wrongful death claim in Kentucky

2024A loss of consortium claim “can be brought independently of a wrongful death claim, but most often are not, -8- as there must be some determination that the death was wrongfully caused in both types of actions as they ‘derive from the same injury.’” Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Ky. 2013) (Noble, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).

2024A loss of consortium claim “can be brought independently of a wrongful death claim, but most often are not, -8- as there must be some determination that the death was wrongfully caused in both types of actions as they ‘derive from the same injury.’” Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Ky. 2013) (Noble, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).

2024Giuliani, supra. Failing to bring a wrongful death claim at all and losing the ability to bring such a claim due to the statute of limitations is the same thing by a different name.

2024Giuliani, supra. Failing to bring a wrongful death claim at all and losing the ability to bring such a claim due to the statute of limitations is the same thing by a different name.

2025Indeed, our Supreme Court has emphatically held that “[u]nder Kentucky law, a wrongful death claim is a distinct interest in a property right that belongs only to the statutorily-designated beneficiaries.” Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Ky. 2015), vacated in part on other grounds by Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd.

2025Indeed, our Supreme Court has emphatically held that “[u]nder Kentucky law, a wrongful death claim is a distinct interest in a property right that belongs only to the statutorily-designated beneficiaries.” Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Ky. 2015), vacated in part on other grounds by Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd.

2026Estate of Wittich By and Through Wittich v. Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Ky. 2017) (citing Gaither v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. App. 2004)).

2026Under KRS 413.180(2), the Court concluded that “a wrongful-death claim commences upon the appointment of a personal representative or no longer than two years from the date of the death.” Flick, 519 S.W.3d at 777 (citing Gaither v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. App. 2004)); see also KENTUCKY HANDBOOK SERIES, WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS, Section 10:5 (2025).

2024See Pete, 413 S.W.3d at 303-04 (Noble, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rehm v. Ford Motor Co., 365 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Ky. App. 2011); Godbey v. University Hospital of Albert B.

2024See Pete, 413 S.W.3d at 303-04 (Noble, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rehm v. Ford Motor Co., 365 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Ky. App. 2011); Godbey v. University Hospital of Albert B.

2015With-no interest in the recovery, the personal representative is a “nominal” party, as the “real .parties in interest are the benefipiaries whom [the personal representative] represents.” (citing Vaughn’s Administrator [ 297 Ky. 309 ], 179 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1944)). 413 S.W.3d 291, 299 (Ky. 2013).

2015With-no interest in the recovery, the personal representative is a “nominal” party, as the “real .parties in interest are the benefipiaries whom [the personal representative] represents.” (citing Vaughn’s Administrator [ 297 Ky. 309 ], 179 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1944)). 413 S.W.3d 291, 299 (Ky. 2013).

2025Our opinion, which resolved the question of whether a decedent can bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate a wrongful death claim, examined the distinction between the wrongful death statute and the survival statute, KRS 411.140. 376 S.W.3d at 598 .

2025Our opinion, which resolved the question of whether a decedent can bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate a wrongful death claim, examined the distinction between the wrongful death statute and the survival statute, KRS 411.140. 376 S.W.3d at 598 .

2024The Court in that case held that a wrongful death claim and this loss of consortium claim were separate legal entities, and that “[t]he parents have [a loss of consortium] claim without regard to whether the personal representative of the decedent ever asserts a claim for wrongful death, and, indeed, without regard to whether a personal representative is ever appointed.” Blevins, 707 S.W.2d at 785 .

2024The Court in that case held that a wrongful death claim and this loss of consortium claim were separate legal entities, and that “[t]he parents have [a loss of consortium] claim without regard to whether the personal representative of the decedent ever asserts a claim for wrongful death, and, indeed, without regard to whether a personal representative is ever appointed.” Blevins, 707 S.W.2d at 785 .

2026In Flick, 519 S.W.3d at 776 , the Supreme Court determined that the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim was found in KRS 413.140(1)(a) and that it was one year from the date of accrual.

2026Under KRS 413.180(2), the Court concluded that “a wrongful-death claim commences upon the appointment of a personal representative or no longer than two years from the date of the death.” Flick, 519 S.W.3d at 777 (citing Gaither v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. App. 2004)); see also KENTUCKY HANDBOOK SERIES, WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS, Section 10:5 (2025).

2026Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). -10- The interplay between KRS 413.140 and KRS 413.180 was explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Estate of Wittich, by and through Wittich v. Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774 (Ky. 2017) and in Conner v. George Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1992).

2026Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). -10- The interplay between KRS 413.140 and KRS 413.180 was explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Estate of Wittich, by and through Wittich v. Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774 (Ky. 2017) and in Conner v. George Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1992).

2026In Greenwell’s Adm’r v. Burba, 182 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Ky. 1944), Kentucky’s highest court held that the defendant’s prior manslaughter conviction should have been admitted in a subsequent civil proceeding involving a wrongful death claim arising from the same facts as the criminal conviction.

2025Grp., L.P. v. Alexander, 530 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Ky. App. 2017).

2023His Estate filed a wrongful death claim in Fayette Circuit Court,1 alleging Henry was negligent in failing to identify Mr. Johnson’s exact location when dispatching EMS.2 1 Carrie Johnson, Mr. Johnson’s widow, filed the complaint individually and on behalf of the estate. 2 The complaint also alleged negligence of the restaurant, Gumbo Ya-Ya, but those claims are not part of this appeal. -2- Henry filed a motion to dismiss, arguing she owed no duty to Mr. Johnson as a matter of law, citing McCuiston v. Butler, 509 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. App. 2017).

2022We do not pass upon specific issues not reached by a trial court because “[t]he proper role for an appellate court is to review [the trial court’s decisions] for error[.]” Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng, 487 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Ky. 2016). -3- contractual provision at Section 3 was unenforceable as it purported to limit Ms. Gill’s ability to claim damages, and such provision could not be severed from the remainder of the Agreement.

2017The elements of a negligence claim are (1.) a legally-cognizable duty, (2] a breach of that duty, (3] causation linking the - breach to an injury, and (4} damages Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 18 85_, 88 (Ky. 2003) (citing Mullin,s v. Commonwealth L_ife Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1992)).

2013It is well settled that an attorney is liable to those parties who are intended to benefit from his or her services “irrespective of any lack of privity.” Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Ky.App.1978); Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.App.1993).

2010It is a fact that in Heskamp the jury was allowed to consider as damages the loss of the decedent’s pension, but the reason given for allowing it was that “[t]he decedent had earned the pension by his services in the past[.]” Heskamp, 172 S.W.2d at 451 (emphasis supplied).

2010Smith, 269 S.W.3d at 882 (emphasis supplied).