wrongful death claim in Texas

2019Russell v. Ingersoll– Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1992).

2008See Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.1992) (“the right of statutory beneficiaries to maintain a wrongful death action is entirely derivative of the decedent’s right to have sued for his own injuries immediately prior to his death,” and the beneficiaries “stand in the legal shoes of the decedent”).

2022Jacksboro Nursing, 2021 WL 1421431 , at *9 (“[I]f Plaintiff filed an adequate report to support the claim of a breach of the standard of Ashley’s care and her survival claim, then the report need not go further and support the wrongful-death claim to avoid dismissal.”); see Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2013) (“No provision of the [MLA] requires an expert report to address each alleged liability theory.”).

2016Ince responds that because Providers’ objections should be overruled, at least as to the survival claim, under Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, he need not show that the report is independently sufficient as to the wrongful death claim, and none of the claims are subject to dismissal. 392 S.W.3d 625, 626 (Tex. 2013).

2022A wrongful-death claim is generally covered by the Texas Wrongful Death Act, and “damages recoverable in a wrongful[-]death action are for the exclusive benefit of the defined statutory beneficiaries and are meant to compensate them for their own personal loss.” Cunningham v. Haroona, 382 S.W.3d 492, 508 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

2022A wrongful-death claim is generally covered by the Texas Wrongful Death Act, and “damages recoverable in a wrongful[-]death action are for the exclusive benefit of the defined statutory beneficiaries and are meant to compensate them for their own personal loss.” Cunningham v. Haroona, 382 S.W.3d 492, 508 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

2026We note that although they asserted a wrongful death claim under the WDA, the Horns also pleaded that TSS was “grossly negligent and should be subjected to exemplary damages pursuant to § 408.0001(b) of the Texas Labor Code and other applicable law.” 9 A. Governing Law “At common law there was no recognized cause of action for the wrongful death of another person.” In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2009).

2014Because the wrongful death claim derives from the Rodriguezes’ other claims, see In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex.2009), and no claims remain against Mestena Uranium and Boerjan, the trial court also correctly rendered no-evidence summary judgment on the wrongful death claims. 4 We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment as to Boerjan and Mestena Uranium’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.

2022While there are circumstances when this result will seem harsh, it is well within the Legislature’s prerogative to prescribe the limitations period for a wrongful death claim which, it must be remembered, did not exist at common law and is a creature of statute. 88 S.W.3d 485 , 494 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. 1998)); see Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1995) (“A wrongful death plaintiff suing on a medical negligence theory . . . does not necessarily have two full years from the time of death to bring a lawsuit.

2016While there are circumstances when this result will seem harsh, it is well within the Legislature’s prerogative to prescribe the limitations period for a wrongful death claim which, it must be remembered, did not exist at common law and is a creature of statute. 968 S.W.2d at 334 (citations omitted).

2012See Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 241 (holding that even if objection by the State failed to make clear that the charge submitted only a special defect theory and not a premises defect theory, the State preserved error by its requested jury question that would have submitted premises defect theory to jury, and trial court’s refusal to submit the requested question constituted a clear refusal to submit the premises defect theory).

2012See Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 241 (holding that even if objection by the State failed to make clear that the charge submitted only a special defect theory and not a premises defect theory, the State preserved error by its requested jury question that would have submitted premises defect theory to jury, and trial court’s refusal to submit the requested question constituted a clear refusal to submit the premises defect theory).

2011See Lubbock Cnty., Tex. v. Trammel=s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (AIt is not the function of a court of appeals to abrogate or modify established precedent.@).

2011See Lubbock Cnty., Tex. v. Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex.2002) ("It is not the function of a court of appeals to abrogate or modify established precedent."). *140 Because binding precedent holds contrary to Appellants' contention that Carla and Guillermo should have been permitted to bring wrongful death claims as Gloria's equitably-adopted children, we overrule Appellants' sixth issue.

2025Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1990), “the traditional rule [is] that the open courts provision of our constitution applies only to common law claims.” Rose turned on a wrongful death claim and, as the Court noted, “there is no common-law cause of action for wrongful death.” Rose v. Drs.

2020According to the court, had it “faced a wrongful death claim in Lucas, [it] could not have reached the same conclusion, for the [O]pen [C]ourts [P]rovision does not apply to statutory claims.” Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845 .

2024See Husain, 964 S.W.2d at 919–20 (holding that ascertainable date of medical negligence determined limitations start date under predecessor statute and disregarding plaintiff’s attempt to characterize the tort as “an improper course of treatment based on a misdiagnosis of fibrocystic disease” rather than “a failure to diagnose cancer” on specific dates); Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 , 892–93 (Tex. 1995) (applying predecessor to Act; reiterating prior holdings that “when a physician fails to diagnose a condition, the continuing nature of the diagnosis does not extend 9 the tort for limitatio

2022While there are circumstances when this result will seem harsh, it is well within the Legislature’s prerogative to prescribe the limitations period for a wrongful death claim which, it must be remembered, did not exist at common law and is a creature of statute. 88 S.W.3d 485 , 494 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. 1998)); see Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1995) (“A wrongful death plaintiff suing on a medical negligence theory . . . does not necessarily have two full years from the time of death to bring a lawsuit.

2020Id. at 157 (cleaned up) (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585 ).

2007See id. at 579, 585 (holding that nonresident defendant did have sufficient purposeful contact with Texas but that there was no substantial connection to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction between those contacts, that is, between the rafting company’s advertising and the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim); Michiana , 168 S.W.3d at 781-92 (stating that there was no purposeful contact because nonresident defendant’s sale in Texas resulted from the “mere fortuity” that the plaintiff happened to reside here and not from any affirmative efforts by the defendant to solicit business in Texa

2024See In re ENSCO Offshore Int’l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (citing Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 145 (1971))).

2024See In re ENSCO Offshore Int’l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (“[T]he fact that the trial court has jurisdiction over the defendants because their offices are in Dallas is a separate issue from whether the case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.”).

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 160 Tex. 363 , 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.1979))).

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. 1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1979))).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (2007) 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 498 3 See Felch v. Transportes Lar–Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir.1996) (finding no specific jurisdiction over a Mexican trucking company that was sued in Texas when a truck hit the plaintiff's mother's vehicle on a Mexican highway); Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev.

2007Because the Druggs did not argue their breach-of-contract claim in the court of appeals and do not do so in their briefs to this Court, we only address the Druggs' wrongful-death claim. [2] We received an amicus brief supporting Moki Mac's position from Grand Canyon Outfitters Association and America Outdoors. [3] See Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir.1996) (finding no specific jurisdiction over a Mexican trucking company that was sued in Texas when a truck hit the plaintiff's mother's vehicle on a Mexican highway); Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev.

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 160 Tex. 363 , 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.1979))).

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. 1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1979))).

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 160 Tex. 363 , 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.1979))).

2015See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 160 Tex. 363 , 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1960) (“The county court when sitting in probate is not subject to a monetary jurisdictional limit.”); Hailey v. Siglar, 194 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“The monetary limitations on a statutory county court’s jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its probate jurisdiction.” (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.1979))).

2014See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir. 2003) (“If [a plaintiff] fails to undertake a reasonably diligent investigation into the cause of injury, the law will impute to her an awareness of any knowledge that she would have uncovered if she had undertaken that inquiry.” (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123-24 & n.10)); Garza v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 , 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the discovery rule can apply to a wrongful-death claim even where the date of death is known, but concluding that the estate’s representative “was certainly on inquiry notice by the ti

2014See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir.2003) (“If [a plaintiff] fails to undertake a reasonably diligent investigation into the cause of injury, the law will impute to her an awareness of any knowledge that she would have uncovered if she had undertaken that inquiry.” (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123 -24 & n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 352 )); Garza v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 , 935, 937 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the discovery rule can apply to a wrongful-death claim even where the date of death is known, but concluding that the estate’s representative “was certainly on inquiry

2014See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir. 2003) (“If [a plaintiff] fails to undertake a reasonably diligent investigation into the cause of injury, the law will impute to her an awareness of any knowledge that she would have uncovered if she had undertaken that inquiry.” (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123-24 & n.10)); Garza v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 , 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the discovery rule can apply to a wrongful-death claim even where the date of death is known, but concluding that the estate’s representative “was certainly on inquiry notice by the ti

2014See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir.2003) (“If [a plaintiff] fails to undertake a reasonably diligent investigation into the cause of injury, the law will impute to her an awareness of any knowledge that she would have uncovered if she had undertaken that inquiry.” (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123 -24 & n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 352 )); Garza v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 , 935, 937 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the discovery rule can apply to a wrongful-death claim even where the date of death is known, but concluding that the estate’s representative “was certainly on inquiry

2026See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 , 355– 56 (Tex. 1990) (rejecting an open courts challenge involving a wrongful death cause of action on this basis).

2025Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1990) (citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 (1990)).

2021In Bay Oaks, the defendant sought dismissal of a wrongful-death claim because the expert report did not link the patient’s death to the injury described in the report or opine as to a cause of death. 555 S.W.3d at 278 .

2018And if any liability theory has been adequately covered, the entire case may proceed.”); see, e.g., Bay Oaks SNF, LLC v. Lancaster, 555 S.W.3d 268 , 278–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. filed) (concluding that the expert report satisfied section 74.351’s requirements as to a survival claim; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the healthcare providers’ motion to dismiss the wrongful death claim, and the entire case could proceed); SCC Partners, Inc. v. Ince, 496 S.W.3d 111 , 114–15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet dism’d) (providing that “if at least on

2006Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co. , 851 S.W.2d 178 , 181–82 (Tex. 1992).

2005Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 (Tex.1992).

2026See also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 693-94 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the Texas Health and Safety Code did not waive sovereign immunity for a wrongful-death claim brought against a hospital on behalf of a patient who committed suicide).

2015Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003), was a wrongful death claim seeking waiver of immunity through the 14 Patient Bill of Rights Act.