bad faith claim in Iowa

2026Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1990) (finding that a bad-faith claim brought against an insurance company after prior litigation awarding the plaintiff damages was not barred by res judicata, as the “bad-faith claim might well be based on events subsequent to the filing of the suit on a policy and therefore could not be based on the ʻsame’ facts”); but see Villareal v. United Fire & Cas.

2019Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1990)); accord id. at 729 (“[W]hen the bad-faith claim is based on conduct that occurred after the breach-of-contract case was filed, that is a different kettle of fish.”).

2017The reasonable basis element of a bad-faith claim “is an objective one.” Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 473 .

2017The reasonable basis element of a bad-faith claim “is an objective one.” Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 473 .

2016See Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319 ; see also Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 838 (noting the Clinton action “could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the original Emmetsburg action”).

2016See Amevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319 ; see also Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 838 (noting the Clinton action “could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the original Emmetsburg action”).

2014Our supreme court first recognized a bad faith claim against insurance carriers in Dolan v. Aid Insurance Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1988).

2001However, the “[u]se of the bad faith ‘fairly debatable’ standard does not require that we also use the second element of the bad-faith claim: the insurer’s ‘knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794 ).

2021Ins., 469 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1991) (affirming directed verdict in favor of an insurer on an insured’s bad-faith claim where the insurer reasonably sought an independent professional evaluation of the claim and relied on the professional’s opinions).

2005Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions Liability & Damages § 5:04, at 5-17 to 5-18 (2d ed.1997) (also discussing exceptions to this rule, none of which are implicated here) [hereinafter “Bad Faith Actions ”]; accord Reuter, 469 N.W.2d at 254 (noting that existence of submissible jury question on insured’s entitlement to policy benefits will generally, though not automatically, establish that the issue is fairly debatable); see also Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins.

2017In Kiner v. Reliance Insurance, we expressly held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claimant’s bad-faith claim against a workers’’compensation insurer arising from an unreasonable denial of medical benefits. 463 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (Iowa 1990).

2017In Kiner v. Reliance Insurance, we expressly held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claimant’s bad-faith claim against a workers’ compensation insurer arising from an unreasonable denial of 11Although American Interstate failed to argue lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the district court, a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction “may be made at any time.” See Kloster, 612 N.W.2d at 773–74; Bailey v. Batchelder, 576 N.W.2d 334 , 337– 38 (Iowa 1998) (holding the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and can be

2016Co., 467 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 1991) (indicating the plaintiff’s bad-faith claim was “not premature”).

1993In Handley , the court found a plaintiff bringing a bad faith claim was entitled to discovery of the insurer’s files. 467 N.W.2d at 250 .

2025Turning to the claim preserved on remand, Beeman argues he is entitled to a new trial under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), because “the State failed to preserve critical biological evidence in this case in bad faith.” As the PCR court noted, Iowa courts have adopted the bad faith standard from Youngblood.

2025Turning to the claim preserved on remand, Beeman argues he is entitled to a new trial under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), because “the State failed to preserve critical biological evidence in this case in bad faith.” As the PCR court noted, Iowa courts have adopted the bad faith standard from Youngblood.

2019In the well-reasoned case of Coleman v. American Universal Insurance , 86 Wis.2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 , 223 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. , 300 Wis.2d 92 , 729 N.W.2d 712 , 725 (2007), the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a bad-faith claim, noting that when the "claimed injury was distinct in time and place from the original on-the-job physical injury which was subject to the Compensation Act. ...

2019In the well-reasoned case of Coleman v. American Universal Insurance , 86 Wis.2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 , 223 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. , 300 Wis.2d 92 , 729 N.W.2d 712 , 725 (2007), the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a bad-faith claim, noting that when the "claimed injury was distinct in time and place from the original on-the-job physical injury which was subject to the Compensation Act. ...

2019See Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins., 621 N.W.2d 388, 397 (Iowa 2001) (en banc).

2019See Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. , 621 N.W.2d 388 , 397 (Iowa 2001) (en banc).

2019The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a third-party administrator could be liable to a bad-faith claim from an insured in a health insurance context in Cary v. United of Omaha Life Insurance, 68 P.3d 462, 463 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).

2019The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a third-party administrator could be liable to a bad-faith claim from an insured in a health insurance context in Cary v. United of Omaha Life Insurance , 68 P.3d 462 , 463 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).

2019App. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in favor of a third-party administrator on a bad-faith claim based on lack of privity), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds , Ex Parte Simmons , 791 So.2d 371 (Ala. 2000) ; Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc. , 72 Cal.App.4th 249 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 803 (1999) ("Our decision is consistent with the majority of cases in other states, which hold that an independent adjuster hired by the insurer owes no duty of care to the insured."); Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am.

2019App. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in favor of a third-party administrator on a bad-faith claim based on lack of privity), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds , Ex Parte Simmons , 791 So.2d 371 (Ala. 2000) ; Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc. , 72 Cal.App.4th 249 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 803 (1999) ("Our decision is consistent with the majority of cases in other states, which hold that an independent adjuster hired by the insurer owes no duty of care to the insured."); Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am.

2019In the well-reasoned case of Coleman v. American Universal Insurance , 86 Wis.2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 , 223 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. , 300 Wis.2d 92 , 729 N.W.2d 712 , 725 (2007), the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a bad-faith claim, noting that when the "claimed injury was distinct in time and place from the original on-the-job physical injury which was subject to the Compensation Act. ...

2019In the well-reasoned case of Coleman v. American Universal Insurance , 86 Wis.2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 , 223 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. , 300 Wis.2d 92 , 729 N.W.2d 712 , 725 (2007), the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a bad-faith claim, noting that when the "claimed injury was distinct in time and place from the original on-the-job physical injury which was subject to the Compensation Act. ...

2019Examination Servs., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 583, 588 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that a bad-faith claim against an administrative services firm was barred by Texas precedent disallowing bad-faith claims against workers’ compensation carriers themselves).

2019Examination Servs., Inc. , 381 S.W.3d 583 , 588 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that a bad-faith claim against an administrative services firm was barred by Texas precedent disallowing bad-faith claims against workers' compensation carriers themselves).

2019See, e.g. , Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. , 9 Cal.3d 566 , 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 510 P.2d 1032 , 1038-39 (1973) (en banc); see also Stempel, 15 Conn. Ins.

2019See, e.g. , Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. , 9 Cal.3d 566 , 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 510 P.2d 1032 , 1038-39 (1973) (en banc); see also Stempel, 15 Conn. Ins.

2019Ins. , 355 S.C. 614 , 586 S.E.2d 586 , 588 (S.C. 2003) (holding that "no bad faith claim can be brought against an independent adjuster or independent adjusting company" due to the lack of privity); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc. , 875 S.W.2d 695 , 697-98 (Tex. 1994) (finding that a claims adjustment firm could not be sued in bad faith by the injured employee because it was not part of the special relationship among the employee, the employer, and the insurer); Carpenter , 381 S.W.3d at 588-89 (summarizing Texas authority that forecloses actions against adjusting and administrative services firms

2019Ins. , 355 S.C. 614 , 586 S.E.2d 586 , 588 (S.C. 2003) (holding that "no bad faith claim can be brought against an independent adjuster or independent adjusting company" due to the lack of privity); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc. , 875 S.W.2d 695 , 697-98 (Tex. 1994) (finding that a claims adjustment firm could not be sued in bad faith by the injured employee because it was not part of the special relationship among the employee, the employer, and the insurer); Carpenter , 381 S.W.3d at 588-89 (summarizing Texas authority that forecloses actions against adjusting and administrative services firms

2016We will review some representative cases. 15 In Salazar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the Restatement’s transactional approach and held that an insured’s bad-faith claim, which was filed after the insured obtained a judgment awarding her UIM policy benefits, was barred by claim preclusion. 148 P.3d 278, 279 , 281–82 (Colo. App. 2006).

2016In Salazar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the Restatements transactional approach and held that an insured’s bad-faith claim, which was filed after the insured obtained a judgment awarding her UIM policy benefits, was barred by claim preclusion. 148 P.3d 278, 279, 281-82 (Colo.App.2006).

2016See Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319 ; see also Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 838 (noting the Clinton action “could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the original Emmetsburg action”).

2016See Amevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319 ; see also Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 838 (noting the Clinton action “could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the original Emmetsburg action”).

2020An insurer is liable for bad faith only when the evidence shows “(1) that the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy,” and “(2) the insurer knew, or had reason to know, that its denial was without basis.” Thornton I, 897 N.W.2d at 461–62 (quoting McIlravy v. N. River Ins., 653 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Iowa 2002)).

2007McIlravy, 653 N.W.2d at 326-27 .