bad faith requirement in Illinois

2022(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), the Supreme Court explicitly held that “[u]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” See also Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549 (reaffirming that where the destroyed evidence “was, at best, ‘potentially useful’ ” the bad-faith requirement set forth in Youngblood applies).

2018Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to 'limi[t] the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.' " Id. at 548 , 124 S.Ct. 1200 (quoting Youngblood , 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ). ¶ 37 Defendant cites to Justice Stevens's succinct concurrence in Fisher as support for his contention that a showing of bad faith is not required under state law

2006Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to ‘limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin [e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.’ [Citation.] We also disagree that Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘ “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.” ’ App. to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (ci

2006Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to 'limi[t] the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.' [Citation.] We also disagree that Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant's 'only hope for exoneration' and is '"essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case."' App. to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (citin

2014Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to ‘limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.’ [Citation.] *** We also disagree that Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘ “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.’ ” *** [T]he applicability of th

2014Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to ‘limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.’ [Citation.] We also disagree that Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘ “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.” ’ *** [T]he applicability of the ba

2020The Ruizes urge us to hold that the 2018 version of the Act applies, while the association maintains that the earlier version is applicable. ¶ 27 Determining whether a current or prior version of a statute is applicable to a cause of action ordinarily requires a retroactivity analysis as set forth in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (2001).

2019The Ruizes urge us to hold that the 2018 version of the Act applies, while the association maintains that the earlier version is applicable. ¶ 27 Determining whether a current or prior version of a statute is applicable to a cause of action ordinarily requires a retroactivity analysis as set forth in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (2001).

2020Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1049 (C.D.

2020Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1049 (C.D.

2014App. 3d 949, 960 (2006)), our supreme court has not determined whether the due-process clause in the Illinois Constitution provides broader protection (People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 240 (2006) (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether the outcome-determinative analysis adopted in Newberry still has vitality in light of the Fisher opinion because, even if it does, Newberry is inapplicable under the facts present here.”)).

2014App. 3d 949, 960 (2006)), our supreme court has not determined whether the due-process clause in the Illinois Constitution provides broader protection (People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 240 (2006) (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether the outcome-determinative analysis adopted in Newberry still has vitality in light of the Fisher opinion because, even if it does, Newberry is inapplicable under the facts present here.”)).

2006We note that one federal district court has concluded that “[a]ny significant distinction between the ‘bad faith’ standard and the ‘oppression’ standard is not overtly apparent.” Janikowski v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959 (N.D.

2006We note that one federal district court has concluded that "[a]ny significant distinction between the `bad faith' standard and the `oppression' standard is not overtly apparent." Janikowski v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (N.D.Ill.1999).

2022(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), the Supreme Court explicitly held that “[u]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” See also Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549 (reaffirming that where the destroyed evidence “was, at best, ‘potentially useful’ ” the bad-faith requirement set forth in Youngblood applies).

2018Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to 'limi[t] the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.' " Id. at 548 , 124 S.Ct. 1200 (quoting Youngblood , 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ). ¶ 37 Defendant cites to Justice Stevens's succinct concurrence in Fisher as support for his contention that a showing of bad faith is not required under state law

2014The insurer may ignore the policyholder’s interest and decline to settle.’ ” Haddick, 198 Ill. 2d at 415 (quoting Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d at 525-26 ). ¶ 17 Pleading Standard for Bad-Faith Cases in Illinois ¶ 18 In Haddick, our supreme court set forth the elements required to establish a bad-faith claim.

2014Id. ¶ 19 The bad-faith claim in Haddick also arose from an automobile accident.

2023Builders Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dragas Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440 (E.D.

2019In the only cases since that one that have returned to address the litigation privilege, both reaffirmed that the privilege immunizes “statements and conduct” (Doe v. Williams McCarthy, LLP, 2017 IL App (2d) 160860, ¶ 19 ), and that it applies to actions taken by an attorney in connection with potential litigation just as 6 We say “assuming” because, although the majority of the allegations in O’Callaghan clearly took place after litigation commenced (i.e., discovery violations, failing to disclose evidence, concealing evidence, contriving a bad-faith defense, etc.), it is not entirely clear t

2018See Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 . 8 Having so found, we need not address any of the alternative grounds for dismissal proposed by McDermott, which include plaintiffs' failure to sufficiently plead a valid intrusion upon seclusion claim, their failure to allege any of its required elements, and forfeiture.

2018See Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 . 8 Having so found, we need not address any of the alternative grounds for dismissal proposed by McDermott, which include plaintiffs' failure to sufficiently plead a valid intrusion upon seclusion claim, their failure to allege any of its required elements, and forfeiture.