bad faith claim in Kentucky

1997The Calloway Circuit Court granted Guaranty National's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the bad faith claim, finding that the legal questions of reformation and agency raised by Guaranty National in filing the declaration of rights action were "fairly debatable." Empire Fire & Marine v. Simpsonville Wrecker, Ky.App., 880 S.W.2d 886 (1994).

1997The Calloway Circuit Court granted Guaranty National’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the bad faith claim, finding that the legal questions of reformation and agency raised by Guaranty National in filing the declaration of rights action were “fairly debatable.” Empire Fire & Marine v. Simpsonville Wrecker, Ky.App., 880 S.W.2d 886 (1994).

2026Co., 351 Mont. 464 , 215 P.3d 649 (2009) (plaintiff was not required to demonstrate serious or severe emotional distress to recover emotional distress damages arising out of a bad faith claim).

2026Co., 351 Mont. 464 , 215 P.3d 649 (2009) (plaintiff was not required to demonstrate serious or severe emotional distress to recover emotional distress damages arising out of a bad faith claim).

2017Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989)), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three-part Anderson test for a bad faith claim. 71 1 S.W.2d at 846 -47 (citing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .) Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson’s three-part test, but we have never 54 III.

2017Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three-part Anderson test for a bad faith claim, 711 S.W.2d at 846 -47 (citing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .) Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson's three-part test, but we have never embraced Anderson’s requirement that the plaintiff must "prove substantial damages aside and apart from the emotional distress,” nor have we barred recovery for emotional distress damages that were not severe.

2018Additionally, this claim would fail as a matter of law under the second element: that the insurer “lackfed] a reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the claim[.]” Id. (quoting Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890 ). “[I]f a particular claim is ‘fairly debatable,’ the insurer is entitled to debate that claim regardless of whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or one of law.” Empire Fire & Marine Ins.

2018Additionally, this claim would fail as a matter of law under the second element: that the insurer “lackfed] a reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the claim[.]” Id. (quoting Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890 ). “[I]f a particular claim is ‘fairly debatable,’ the insurer is entitled to debate that claim regardless of whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or one of law.” Empire Fire & Marine Ins.

2017Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2013), asserting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Kentucky law, has recognized that an insurer can raise coverage disputes without opening itself up to a bad faith claim.

2017Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2013), asserting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Kentucky law, has recognized that an insurer can raise coverage disputes without opening itself up to a bad faith claim.

2017Ky. 2014) (district court was not persuaded that “expert evidence is necessary to substantiate a claim [of damages for emotional distress] for discrimination or retaliation under the KCRA).”-28 Based on the foregoing, the MacGlashan court concluded_that ` 237 In Minter, a different division of the United States Distiict Court, Western ' District of Kentucky, went onto explain that Osbome’s expert requirement made sense in negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, “as the elements _ .of such a claim specifically require ‘severe or serious emotional injury.”" 2014 WL 57809

2017Ky. 2014) (district court Was not persuaded that “expert evidence is necessary to substantiate a claim [of damages for emotional distress] for discrimination or retaliation under the KCRA).”28 Based on the foregoing, the MacGlashan court concluded that 28 In Minter, a different division of the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky, went on to explain that Osborne’s expert requirement made sense in negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress cases “as the elements of such a claim specifically require ‘severe or serious emotional injury.’” 2014 WL 5780959 at *4

2017Co., 784 _ S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989)), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three~part Anderson test for a bad faith claim. 71 1 S.W.2d at 846-47 {citingAnderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .] Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson’s three-part test, but we have never 54 III.

2017Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three-part Anderson test for a bad faith claim, 711 S.W.2d at 846 -47 (citing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .) Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson's three-part test, but we have never embraced Anderson’s requirement that the plaintiff must "prove substantial damages aside and apart from the emotional distress,” nor have we barred recovery for emotional distress damages that were not severe.

2025Progressive asserts that no evidence supports an inference of harassment, deception, or reckless disregard of the Blevinses’ rights as required under Wittmer, supra. It further argues that the indemnity provision in the proposed release was -11- consistent with Coots, supra, and that the circuit court correctly found its conduct did not approach the level of outrageousness necessary to sustain a bad-faith claim.

2023To prove entitlement to a missing evidence instruction in civil litigation, a litigant “only [has] to show that the opposing party had exclusive control over the evidence 86 See, e.g., Sutton v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836 , 848 (Ky. 2021). 87 English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 . 88 Dooley v. Commonwealth, 626 S.W.3d 487 , 502 (Ky. 2021). 30 when it went missing and that the evidence is missing without explanation.”89 Sanchez points to this Court’s dicta in Dooley v. Commonwealth that “our historical imposition of a higher burden on criminal defendants than civil litigants is more than curious[,]” an

2018See generally DeStock No. 14 v. Logsdon , 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999) ; James v. Wilson , 95 S.W.3d 875 (Ky. App. 2002) ; N. Hardin Dev., Inc. v. Corkran , 839 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1992) ; T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks , 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006) ; Jenkins, supra.

2018See generally DeStock No. 14 v. Logsdon , 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999) ; James v. Wilson , 95 S.W.3d 875 (Ky. App. 2002) ; N. Hardin Dev., Inc. v. Corkran , 839 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1992) ; T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks , 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006) ; Jenkins, supra.

2018See generally DeStock No. 14 v. Logsdon , 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999) ; James v. Wilson , 95 S.W.3d 875 (Ky. App. 2002) ; N. Hardin Dev., Inc. v. Corkran , 839 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1992) ; T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks , 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006) ; Jenkins, supra.

2018See generally DeStock No. 14 v. Logsdon , 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999) ; James v. Wilson , 95 S.W.3d 875 (Ky. App. 2002) ; N. Hardin Dev., Inc. v. Corkran , 839 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1992) ; T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks , 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006) ; Jenkins, supra.

2017Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three-part Anderson test for a bad faith claim, 711 S.W.2d at 846 -47 (citing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .) Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson's three-part test, but we have never embraced Anderson’s requirement that the plaintiff must "prove substantial damages aside and apart from the emotional distress,” nor have we barred recovery for emotional distress damages that were not severe.

2017Notably, in Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to extend Camper’s (the case relied on by this Court in Osborne) heightened standard of proof for the recovery of emotional damages in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to all claims for emotional damages.

2017Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989)), but in his dissent Justice Leibson advocated adopting the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s three-part Anderson test for a bad faith claim. 71 1 S.W.2d at 846 -47 (citing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 371 .) Eventually, the Curry Court (and later Wittmer v. Jones) adopted Anderson’s three-part test, but we have never 54 III.

2013The attorney in Knotts was already deeply involved in the litigation, which was a bad faith claim, and had litigated the related negligence case “from its inception.” Id.

2013That attorney had “unique knowledge and familiarity with the underlying facts in that action,” id. at 557 , and “knowledge of the case no one else could duplicate,” id. at 560 .