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11 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Employers Mutual Companies v. Nordstromgreen2 sentences1997Id. at 858. 1996Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d at 858 . | 1 | 2 |
Patton v. Newmar Corp.green2 sentences2014“The task of determining what, if any, sanction is to be imposed is implicated by the broad authority provided the [district] court.” Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 118 . 13 Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision to impose sanctions under an abuse- of-discretion standard. 2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher | 1 | 1 |
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piperred2 sentences2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher 2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher | 1 | 1 |
Harlan v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2013Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to “limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of eases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.” Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 ) (alteration in original). 2013Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to “limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of eases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.” Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 ) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
City of Minneapolis v. Wurtelegreen2 sentences2006See Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 390 ; Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 108 , 210 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1973). 2006See Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 390 ; Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 108, 210 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
HOUSING & REDEV. AUTH. OF CITY OF ST. PAUL v. Schapirogreen2 sentences2006See Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 390 ; Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 108, 210 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1973). 2006See Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 390 ; Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 108, 210 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Larson v. Anchor Casualty Co.green2 sentences1996See Larson, 249 Minn. at 355-56 , 82 N.W.2d at 386-87 . 1996See Larson, 249 Minn. at 355-56 , 82 N.W.2d at 386-87 . | 1 | 1 |
Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of Londongreen1 sentence1987Thus the court observes in its opinion, "At common law in Minnesota the 1977 judgment against Car-Del would have been a nullity since the effect of dissolution was that the corporation wholly ceased to exist for any purpose." Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 385 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn.App.1986). [7] We say plaintiffs "apparently" raised the separate issue of the validity of the dissolution because the record is not clear that this issue was explicitly raised, except perhaps obliquely as a reason for upholding the assignment. | 1 | 1 |
Strand v. Travelers Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1986See Strand v. Travelers Insurance Co., 300 Minn. 311 , 219 N.W.2d 622 (1974). 1986See Strand v. Travelers Insurance Co., 300 Minn. 311 , 219 N.W.2d 622 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc.green2 sentences1976Although the specific issue of whether attorneys fees may be recovered as damages in mandamus actions is one of first impression in Minnesota, it is the settled gen *544 eral rule in this state regarding all other types of legal proceedings that “attorney’s fees are not recoverable as an item of damages unless there is a specific contract permitting such recovery or such fees are authorized by statute.” Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc. 244 Minn. 62, 69 , 69 N. W. 2d 118, 124 (1955); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. 1976Although the specific issue of whether attorneys fees may be recovered as damages in mandamus actions is one of first impression in Minnesota, it is the settled gen *544 eral rule in this state regarding all other types of legal proceedings that “attorney’s fees are not recoverable as an item of damages unless there is a specific contract permitting such recovery or such fees are authorized by statute.” Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc. 244 Minn. 62, 69 , 69 N. W. 2d 118, 124 (1955); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher 2014But such awards are available only when a party acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S. Ct. 2123 , 2133 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 , 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (1979); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Chambers and Roadway as setting a bad faith standard for attorney-fees awards, although not for all exercises of inherent power); Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (relying on federal caselaw addressing sanctions imposed under inher | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Uselman v. Uselman
red
1 sentence1991Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 140 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81 , 96-97 n. 13 (Minn. 1979). 1990Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81 , 96-97 n. 13 (Minn.1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Duxor Investment Aktiengesellschaft v. Investment Rarities Inc.
green
2 sentences1987On the need to frame proper questions, see Duxor Investment Aktiengesellschaft v. Investment Rarities, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.1987). . 1987Where the judgment debtor is dissolved and has no interest in pursuing a bad faith claim, does a judgment creditor have a direct cause of action against an insurer for bad faith? [5] On the need to frame proper questions, see Duxor Investment Aktiengesellschaft v. Investment Rarities, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1987). [6] It is clear that the court of appeals understood the parties were not questioning the validity of the dissolution. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.