103 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maris v. McGrathgreen2 sentences2019"To ensure ... that fear of an award of [attorney's] fees against them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *32 Maris v. McGrath , supra, 269 Conn. at 845 , 850 A.2d 133 . 2019"To ensure ... that fear of an award of [attorney's] fees against them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *32 Maris v. McGrath , supra, 269 Conn. at 845 , 850 A.2d 133 . | 4 | 15 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,755, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,074 William B. Weinberger v. James C. Kendrick, Charles M. Coynegreen2 sentences1994"To ensure . . . that fear of an award of attorneys' fees against them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both `clear evidence' that the challenged actions `are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,'. . . and `a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts.'" (Citations omitted. ) Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A. , supra, 344, quoting Weinberger v. Hendrick , 698 F.2d 61 , 1989“To ensure . . . that fear of an award of attorneys’ fees against them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both ‘clear evidence’ that the challenged actions ‘are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,’ . . . and ‘a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., supra, 344, quoting Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 | 3 | 5 |
Nemeroff v. Abelsongreen2 sentences2019As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, "[a] claim is colorable, for the purpose of the bad faith exception, when it has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individual making the claim." Nemeroff v. Abelson , 620 F.2d 339 , 348 (2d Cir. 1980). 1997The Court noted that "[w]hether a claim is colorable, for purpose of the bad-faith exception, is a matter of whether a reasonable attorney would have concluded that facts supporting the claim might be established, not whether such facts had been established." Id. , quoting Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 , 348 (2d Cir. 1980). | 2 | 8 |
CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhurygreen2 sentences2020See CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 395 , 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) ([t]o determine whether the bad faith exception applies, the court must assess whether there has been substan- tive bad faith as exhibited by, for example, a party’s . . . wilful violations of court orders . . . ), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 , 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. 2020See CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 395 , 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) ([t]o determine whether the bad faith exception applies, the court must assess whether there has been substan- tive bad faith as exhibited by, for example, a party’s . . . wilful violations of court orders . . . ), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 , 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. | 2 | 7 |
State v. Salmongreen2 sentences2020See CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 395 , 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) ([t]o determine whether the bad faith exception applies, the court must assess whether there has been substan- tive bad faith as exhibited by, for example, a party’s . . . wilful violations of court orders . . . ), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 , 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. 2020See CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 395 , 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) ([t]o determine whether the bad faith exception applies, the court must assess whether there has been substan- tive bad faith as exhibited by, for example, a party’s . . . wilful violations of court orders . . . ), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 , 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. | 2 | 7 |
Gupta v. New Britain General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2003"Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital , 239 Conn. 574 , 598 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996). 2003"Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital , 239 Conn. 574 , 598 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996). | 2 | 3 |
cluster 463732green2 sentences1989“To ensure . . . that fear of an award of attorneys’ fees against them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both ‘clear evidence’ that the challenged actions ‘are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,’ . . . and ‘a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., supra, 344, quoting Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 1989Furthermore, we note that the critical factual findings supporting the bad faith exception must be supported by “clear evidence.” Dow Chemical Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986). | 2 | 2 |
Habetz v. Condongreen2 sentences2017We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did ... § 20-429(f) abrogate the bad faith exception to the [act] created in Habetz v. Condon , 224 Conn. 231 , 240, 618 A.2d 501 (1992) ?"; and (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff?" Burns v. Adler , 319 Conn. 931 , 125 A.3d 205 (2015) ; see also footnote 7 of this opinion. 2017We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did ... § 20-429(f) abrogate the bad faith exception to the [act] created in Habetz v. Condon , 224 Conn. 231 , 240, 618 A.2d 501 (1992) ?"; and (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff?" Burns v. Adler , 319 Conn. 931 , 125 A.3d 205 (2015) ; see also footnote 7 of this opinion. | 1 | 18 |
Barrett Builders v. Millergreen2 sentences2017Given the "strong" estoppel basis of the bad faith doctrine; id., at 240 , 618 A.2d 501 ; allowing a repudiation of a defective contract drafted by a homeowner's attorney or architect does nothing to further the legislative judgment to "impose the burden of compliance with the statute on the professional, the contractor, rather than on the nonprofessional, the consumer." Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 326 , 576 A.2d 455 ; see also Wright Bros. 2017Given the "strong" estoppel basis of the bad faith doctrine; id., at 240 , 618 A.2d 501 ; allowing a repudiation of a defective contract drafted by a homeowner's attorney or architect does nothing to further the legislative judgment to "impose the burden of compliance with the statute on the professional, the contractor, rather than on the nonprofessional, the consumer." Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 326 , 576 A.2d 455 ; see also Wright Bros. | 1 | 6 |
Rinfret v. Portergreen2 sentences2018"Significantly, our appellate courts have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent ... a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rinfret v. Porter , 173 Conn. App. 498 , 507-509, 164 A.3d 812 (2017). 2018"Significantly, our appellate courts have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent ... a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rinfret v. Porter , 173 Conn. App. 498 , 507-509, 164 A.3d 812 (2017). | 1 | 4 |
Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manninggreen2 sentences2017The Appellate Court concluded that it was bound to reject the claim that the bad faith exception has been legislatively abrogated pursuant to its decision in Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning , 126 Conn.App. 94 , 104, 11 A.3d 165 (2011), aff'd, 307 Conn. 582 , 57 A.3d 730 (2012), in which it had held to the contrary. 2017The Appellate Court concluded that it was bound to reject the claim that the bad faith exception has been legislatively abrogated pursuant to its decision in Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning , 126 Conn.App. 94 , 104, 11 A.3d 165 (2011), aff'd, 307 Conn. 582 , 57 A.3d 730 (2012), in which it had held to the contrary. | 1 | 2 |
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Pipergreen2 sentences2001Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper , supra, 766, quoting Hall v. Cole , 412 U.S. 1 , 15 (1973). 2000Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper , 447 U.S. 752 , 766 (1980); Hall v. Cole , 412 U.S. 1 , 15 (1973); Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App., supra 360. | 1 | 2 |
TRAYSTMAN, CORIC AND KERAMIDAS v. Daiglegreen2 sentences2026Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582 , 923 A.2d 697 (2007); see also Traystman, Coric & Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418, 429 , 922 A.2d 1056 (2007) (“The law expects parties to bear their own litigation expenses, except where the legislature has dictated otherwise by way of statute. . . . 2026Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582 , 923 A.2d 697 (2007); see also Traystman, Coric & Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418, 429 , 922 A.2d 1056 (2007) (“The law expects parties to bear their own litigation expenses, except where the legislature has dictated otherwise by way of statute. . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Sabrina C. v. Fortingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Orcuttgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacMillan v. Higginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Housing Authority v. State Board of Labor Relationsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Macmillan v. Higginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hovet v. Allstate Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Leger v. Kelleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buckman v. People Express, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fattibene v. Kealey
green
2 sentences2002Whether a claim is colorable, for purposes of the bad-faith exception, is a matter of whether a reasonable attorney could have concluded that fact supporting CT Page 11522 the claim might be established, not whether such facts had been established ." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 360-61 . 2002"Whether a claim is colorable for the purposes of the bad faith exception is a matter of whether a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the claim might be established, not whether such facts had been established." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 , 361 , 558 A.2d 677 (1989). | 11 | 1991–2004 |
Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld
green
2 sentences2017In the present case, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's finding of bad faith because a homeowner does not act in bad faith unless the homeowner "accepts the contractor's services knowing that he has an 'escape hatch' under the [act] which allows him to avoid payment for those services." See Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240 , 248, 618 A.2d 506 (1992) (trial court properly found that plaintiff had not proven bad faith when there was no "proof that the attorneys intentionally [drafted a noncompliant contract] in order to have 2017In the present case, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's finding of bad faith because a homeowner does not act in bad faith unless the homeowner "accepts the contractor's services knowing that he has an 'escape hatch' under the [act] which allows him to avoid payment for those services." See Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240 , 248, 618 A.2d 506 (1992) (trial court properly found that plaintiff had not proven bad faith when there was no "proof that the attorneys intentionally [drafted a noncompliant contract] in order to have | 10 | 1994–2017 |
Dinnis v. Roberts
green
2 sentences1998The bad faith exception, however, is limited to instances "relating to the formation of, or inducement to, enter into a home improvement contract." Dinnis v. Roberts. 35 Conn. App. 253 , 257 , 644 A.2d 971 (1994). 1998The bad faith exception, however, is limited to instances "relating to the formation of, or inducement to, enter into a home improvement contract." Dinnis v. Roberts. 35 Conn. App. 253 , 257 , 644 A.2d 971 (1994). | 8 | 1995–2015 |
Hall v. Cole
green
2 sentences1989This bad faith exception applies, not only to the filing of an action, “ ‘but also in the conduct of the litigation.’ ” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, 766, quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 , 93 S. Ct. 1943 , 36 L. 1989This bad faith exception applies, not only to the filing of an action, “ ‘but also in the conduct of the litigation.’ ” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, 766, quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 , 93 S. Ct. 1943 , 36 L. | 7 | 1989–2004 |
ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2026Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582 , 923 A.2d 697 (2007); see also Traystman, Coric & Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418, 429 , 922 A.2d 1056 (2007) (“The law expects parties to bear their own litigation expenses, except where the legislature has dictated otherwise by way of statute. . . . 2026Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582 , 923 A.2d 697 (2007); see also Traystman, Coric & Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418, 429 , 922 A.2d 1056 (2007) (“The law expects parties to bear their own litigation expenses, except where the legislature has dictated otherwise by way of statute. . . . | 6 | 2009–2026 |
Kupersmith v. Kupersmith
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, the trial court must make a specific finding as to whether coun- sel’s [or a party’s] conduct . . . constituted or was tan- tamount to bad faith, a finding that would have to precede any sanction under the court’s inherent powers to impose attorney’s fees for engaging in bad faith litiga- tion practices.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn. App. 79, 97 , 78 A.3d 860 (2013). ‘‘[A] litigant seeking an award of attorney’s fees for the bad faith conduct of the opposing party faces a high hurdle.’’ Berzins v. Berzins, supra, 306 Conn. 662 . ‘‘To ensure 2017Moreover, the trial court must make a specific finding as to whether coun- sel’s [or a party’s] conduct . . . constituted or was tan- tamount to bad faith, a finding that would have to precede any sanction under the court’s inherent powers to impose attorney’s fees for engaging in bad faith litiga- tion practices.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn. App. 79, 97 , 78 A.3d 860 (2013). ‘‘[A] litigant seeking an award of attorney’s fees for the bad faith conduct of the opposing party faces a high hurdle.’’ Berzins v. Berzins, supra, 306 Conn. 662 . ‘‘To ensure | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Childs v. Bainer
green
2 sentences1998It is evident that the defendant cannot recover on the bad faith exception because it is limited to "instances of bad faith relating to the formation of, or inducement to, enter into a home improvement contract" and even possibly an "unwarranted" or an "improper termination or repudiation of the agreement." Dinnis v. Roberts , 35 Conn. App. 253 , 257 , 644 A.2d 971 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 924 , 648 A.2d 162 (1994). 1998It is evident that the defendant cannot recover on the bad faith exception because it is limited to "instances of bad faith relating to the formation of, or inducement to, enter into a home improvement contract" and even possibly an "unwarranted" or an "improper termination or repudiation of the agreement." Dinnis v. Roberts , 35 Conn. App. 253 , 257 , 644 A.2d 971 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 924 , 648 A.2d 162 (1994). | 3 | 1996–2015 |
Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso
green
2 sentences2009Because the bad faith exception may not be used by a contractor to recover on a restitutionary theory when . . . the contractor has not performed any of the home improvement services contemplated by the contract, the [contractor] cannot recover even if it can establish that the [homeowner] repudiated the contract in bad faith.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 681-82 , 657 A.2d 1087 (1995). 2009Because the bad faith exception may not be used by a contractor to recover on a restitutionary theory when . . . the contractor has not performed any of the home improvement services contemplated by the contract, the [contractor] cannot recover even if it can establish that the [homeowner] repudiated the contract in bad faith.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 681-82 , 657 A.2d 1087 (1995). | 3 | 1998–2009 |
Beverly v. State
green
2 sentences2002In construing § 52-226a , our Appellate Court has stated, "[W]e have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly v. State , 44 Conn. App. 641 , 648-649 , 691 A.2d 1093 (1997). 2002In construing § 52-226a , our Appellate Court has stated, "[W]e have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly v. State , 44 Conn. App. 641 , 648-649 , 691 A.2d 1093 (1997). | 3 | 1998–2002 |
State v. Morales
green
2 sentences1996State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707 , 657 A.2d 585 (1995). 1996State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707 , 657 A.2d 585 (1995). | 3 | 1995–1996 |
Matthiessen v. Vanech
green
2 sentences2020Co., 282 Conn. 576 , 591–92 n.13, 923 A.2d 697 (2007) (same); Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 833 , 836 A.2d 394 (2003) (While we have attempted to draw definitional distinc- tions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. 2020Co., 282 Conn. 576 , 591–92 n.13, 923 A.2d 697 (2007) (same); Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 833 , 836 A.2d 394 (2003) (While we have attempted to draw definitional distinc- tions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. | 2 | 2009–2020 |
Liljedahl Bros. v. Grigsby
green
2 sentences2017The bad faith exception had its genesis in dictum in Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 328 -29 , 576 A.2d 455 , and its companion cases, A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco , 215 Conn. 336 , 340, 576 A.2d 464 (1990), Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby , 215 Conn. 345 , 350, 576 A.2d 149 (1990), and Sidney v. DeVries , 215 Conn. 350 , 354, 575 A.2d 228 (1990) (per curiam). 2017The bad faith exception had its genesis in dictum in Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 328 -29 , 576 A.2d 455 , and its companion cases, A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco , 215 Conn. 336 , 340, 576 A.2d 464 (1990), Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby , 215 Conn. 345 , 350, 576 A.2d 149 (1990), and Sidney v. DeVries , 215 Conn. 350 , 354, 575 A.2d 228 (1990) (per curiam). | 2 | 1996–2017 |
Sidney v. DeVries
green
2 sentences2017The bad faith exception had its genesis in dictum in Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 328 -29 , 576 A.2d 455 , and its companion cases, A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco , 215 Conn. 336 , 340, 576 A.2d 464 (1990), Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby , 215 Conn. 345 , 350, 576 A.2d 149 (1990), and Sidney v. DeVries , 215 Conn. 350 , 354, 575 A.2d 228 (1990) (per curiam). 2017The bad faith exception had its genesis in dictum in Barrett Builders v. Miller , supra, 215 Conn. at 328 -29 , 576 A.2d 455 , and its companion cases, A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco , 215 Conn. 336 , 340, 576 A.2d 464 (1990), Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby , 215 Conn. 345 , 350, 576 A.2d 149 (1990), and Sidney v. DeVries , 215 Conn. 350 , 354, 575 A.2d 228 (1990) (per curiam). | 2 | 1996–2017 |
New England Custom Concrete, LLC v. Carbone
green
2 sentences2017There is nothing dishonest or sinister about homeowners proceeding on the assumption that there is a valid contract, enforcing its provisions, and later, in defense to a suit by the contractor, upon learning that the contract is invalid, then exercising their right to repudiate it." Indeed, I wholly agree with the majority's statement that the bad faith exception does not apply when the homeowner "repudiates the contract because the contractor's noncompliance with the act gave rise to a genuine, good faith dispute about the scope of the work or the contract price." See Taylor v. King , 121 Con 2017There is nothing dishonest or sinister about homeowners proceeding on the assumption that there is a valid contract, enforcing its provisions, and later, in defense to a suit by the contractor, upon learning that the contract is invalid, then exercising their right to repudiate it." Indeed, I wholly agree with the majority's statement that the bad faith exception does not apply when the homeowner "repudiates the contract because the contractor's noncompliance with the act gave rise to a genuine, good faith dispute about the scope of the work or the contract price." See Taylor v. King , 121 Con | 2 | 2011–2017 |
Peterson v. City of Norwalk
green
2 sentences2007This court also has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the other party’s attorney.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation *583 marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, supra, 270 Conn. 178 ; id., 178-79 (trial court properly denied motion for attorney’s fees in declaratory judgment action challenging practice of “underfilling” positions in city’s fire department); see also Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 844 , 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (“[i]t is generally 2007This court also has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the other party’s attorney.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation *583 marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, supra, 270 Conn. 178 ; id., 178-79 (trial court properly denied motion for attorney’s fees in declaratory judgment action challenging practice of “underfilling” positions in city’s fire department); see also Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 844 , 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (“[i]t is generally | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Broadnax v. City of New Haven
green
2 sentences2006For example, a specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs ... or a statute may confer such rights. . . . [Our Supreme Court] also has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the party or the other party’s attorney. . . . [W]e review the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 178 , 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). 2006For example, a specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs ... or a statute may confer such rights. . . . [Our Supreme Court] also has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the party or the other party’s attorney. . . . [W]e review the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 178 , 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). | 2 | 2006–2012 |
Meadows v. Higgins
green
2 sentences2001The attorney trial referee responded to the three queries from the court by indicating that: (1) the only issue before him was the alleged bad faith of the defendants because the parties had stipulated that the contract did not comply with the HIA because there was no cancellation clause at all, whereas Wright Bros. v. Dowling , supra, 247 Conn. 226 , involved a technical non-compliance with the cancellation statute; (2) although the defendants' attorney's preparation of the contract "fell far short in terms of quality," because the contract did not comply with the HIA, the referee determined 1999On June 1, 1999, the Supreme Court decided Meadows v. Higgins , 249 Conn. 155 , ___ A.2d ___ (1999), in which it ruled that the plaintiff in that case was acting as a subcontractor to whom the HIA did not apply. | 2 | 1999–2001 |
| Jacques v. Jacques green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Lederle v. Spivey green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Lederle v. Spivey green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In Re Margaret J. Myers, Debtor. Margaret J. Myers green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Renaissance Management Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Gray neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Dowling green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Keller v. Keller green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Kronberg Bros. v. Steele green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Munro v. Munoz green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Kronberg Bros. v. Steele green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Taylor v. King green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Harley v. Indian Spring Land Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Keller v. Keller green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Burns v. Adler green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States Steel Corporation v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| PT & L. CONST. v. Dept. of Transp. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Hirschfeld v. MACHINIST green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Hirschfeld v. MacHinist green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Waterview Site Service, Inc. v. Pay Day, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lucien v. McCormick Construction, LLC green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.