14 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.green2 sentences2023However, we also note that "courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved." Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014). 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating a court need not address remaining issues when another issue is dispositive). 2021See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). entitled the injured party to maintain an action to recover damages. | 3 | 3 |
Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2024Co., 97 S.C. 27, 30 , 81 S.E. 189, 190 (1914) (explaining that a survival action is distinct from a wrongful death claim in part because "the elements of damage recoverable are entirely different"). 2024Co., 97 S.C. 27, 30 , 81 S.E. 189, 190 (1914) (explaining that a survival action is distinct from a wrongful death claim in part because "the elements of damage recoverable are entirely different"). | 1 | 2 |
Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United Healthcare Services, Inc.green2 sentences2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati 2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati | 1 | 1 |
Fisher Ex Rel. Estate of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabeegreen2 sentences2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati 2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati | 1 | 1 |
Riley Ex Rel. Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2023Every such action shall be brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of such person." (emphasis added)); Riley, 414 S.C. at 196 , 777 S.E.2d at 830 (affirming a setoff that conformed to the allocation of damages between a wrongful death claim and a survival claim); Jolly, 435 S.C. at 670, 869 S.E.2d at 853 (explaining why wrongful death and survival are different claims for different injuries despite the fact that they were created out of the same set of facts); Widener, 397 S.C. at 473 n.1, 724 S.E.2d at 191 n.1 (citing Bennett v. Spartanburg Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 97 S 2023Every such action shall be brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of such person." (emphasis added)); Riley, 414 S.C. at 196 , 777 S.E.2d at 830 (affirming a setoff that conformed to the allocation of damages between a wrongful death claim and a survival claim); Jolly, 435 S.C. at 670, 869 S.E.2d at 853 (explaining why wrongful death and survival are different claims for different injuries despite the fact that they were created out of the same set of facts); Widener, 397 S.C. at 473 n.1, 724 S.E.2d at 191 n.1 (citing Bennett v. Spartanburg Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 97 S | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Stokes Ex Rel. Spell v. Pee Dee Family Physicians, L.L.P.green2 sentences2021Spell v. Pee Dee Family Physicians, L.L.P., 389 S.C. 343, 349 , 699 S.E.2d 143, 146 (2010) (holding that a wrongful death claim "lies in the decedent's estate only when the decedent possessed the right of recovery at his death"); id. at 347 , 699 S.E.2d at 145 ("[I]f the decedent had no claim at his death, the estate has no claim."). 2021Spell v. Pee Dee Family Physicians, L.L.P., 389 S.C. 343, 349 , 699 S.E.2d 143, 146 (2010) (holding that a wrongful death claim "lies in the decedent's estate only when the decedent possessed the right of recovery at his death"); id. at 347 , 699 S.E.2d at 145 ("[I]f the decedent had no claim at his death, the estate has no claim."). | 1 | 1 |
Burroughs v. Worshamgreen2 sentences2021They state that wrongful death claims "allow a decedent's heirs to pursue the decedent's personal injury claims after his or her death." In making this conclusion, Appellants rely on Burroughs v. Worsham, 352 S.C. 382, 406 , 574 S.E.2d 215, 227 (Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that a wrongful death claim is to compensate the heirs of a decedent, who, if he had survived, could have brought a personal injury action. 2021They state that wrongful death claims "allow a decedent's heirs to pursue the decedent's personal injury claims after his or her death." In making this conclusion, Appellants rely on Burroughs v. Worsham, 352 S.C. 382, 406 , 574 S.E.2d 215, 227 (Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that a wrongful death claim is to compensate the heirs of a decedent, who, if he had survived, could have brought a personal injury action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati 2025Est. of Shaw-Baker v. Huckabee, 422 S.C. 234, 240 , 811 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2018) ("[T]he substantive right to bring a survival action—like a wrongful death action— is determined by the Probate Code."); id. ("[W]rongful death actions must be brought by the personal representative . . . ."); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (noting courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved); Carolina Care Plan, Inc., 361 S.C. at 557 , 606 S.E.2d at 759 (holding the issue of whether the arbitrati | 3 | 2023–2025 |
Rutland v. South Carolina Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2024Nevertheless, the plaintiff and two settling defendants agreed to allocate almost half of $305,000 in settlement funds "to conscious pain and suffering under the potential . . . survival claim" and the remainder to the wrongful death claim. 400 S.C. at 212 , 734 S.E.2d at 143 . 2024Nevertheless, the plaintiff and two settling defendants agreed to allocate almost half of $305,000 in settlement funds "to conscious pain and suffering under the potential . . . survival claim" and the remainder to the wrongful death claim. 400 S.C. at 212 , 734 S.E.2d at 143 . | 3 | 2014–2024 |
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024However, in Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, our supreme court explained "courts may not refuse to compel arbitration simply because a wrongful death claim is involved." 408 S.C. 371 , 378 n.3, 759 S.E.2d 727 , 731 n.3 (2014) (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (per curiam) (invalidating West Virginia's policy of refusing to refer wrongful death claims against a nursing home to arbitration)). 4 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order denying Appellants' motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is REVERSED AND REMANDED. 5 THOM 2014Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, -U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203-04 , 182 L.Ed.2d 42 (2012) (per curiam) (invalidating West Virginia’s policy refusing to refer wrongful death claims against a nursing home to arbitration). 4 . | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Welch v. Epstein
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 312 , 536 S.E.2d at 425 . 2012Id. at 312 , 536 S.E.2d at 425 . | 2 | 2010–2012 |
Price v. Railroad Co.
green
2 sentences2024They rely on Price v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 33 S.C. 556 , 12 S.E. 413 (1890), and Reed v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 37 S.C. 42 , 16 S.E. 289 (1892), and argue those cases hold that where a plaintiff settles his personal injury claim while living, and he ultimately dies of his injuries, "his estate [is] barred from recovering on its wrongful death claim." We do not doubt Fisher and Crosby are correct as to the holdings of Price and Reed. 2024They rely on Price v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 33 S.C. 556 , 12 S.E. 413 (1890), and Reed v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 37 S.C. 42 , 16 S.E. 289 (1892), and argue those cases hold that where a plaintiff settles his personal injury claim while living, and he ultimately dies of his injuries, "his estate [is] barred from recovering on its wrongful death claim." We do not doubt Fisher and Crosby are correct as to the holdings of Price and Reed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Reed v. Northeastern Railroad
neutral
2 sentences2024They rely on Price v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 33 S.C. 556 , 12 S.E. 413 (1890), and Reed v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 37 S.C. 42 , 16 S.E. 289 (1892), and argue those cases hold that where a plaintiff settles his personal injury claim while living, and he ultimately dies of his injuries, "his estate [is] barred from recovering on its wrongful death claim." We do not doubt Fisher and Crosby are correct as to the holdings of Price and Reed. 2024They rely on Price v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 33 S.C. 556 , 12 S.E. 413 (1890), and Reed v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 37 S.C. 42 , 16 S.E. 289 (1892), and argue those cases hold that where a plaintiff settles his personal injury claim while living, and he ultimately dies of his injuries, "his estate [is] barred from recovering on its wrongful death claim." We do not doubt Fisher and Crosby are correct as to the holdings of Price and Reed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Smith v. Widener
green
2 sentences2023Every such action shall be brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of such person." (emphasis added)); Riley, 414 S.C. at 196 , 777 S.E.2d at 830 (affirming a setoff that conformed to the allocation of damages between a wrongful death claim and a survival claim); Jolly, 435 S.C. at 670, 869 S.E.2d at 853 (explaining why wrongful death and survival are different claims for different injuries despite the fact that they were created out of the same set of facts); Widener, 397 S.C. at 473 n.1, 724 S.E.2d at 191 n.1 (citing Bennett v. Spartanburg Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 97 S 2023Every such action shall be brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of such person." (emphasis added)); Riley, 414 S.C. at 196 , 777 S.E.2d at 830 (affirming a setoff that conformed to the allocation of damages between a wrongful death claim and a survival claim); Jolly, 435 S.C. at 670, 869 S.E.2d at 853 (explaining why wrongful death and survival are different claims for different injuries despite the fact that they were created out of the same set of facts); Widener, 397 S.C. at 473 n.1, 724 S.E.2d at 191 n.1 (citing Bennett v. Spartanburg Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 97 S | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Riley v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 17 , 757 S.E.2d at 431 . 2015Id. at 17 , 757 S.E.2d at 431 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Quattlebaum v. Carey Canada, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010In Quattlebaum v. Carey Canada, Inc., the honorable and learned judge, Joe F. Anderson, Jr., correctly applied South Carolina law and dismissed a wrongful death claim because the decedent possessed no claim at his death. 685 F.Supp. 939 (D.S.C.1988). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.