wrongful death claim in Alabama

2025It is true, as Owners argues, that the damages available on a wrongful-death claim under Alabama law are punitive in nature and that a wrongful-death plaintiff is entitled to a single recovery that "cannot be apportioned [by a jury] among joint tort-feasors," i.e., neither Alabama's wrongful-death statute, see § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, nor our common law provides for indemnity or contribution in a wrongful-death case. 18 SC-2023-0882 and SC-2023-0914 Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Ala. 1988).

2025It is true, as Owners argues, that the damages available on a wrongful-death claim under Alabama law are punitive in nature and that a wrongful-death plaintiff is entitled to a single recovery that "cannot be apportioned [by a jury] among joint tort-feasors," i.e., neither Alabama's wrongful-death statute, see § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, nor our common law provides for indemnity or contribution in a wrongful-death case. 18 SC-2023-0882 and SC-2023-0914 Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Ala. 1988).

2016Section 43-2-831, Ala.Code 1975, states, in part: “The powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to the appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter.” In Wood v. Way man, 47 So.3d 1212, 1216 (Ala.2010), this Court addressed the issue whether, under § 43-2-831, the appointment of a personal representative occurring after the expiration of the limitations period for a wrongful-death’ claim relates back to the filing of that claim.

2016In Wood v. Wayman, 47 So.3d 1212 (Ala.2010), this Court held, as explained in Alvarado , “that relation back generally cannot be used to prevent a wrongful-death claim from being time-barred where the personal representative is appointed after the two-year limitations period has expired.” Alvarado, 205 So.3d at 1192 .

2018See Waters v. Hipp , 600 So.2d 981 , 982 (Ala. 1992) ("A 'personal representative,' for the purposes of § 6-5-410, is an executor or an administrator.").

2018See Waters v. Hipp , 600 So.2d 981 , 982 (Ala. 1992) ("A 'personal representative,' for the purposes of § 6-5-410, is an executor or an administrator.").

2016As this Court explained in Sledge v. IC Corp., 47 So.3d 243, 247 (Ala.2010): "The complaint alleges several different counts against [the defendants], including products liability (count VIII), negligence and/or wanton conduct (count IX), violation of the AEMLD- (count X), and breach of warranty (count XI).

2013Because the trial court’s partial summary judgment did not ‘direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,’ i.e., because it did not enter a judgment on Sledge’s wrongful-death claim, certification is not available under Rule 54(b); this appeal is thus from a nonfinal judgment and is due to be dismissed. [[Image here]] “ 4 We see nothing in the arguments before us indicating that [the personal representative] is also seeking damages of the nature found in Benefield v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp., 406 So.2d 873 (Ala.1981) (in which the plaintiff

2013Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, supra; Ex parte Taylor, 93 So.3d 118, 118 (Ala.2012) (Murdock, J., concurring specially); Wood v. Wayman, 47 So.3d 1212, 1216 (Ala.2010); Steele v. Steele, 623 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Ala.1993).

2012Steele v. Steele, 623 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Ala.1993) (“[D]amages awarded pursuant to [the Wrongful Death Act, § 6-5-410,] ... are not part of the decedent’s estate.”).

2024In pertinent part, Justice Bolin wrote the following: "[Section] 6-5-410(d) requires that the wrongful-death action be filed 'within two years from and after the death of the testator or intestate.' This Court has consistently held that 'the wrongful death statute, which provides a two-year limitations period, is a statute of creation, otherwise known as a nonclaim bar to recovery, and that it is not subject to tolling provisions.' Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So. 2d 707, 708 (Ala. 1997)(emphasis added); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. 1992)('It is well settled that the time limitation se

2004A personal representative may ratify and accept acts on behalf of the estate done by others where the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.” (Emphasis added.) See Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So.2d 707 (Ala.1997) (holding that when a husband filed an action within two years of his wife’s death asserting a wrongful-death claim, the fact that the husband had not been appointed as the wife’s personal representative for more than two years did not bar his claim because his appointment related back to the filing of the wrongful-death claim); Estate of Jones v. State Farm Mut.

2024In Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd, 205 So. 3d 1188, 1192 (Ala. 2016), the Court applied the general rule "that [the] relation[-]back [doctrine] … cannot be used to prevent a wrongful-death claim from being time-barred where the personal representative is appointed after the two-year limitations period has expired." Dr. Jones's mandamus petition relies heavily on Justice Bolin's special concurrence in Alvarado.

2016In Wood v. Wayman, 47 So.3d 1212 (Ala.2010), this Court held, as explained in Alvarado , “that relation back generally cannot be used to prevent a wrongful-death claim from being time-barred where the personal representative is appointed after the two-year limitations period has expired.” Alvarado, 205 So.3d at 1192 .

2014Likewise, matters concerning the personal representative's settlement of a wrongful-death claim and the distribution of the proceeds therefrom do not fall within the Mobile Probate Court's general equity jurisdiction, which is limited to matters of equity 'in the administration of the estates,' Act No. 91–131, Ala. Acts 1991, and to 'any proceeding 29 1130385, 1130403 involving a testamentary or inter vivos trust.' Ala. Code 1975, § 19–3B–203." 93 So. 3d at 122 .

2014Likewise, matters concerning the personal representative’s settlement of a wrongful-death claim and the distribution of the proceeds therefrom do not fall within the Mobile Probate Court’s general equity jurisdiction, which is limited to matters of equity ‘in the administration of the estates,’ Act No. 91-131, Ala. Acts 1991, and to ‘any proceeding involving a testamentary or inter aúvos trust.’ Ala. Code 1975, § 19-3B-203.” 93 So.3d at 122 .

1993See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beggs, 525 So.2d 1350, 1352-53 (Ala.1988) (bad faith failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits): “[I]t is doubtful that an insured could ever prove the amount of an insurer’s liability under uninsured motorist coverage in a wrongful death case with the specificity necessary to recover against an insurer for bad faith in failing to negotiate or pay a wrongful death claim under uninsured motorist coverage.

1991Justice Houston wrote for the Court: "[I]t is doubtful that an insured could ever prove the amount of an insurer's liability under uninsured motorist coverage in a wrongful death case with the specificity necessary to recover against an insurer for bad faith in failing to negotiate or pay a wrongful death claim under uninsured motorist coverage." Id. at 1352-53 .

2024In pertinent part, Justice Bolin wrote the following: "[Section] 6-5-410(d) requires that the wrongful-death action be filed 'within two years from and after the death of the testator or intestate.' This Court has consistently held that 'the wrongful death statute, which provides a two-year limitations period, is a statute of creation, otherwise known as a nonclaim bar to recovery, and that it is not subject to tolling provisions.' Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So. 2d 707, 708 (Ala. 1997)(emphasis added); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. 1992)('It is well settled that the time limitation se

2024See also Bradberry v. Carrier Corp., 86 So. 3d 973, 984 (Ala. 2011) (" '[T]he personal representative is authorized [under the Wrongful Death Act] to sue as an agent of legislative appointment for effecting the declared public policy of preventing homicides.' " (citations omitted)), and Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So. 3d 1038, 1042 (Ala. 2013) ("[T]he proceeds 50 SC-2023-0601 collected as a result of a wrongful-death claim are not part of the decedent's estate.").

2024See also Bradberry v. Carrier Corp., 86 So. 3d 973, 984 (Ala. 2011) (" '[T]he personal representative is authorized [under the Wrongful Death Act] to sue as an agent of legislative appointment for effecting the declared public policy of preventing homicides.' " (citations omitted)), and Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So. 3d 1038, 1042 (Ala. 2013) ("[T]he proceeds 50 SC-2023-0601 collected as a result of a wrongful-death claim are not part of the decedent's estate.").

2023See Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609 , 55 So. 104 (1911); see also § 6- 5-410, Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing only the personal representative of a decedent's estate to pursue a wrongful-death claim).

2023See Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609 , 55 So. 104 (1911); see also § 6- 5-410, Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing only the personal representative of a decedent's estate to pursue a wrongful-death claim).

2023Co., 291 Ala. 389, 394 , 281 So. 2d 636, 640 (1973) (quoting Automotive Acceptance Corp. v. Powell, 45 Ala. App. 596, 601 , 234 So. 2d 593, 597 (Civ. 1970)) (emphasis added).

2023Co., 291 Ala. 389, 394 , 281 So. 2d 636, 640 (1973) (quoting Automotive Acceptance Corp. v. Powell, 45 Ala. App. 596, 601 , 234 So. 2d 593, 597 (Civ. 1970)) (emphasis added).

2023See Benitez, 872 So. 2d at 847-48 .

2023Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746 (Ala. Civ.

2023See Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So. 2d 521, 523-24 (Ala. 1983) ("[N]otwithstanding the general rule that an attorney's authority to act on behalf of a client ceases on the death of that client, we adhere to the view that the attorney for a party continues to have a duty to the court after the demise of that client and, in discharge of that duty, must inform the court and other parties of the death.").

2023Co., 291 Ala. 389, 394 , 281 So. 2d 636, 640 (1973) (quoting Automotive Acceptance Corp. v. Powell, 45 Ala. App. 596, 601 , 234 So. 2d 593, 597 (Civ. 1970)) (emphasis added).

2023Co., 291 Ala. 389, 394 , 281 So. 2d 636, 640 (1973) (quoting Automotive Acceptance Corp. v. Powell, 45 Ala. App. 596, 601 , 234 So. 2d 593, 597 (Civ. 1970)) (emphasis added).