bad faith claim in Utah

2026In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, our supreme court held that the implied covenant imposes a duty on an insurer in the first-party insurance context to—at a minimum—(1) “diligently investigate the facts” underlying an 20241295-CA 6 2026 UT App 94 Newman v. LM General Insurance Co. insured party’s claim to determine whether it is “valid,” (2) “fairly evaluate the claim,” and (3) “act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.” 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 5 “When an insurer breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the insured is thereby damaged, t

2008In keeping with this requirement, however, "when an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id. "[If the evidence presented cere-ates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial, . eliminating the bad faith claim." Prince v. Bear River Mut.

2026And “[i]f the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim’s validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim.” Id.

2002Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see also 14 Lee R.

2026In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, our supreme court held that the implied covenant imposes a duty on an insurer in the first-party insurance context to—at a minimum—(1) “diligently investigate the facts” underlying an 20241295-CA 6 2026 UT App 94 Newman v. LM General Insurance Co. insured party’s claim to determine whether it is “valid,” (2) “fairly evaluate the claim,” and (3) “act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.” 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 5 “When an insurer breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the insured is thereby damaged, t

2026In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, our supreme court held that the implied covenant imposes a duty on an insurer in the first-party insurance context to—at a minimum—(1) “diligently investigate the facts” underlying an 20241295-CA 6 2026 UT App 94 Newman v. LM General Insurance Co. insured party’s claim to determine whether it is “valid,” (2) “fairly evaluate the claim,” and (3) “act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.” 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 5 “When an insurer breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the insured is thereby damaged, t

2022Savage, 908 P.2d at 865 (―[A]n action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract.‖).

2021See Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 , ¶¶ 43-44, 293 P.3d 259 (Lee, J., concurring); cf. Belnap v. Howard, 2019 UT 9 , 437 P.3d 355 (declining to read a bad faith exception in a statute where no basis for it existed in the plain language).

2021See Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 , ¶¶ 43-44, 293 P.3d 259 (Lee, J., concurring); cf. Belnap v. Howard, 2019 UT 9 , 437 P.3d 355 (declining to read a bad faith exception in a statute where no basis for it existed in the plain language).

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015Co., 330 N.C. 755 , 412 S.E.2d 43, 43 (1992) (holding that "the statute of limitations begins to run when final judgment is entered in favor of the lien claimant"); Shannon v. Shannon, 193 Or. 575 , 238 P.2d 744, 746 (1951) (observing that in the context of installments paid after a divorce, "the statute of limitations begins to run as to each installment from the due date thereof" because each "constitutes a separate and final judgment"); Am.

2015Co., 330 N.C. 755 , 412 S.E.2d 43, 43 (1992) (holding that "the statute of limitations begins to run when final judgment is entered in favor of the lien claimant"); Shannon v. Shannon, 193 Or. 575 , 238 P.2d 744, 746 (1951) (observing that in the context of installments paid after a divorce, "the statute of limitations begins to run as to each installment from the due date thereof" because each "constitutes a separate and final judgment"); Am.

2015Co., 330 N.C. 755 , 412 S.E.2d 43, 43 (1992) (holding that "the statute of limitations begins to run when final judgment is entered in favor of the lien claimant"); Shannon v. Shannon, 193 Or. 575 , 238 P.2d 744, 746 (1951) (observing that in the context of installments paid after a divorce, "the statute of limitations begins to run as to each installment from the due date thereof" because each "constitutes a separate and final judgment"); Am.

2015Co., 330 N.C. 755 , 412 S.E.2d 43, 43 (1992) (holding that "the statute of limitations begins to run when final judgment is entered in favor of the lien claimant"); Shannon v. Shannon, 193 Or. 575 , 238 P.2d 744, 746 (1951) (observing that in the context of installments paid after a divorce, "the statute of limitations begins to run as to each installment from the due date thereof" because each "constitutes a separate and final judgment"); Am.

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2015See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 , 162 P.3d 1097 (observing that the until there is a final judg: ment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal must be filed does not begin);. see also Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601 , 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1903) ("Until there is a final judgment . cause of action accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run."); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164 , 225 P. 208, 210 (1924) ("Ordinarily where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of the final

2013Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Scottsdale on the bad faith claim. 4 III Scottsdale's Request for Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal Is Denied, but It May Recover Its Costs. {17 Scottsdale seeks reimbursement for attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal on the basis that the " 'appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of [court] time and resources."" (Quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 36

2007See id. at 776 (stating that the premise of the plaintiff's bad faith claim invoked the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction); see also Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 10 , 57 P.3d 1084 ("Notwithstanding Plaintiff's attempt to characterize their claim so as to avoid application of the [Act] ... the language of their complaint clearly invokes the application of the Act.").

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2007See id. at 776 (stating that the premise of the plaintiff's bad faith claim invoked the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction); see also Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 10 , 57 P.3d 1084 ("Notwithstanding Plaintiff's attempt to characterize their claim so as to avoid application of the [Act] ... the language of their complaint clearly invokes the application of the Act.").

2007See id. at 776 (stating that the premise of the plaintiff's bad faith claim invoked the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction); see also Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 10 , 57 P.3d 1084 ("Notwithstanding Plaintiff's attempt to characterize their claim so as to avoid application of the [Act] ... the language of their complaint clearly invokes the application of the Act.").

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2007Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky.1997) (declining to reject Youngblood approach based on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal constitution), and North

2005A “party seeking a protective order has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order.” Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1990). ¶ 9 Here, Farmers appears to base its assertion that good cause for a protective order exists on its argument that an insured must establish a breach of the express terms of an insurance contract prior to bringing a first-party bad faith claim, and that, as a result, no discovery is permissible concerning the Christiansens’ bad faith claim until this breach of express contract is established.

2005“To establish a lack of good faith, or ‘bad faith’ under section 78-27-56, a party must prove that one or more of these factors is lacking.” Id.; see also Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (reversing an order awarding attorney fees where the trial court neither stated which of the bad faith factors applied nor discussed any evidence supporting any factor).

2001Co. v. McClelland, 105 Nev. 504 , 780 P.2d 193, 197-98 (1989) ("[A] wife's coverage as a dependent under her husband's health insurance policy does not give her standing to enforce her husband's contract rights for bad faith denial of health care benefits."); Vecchiarelli v. Cont’l Ins.

2001Co. v. McClelland, 105 Nev. 504 , 780 P.2d 193, 197-98 (1989) ("[A] wife's coverage as a dependent under her husband's health insurance policy does not give her standing to enforce her husband's contract rights for bad faith denial of health care benefits."); Vecchiarelli v. Cont’l Ins.