very result—barring a wrongful death claim under the statute of limitations because the underlying claim lapsed during the deceased’s life—in Deggs v. Asbestos Corp., 186 Wn.2d 716, 732 , 381 P.3d 32 (2016). | 2 | 2018–2020 |
Deggs v. Asbestos Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Deqqs, 188 Wn. 2015But in Deggs v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., this court recently held that a decedent must have "a valid subsisting cause of action" at the time of death for a wrongful death claim to accrue.5 In that case, Roy Sundberg had "successfully sued several defendants for injuries related to asbestos exposure."6 After his death, his personal representative "filed a wrongful death action against one of the same defendants from [the previous] lawsuit and several new defendants."7 This court determined that Sundberg could not have brought another personal injury claim during his lifetime.8 To the extent that re | 2 | 2015–2018 |
Mohr v. Grantham
green
2 sentences2013See RCW 4.20.010; Herskovits, 99 Wn.2d at 631-32,634-35 (Pearson, J., concurring); Mohr, 172 Wn.2d at 857 . 2013See RCW 4.20.010; Herskovits, 99 Wn.2d at 631-32, 634-35 (Pearson, J., concurring); Mohr, 172 Wn.2d at 857 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Daugert v. Pappas
green
2 sentences2013Our Supreme Court soon called the loss of a chance an "analysis." Daugert, 104 Wn.2d at 262 . 2013Our Supreme Court soon called the loss of a chance an “analysis.” Daugert, 104 Wn.2d at 262 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Newell-Blais Post 443, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1990Co., 396 Mass. 633 , 487 N.E.2d 1371 (1986), the insurer denied coverage for a wrongful death claim alleging a veterans' organization was negligent in serving alcohol. 1990Co., 396 Mass. 633 , 487 N.E.2d 1371 (1986), the insurer denied coverage for a wrongful death claim alleging a veterans' organization was negligent in serving alcohol. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Orcutt v. Spokane County
green
2 sentences2026The Arsnow rule was reaffirmed 30 years later in Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wn.2d 846 , 364 P.2d 1102 (1961) (holding that plaintiff could use medical witness testimony to establish decedent’s “uncontrollable impulse” to commit suicide in a wrongful death claim). 2026The Arsnow rule was reaffirmed 30 years later in Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wn.2d 846 , 364 P.2d 1102 (1961) (holding that plaintiff could use medical witness testimony to establish decedent’s “uncontrollable impulse” to commit suicide in a wrongful death claim). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hunt v. King County
green
2 sentences2026Webstad’s adult son sued Stortini for a wrongful death claim, and the court granted summary judgment to Stortini. 13 Ruth Scott et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 103730-9 In Hunt v. King County, 4 Wn. 2026App. 14 , 481 P.2d 593 (1971), Division One provides a helpful discussion of Arsnow’s limits. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Huntington v. Samaritan Hospital
green
2 sentences2025App. 357 , 666 P.2d 405 (1983), aff’d, 101 Wn.2d 466 , 680 P.2d 58 (1984); and (2) the correct categorization of a creditor’s claim, Bartlett v. Estate of Parman, No. 56536-6-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056536-6-II%20Unpublished%20 Opinion.pdf. 2025App. 357 , 666 P.2d 405 (1983), aff’d, 101 Wn.2d 466 , 680 P.2d 58 (1984); and (2) the correct categorization of a creditor’s claim, Bartlett v. Estate of Parman, No. 56536-6-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056536-6-II%20Unpublished%20 Opinion.pdf. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Huntington v. Samaritan Hospital
green
2 sentences2025But the appellate issues addressed in two of the cases involved: (1) the authority 4 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West of a PR to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate, Huntington v. Samaritan Hospital, 35 Wn. 2025App. 357 , 666 P.2d 405 (1983), aff’d, 101 Wn.2d 466 , 680 P.2d 58 (1984); and (2) the correct categorization of a creditor’s claim, Bartlett v. Estate of Parman, No. 56536-6-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056536-6-II%20Unpublished%20 Opinion.pdf. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fast v. Kennewick Public Hospital District
green
2 sentences2020Fast, 187 Wn.2d at 39 . 2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, PS
green
2 sentences2019“We review judgments as a matter of law de novo.”®> A motion for judgment as a matter of law admits the truth of the evidence and reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party.5® Statutory interpretation is also a matter of law reviewed de novo.°” In its damages instructions, the court told the jury to consider economic damages, such as medical costs, and noneconomic damages, such as “pain, suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life experienced,” when calculating the extent of Leren’s injury.6° The court also told the jury to “consider what Marvin Leren reasonab 2019“We review judgments as a matter of law de novo.”®> A motion for judgment as a matter of law admits the truth of the evidence and reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party.5® Statutory interpretation is also a matter of law reviewed de novo.°” In its damages instructions, the court told the jury to consider economic damages, such as medical costs, and noneconomic damages, such as “pain, suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life experienced,” when calculating the extent of Leren’s injury.6° The court also told the jury to “consider what Marvin Leren reasonab | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bowers v. FIBREBOARD CORPORATION
green
2 sentences2018While we agree that the language of the wrongful -5- No. 74554-9-1/6 death act creates a separate cause of action on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries, we cannot agree that the judgment in the estate's survival action against Brandes had no effect on the estate's wrongful death claim.3 Washington's special survival statute, RCW 4.20.060, allows the executor or administrator of an estate "to recover for the decedent's damages, including any pain and suffering between the time of the injury and the time of death." Bowers v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 Wn. 2018App. 454,460 , 832 P.2d 523 (1992). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estate of Otani v. Broudy
green
1 sentence2018The distinguishing characteristic between a wrongful death claim and a survival action is "that the wrongful death statutes govern postdeath damages of the deceased and the survival statutes govern predeath damages." Broudv, 151 Wn.2d at 755 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Long v. Dugan
green
1 sentence2018“Loss of consortium is not, in and of itself, a cause of action but rather an element of damages.” Long v. Dugan, 57 Wn. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fast v. Kennewick Public Hospital District
green
2 sentences2018Regarding the wrongful death claim, the trial court granted summary judgment due to a violation of the statute of limitations, relying on Fast v. Kennewick Public Hospital District, 188 Wash.App. 43 , 354 P.3d 858 (2015), which held that the applicable statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim stemming from alleged medical malpractice is the general three-year period in RCW 4.16.080. ¶ 7 Ms. Reyes timely appealed the grant of summary judgment. 2018Regarding the wrongful death claim, the trial court granted summary judgment due to a violation of the statute of limitations, relying on Fast v. Kennewick Public Hospital District, 188 Wash.App. 43 , 354 P.3d 858 (2015), which held that the applicable statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim stemming from alleged medical malpractice is the general three-year period in RCW 4.16.080. ¶ 7 Ms. Reyes timely appealed the grant of summary judgment. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Upchurch v. Hubbard
green
2 sentences2016See Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 70-71 , 507 P.2d 149 (1973) (refusing to disallow overlapping survival and wrongful death actions, and instead avoiding double recovery by limiting lost income in survival action to net accumulations); WPI 31.01 cmt. at 336 (recognizing that same recovery may be allowed under survival and wrongful death statutes and "[c]are must be talcen to avoid allowing a double recovery"). -4- Deggs v. Asbestos Corp. Limited, et al., 91969-1 (Stephens, J., dissenting) wrongful act or default must be of such character as would have entitled the injured person to mainta 2016See Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 70-71 , 507 P.2d 149 (1973) (refusing to disallow overlapping survival and wrongful death actions, and instead avoiding double recovery by limiting lost income in survival action to net accumulations); WPI 31.01 cmt. at 336 (recognizing that same recovery may be allowed under survival and wrongful death statutes and "[c]are must be talcen to avoid allowing a double recovery"). -4- Deggs v. Asbestos Corp. Limited, et al., 91969-1 (Stephens, J., dissenting) wrongful act or default must be of such character as would have entitled the injured person to mainta | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ryan v. Poole green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Atchison v. Great Western Malting Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Shaw v. Rogers & Rogers neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Atchison v. Great Western Malting Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Beal for Martinez v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| James S. Black & Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Faust v. Albertson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Faust v. Albertson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Soter v. Cowles Pub. Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Allen v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Benton v. Associated Indemnity Corp. neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hartley v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State Ex Rel. Patchett v. SUP. CT. FOR FRANKLIN CTY. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Gray v. Goodson green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.