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127 Pennsylvania opinions name it 21 courts 1928–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'Donnell Ex Rel. Mitro v. Allstate Insurance Co.green2 sentences2018Co., 734 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2002), we have ____________________________________________ 23 To the extent the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the Unfair Insurance Practices Act in its conduct of this litigation—again, the trial court found a violation without addressing that Act in any detail—we address that matter in this section. 24 Appellant originally produced a claims log with Potosnak’s report redacted. - 48 - J-A25026-17 refused to recognize that an insurer’s discovery practices constitute grounds for a bad faith claim under section 8371, absent the use of discovery to co 2018Co., 734 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2002), we have refused to recognize that an insurer's discovery practices constitute grounds for a bad faith claim under section 8371, absent the use of discovery to conduct an improper investigation. | 5 | 15 |
Rancosky v. Washington National Ins. Co., Aplt.green2 sentences2025Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2013) (agreeing that, Section 8371 does not define the term ____________________________________________ 17 We find Erie Insurance’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in Rancosky, supra, for the proposition that that the term “claim” refers only to the bad faith claim, to be misplaced. 2018Co. , --- Pa. ----, 170 A.3d 364 , 365 (2017). "[P]roof of an insurance company's motive of self-interest or ill-will is not a prerequisite to prevailing in a bad faith claim[,]" though such evidence is probative of the second prong of the bad faith test. | 5 | 9 |
March v. Paradise Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2016Co., 646 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. 1994) (reiterating that bad faith “claims under section 8371 are separate and distinct causes of action and [] the language of section 8371 does not indicate that success on the contract claim is a prerequisite to success on the bad faith claim”). 2015The Dissent also asserts that, to the extent that LeAnn asserts a bad faith claim based on Conseco’s decision to lapse the Cancer Policy, the limitations period for such claim began to run “either on March 9, 2005 , when Conseco first advised LeAnn that [the Cancer P]olicy had lapsed, or on September 21, 2006, when Conseco denied LeAnn’s request for WOP and advised her that coverage had ended on May 24, 2003.” Id. | 5 | 6 |
Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2025Co., 791 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002) (agreeing that, Section 8371 permits a litigant to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in pursuing the underlying UIM claim, as well as the bad faith claim). - 15 - At the damages trial, Michael O. 2015Co., 791 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa.Super.2002) (“The trial judge who acted as factfinder in this matter permitted the admission of this expert to aid the court in its ability to evaluate the bad faith claim.”). | 3 | 7 |
Adamski v. Allstate Insurance Co.green2 sentences2023Similarly, in Adamski, supra, we held that a bad faith claim accrues after the initial denial of coverage and cannot be revived by additional requests by the insured.5 While Neely insists that his suit would have been dismissed if he had filed prior to his 65th birthday, he has not cited any law in support of his contention and we have uncovered none. 2007For purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to pay a claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.” Adamski v. Allstate Insurance Company, 738 A.2d 1033, 1036 (Pa. Super. 1999). (citations omitted) The available relief for a bad faith claim is provided in 42 Pa.C.S. §8371. 1 At the preliminary objections stage of the pleadings and under the standard for evaluating a demurrer to the plaintiffs’ complaint, we find | 3 | 4 |
Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2018Co. , 437 Pa.Super. 108 , 649 A.2d 680 (1994), which provides that to succeed on a bad faith claim, a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis. 2018Co. , 437 Pa.Super. 108 , 649 A.2d 680 (1994), which provides that to succeed on a bad faith claim, a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis. | 2 | 11 |
Lucchino v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023See, Solebury, supra (reversing the Board based on a misapplication of the standard, but not rejecting the standard); Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 809 A.2d 264, 288 (Pa. 2002) (affirming the application of the bad-faith standard in awarding fees: “The [Board] and the Commonwealth Court correctly determined that Lucchino initiated this litigation in bad faith and, thus, the EHB did not abuse its discretion by awarding Luzerne costs and 2 Certainly the bad faith standard does not eliminate fee recovery, as this Court affirmed the award of fees based on a party’s bad faith in Lucchino. 3 The Court w 2023See, Solebury, supra (reversing the Board based on a misapplication of the standard, but not rejecting the standard); Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 809 A.2d 264, 288 (Pa. 2002) (affirming the application of the bad-faith standard in awarding fees: “The [Board] and the Commonwealth Court correctly determined that Lucchino initiated this litigation in bad faith and, thus, the EHB did not abuse its discretion by awarding Luzerne costs and 2 Certainly the bad faith standard does not eliminate fee recovery, as this Court affirmed the award of fees based on a party’s bad faith in Lucchino. 3 The Court w | 2 | 5 |
Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc.red2 sentences2025This conclusion is further supported by the decision of this Court in Birth Center, supra, wherein we held that “[t]he term ‘claim’ [as it pertains to Section 8731] is not limited to the bad faith claim.” 17 Birth Center, 727 A.2d at 1160 n.11; see also Grossi v. Travelers Pers. 2007Paul Companies, Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1164 (Pa.Super.1999), disapproved of on other grounds in Mishoe v. Erie Insurance Co., 573 Pa. 267 , 824 A.2d 1153 (2003) (concluding that two letters prepared by a party’s counsel concerning the potential for a bad faith claim were not protected under attorney-client privilege because the letters contained no protected communications from the party to its counsel); see also Coregis Insurance Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, 186 F.Supp.2d 567, 569-72 (E.D.Pa.2002) (reviewing Pennsylvania statutory and case law on attorney-client privilege and conc | 2 | 3 |
Cowden v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green2 sentences2013The standard proposed by ANI is as follows: This articulation of the bad faith standard which follows from Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459 , 134 A.2d 223 (Pa.1957), and its progeny should apply here. 2013The standard proposed by ANI is as follows: This articulation of the bad faith standard which follows from Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459 , 134 A.2d 223 (Pa.1957), and its progeny should apply here. | 2 | 3 |
Grossi v. Travelers Personal Insurance Co.green2 sentences2025Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2013) (agreeing that, Section 8371 does not define the term ____________________________________________ 17 We find Erie Insurance’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in Rancosky, supra, for the proposition that that the term “claim” refers only to the bad faith claim, to be misplaced. 2014See Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1148-1149 (“to succeed on a claim under section 8371, the insured must show that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resourcesred2 sentences2023While it made some effort to argue the bad-faith standard’s propriety as developed in case law, it also ventured several policy points: DEP is solely 60 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 61 Id. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 62 Upper Gwynedd Towamencin Mun. 2023While it made some effort to argue the bad-faith standard’s propriety as developed in case law, it also ventured several policy points: DEP is solely 60 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 61 Id. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 62 Upper Gwynedd Towamencin Mun. | 2 | 2 |
Upper Gwynedd Towamencin Municipal Authority v. Department of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2023Auth. v. DEP, 9 A.3d 255, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 2023Auth. v. DEP, 9 A.3d 255, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). | 2 | 2 |
Kelly v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2015In contrast, if an insurer breaches its duty to settle while defending subject to a reservation of rights and the insured accepts a reasonable settlement offer, the insured need only demonstrate that the insurer breached its duty by failing to consent to a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and non-collusive, as described above, rather than demonstrating bad faith by the insurer, as the damages sought are subject to the policy limits to which the insurer originally contracted.18 See Kelly, 620 N.W.2d at 645 (“The bad faith standard is simply not appropriate here, where the issue is one of co 2015In contrast, if an insurer breaches its duty to settle while defending subject to a reservation of rights and the insured accepts a reasonable settlement offer, the insured need only demonstrate that the insurer breached its duty by failing to consent to a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and non-collusive, as described above, rather than demonstrating bad faith by the insurer, as the damages sought are subject to the policy limits to which the insurer originally contracted. 18 See Kelly, 620 N.W.2d at 645 (“The bad faith standard is simply not appropriate here, where the issue is one of c | 2 | 2 |
Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2013Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 414-416 (Pa. Super. 2004), a determination of bad faith by an automobile insurer can be based on the conduct of the insurer and its employee-witnesses during trial of the bad-faith claim. 2013In Hollock, supra at 419-20 , we noted that “the elements of proof necessary to establish a claim for punitive damages under this section are co-extensive with those that establish the bad faith claim itself.” We upheld a sizable punitive damage award of $2.8 million therein. | 2 | 2 |
Booze v. Allstate Insurance Co.green2 sentences2006To establish a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania law, the Superior Court has consistently required that the insured demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence “(1) that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits; and (2) that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis.” Brickman Group Ltd. v. CGU Insurance Company, 865 A.2d 918, 930 (Pa. Super. 2004), quoting Booze v. Allstate Insurance Company, 750 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2000). 2004Co., 750 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 722 , 766 A.2d 1242 (2000) (finding that an insured had an obligation to plead the aforementioned elements, and failed to do so, when she alleged solely in the complaint that the insurer mislead her into purchasing particular coverage). | 2 | 2 |
Bergman v. United Services Automobile Ass'ngreen2 sentences2004Ass’n, 742 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Pa.Super.1999). ¶ 10 In its first question, Erie asserts that the trial court erroneously based its determination of bad faith on the conduct of the company and its employee-witnesses during trial of the bad faith claim. 2004Ass'n, 742 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Pa.Super.1999). ¶ 10 In its first question, Erie asserts that the trial court erroneously based its determination of bad faith on the conduct of the company and its employee-witnesses during trial of the bad faith claim. | 2 | 2 |
| D'AMBROSIO v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.green | 2 | 2 |
Nealy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Shadduck, 713 A.2d at 638 (quoting Nealy, supra at 794 ). 2022Co., 695 A.2d 790 , 792-93 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Nordi v. Keystone Health Plan West, Inc., 989 A.2d 376 , 381-83 & n. 4 (Pa. Super. 2010) (addressing the bad faith claim on the merits despite the concession that the insured's coverage claim failed). | 1 | 3 |
Ash v. Continental Insurancegreen2 sentences2013Insurers do a terrible disservice to their insureds when they fail to evaluate each individual case in terms of the situation presented and the individual affected.” Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 382 . (15) When considering the merits of a bad faith claim, “one must look at the behavior of the insurer toward the insured and measure its reasonableness... to see whether it is perhaps more than mere negligence or bad judgment....” Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523 , 932 A.2d 877 (2007). (16) With respect to the present case, the evidence clearly shows that Fidelity did not have a reasonabl 2013Insurers do a terrible disservice to their insureds when they fail to evaluate each individual case in terms of the situation presented and the individual affected.” Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 382 . (15) When considering the merits of a bad faith claim, “one must look at the behavior of the insurer toward the insured and measure its reasonableness... to see whether it is perhaps more than mere negligence or bad judgment....” Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523 , 932 A.2d 877 (2007). (16) With respect to the present case, the evidence clearly shows that Fidelity did not have a reasonabl | 1 | 3 |
Regina Polselli Rudolph R. Polselli (Intervenor-Plaintiff in d.c.) v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company. Regina Polselligreen2 sentences2011Id. at 533-34 . 1998However, the recent decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Polselli v. Nationwide, 126 F.3d 524 (3rd Cir. 1997), highlights the “contractual” characteristics of a bad faith claim: “[W]e conclude that since an insurer’s duty of good faith toward an insured is implicit in every insurance policy, an action to enforce that duty must necessarily ‘arise under’ that policy. | 1 | 3 |
Mishoe v. Erie Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Because there is no right to a jury trial for 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371 insurance bad faith claims, Mishoe v. Erie Insurance Co., 824 A.2d 1153, 1154, 1156-59, 1161 (Pa. 2003), Plaintiff’s claims were bifurcated, with the breach of contract claim to be tried to a jury and the bad faith claim to be tried in a subsequent bench trial. 2007Paul Companies, Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1164 (Pa.Super.1999), disapproved of on other grounds in Mishoe v. Erie Insurance Co., 573 Pa. 267 , 824 A.2d 1153 (2003) (concluding that two letters prepared by a party’s counsel concerning the potential for a bad faith claim were not protected under attorney-client privilege because the letters contained no protected communications from the party to its counsel); see also Coregis Insurance Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, 186 F.Supp.2d 567, 569-72 (E.D.Pa.2002) (reviewing Pennsylvania statutory and case law on attorney-client privilege and conc | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Tejedagreen2 sentences2015As such, under Ash, supra, all alleged Bad Faith allegations occurring prior to January 14, 2001, fall outside the statute of limitations. 2014Co., and states that § 8371 “applies only in limited circumstance — i.e., where the insured has filed ‘an action arising under an insurance policy’ against his insurer — and it only permits a narrow class of plaintiffs to pursue the bad faith claim against a narrow class of defendants.” Ash, 932 A.2d at 882 . | 1 | 2 |
Ridgeway v. U.S. Life Credit Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2006The Superior Court rejected this second action as beyond the scope of the bad faith statute, which it found limited to protecting an insured from bad faith denials of coverage. 793 A.2d at 977 . 2006The Supexior Court rejected this second action as beyond the scope of the bad faith statute, which it found limited to protecting an insured from bad faith denials of coverage. 793 A.2d at 977 . | 1 | 2 |
| MGA Insurance v. Bakosgreen | 1 | 2 |
| AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Brown v. Progressive Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Krishnan v. Cutler Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Richards, R. v. Ameriprise Financialgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bombar v. West American Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wenk, J. v. State Farm Fire and Casualtygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nordi v. Keystone Health Plan West Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rettger v. UPMC SHADYSIDEgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Horowitz v. Universal Underwriters Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michael, G. v. Stock, J.green | 1 | 1 |
| Berg, D. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Belfonte v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Harleysville Mutual Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gillard v. AIG Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Co., 44 A.3d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2012), where this Court concluded that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the plaintiffs’ bad-faith claim and remanded for a new trial, where the plaintiffs would have the burden to prove their bad-faith ____________________________________________ 8 The Wenks’ Brief is a combination of argument on their issues presented in their appeal docketed at 1284 WDA 2018 and response to both State Farm and FireDEX cross-appeals. 2020Co., 44 A.3d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2012), where this Court concluded that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the plaintiffs’ bad-faith claim and remanded for a new trial, where the plaintiffs would have the burden to prove their bad-faith ____________________________________________ 8 The Wenks’ Brief is a combination of argument on their issues presented in their appeal docketed at 1284 WDA 2018 and response to both State Farm and FireDEX cross-appeals. | 6 | 2013–2020 |
Solebury Township v. Department of Environmental Protection
green
2 sentences2023See, Solebury, supra (reversing the Board based on a misapplication of the standard, but not rejecting the standard); Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 809 A.2d 264, 288 (Pa. 2002) (affirming the application of the bad-faith standard in awarding fees: “The [Board] and the Commonwealth Court correctly determined that Lucchino initiated this litigation in bad faith and, thus, the EHB did not abuse its discretion by awarding Luzerne costs and 2 Certainly the bad faith standard does not eliminate fee recovery, as this Court affirmed the award of fees based on a party’s bad faith in Lucchino. 3 The Court w 2023Indeed, the plain language of Section 307 does not specify on what basis for counsel fees may be granted or denied, nor does that statute mandate that such standards be created.” Solebury, 928 A.2d at 1003 . 3 In light of that broad discretion, it cannot be overlooked that the majority’s decision today represents a significant deviation from this Court’s jurisprudence, which has never prohibited the Board from utilizing a particular standard – including the bad faith standard. | 4 | 2023–2023 |
Illinois v. Fisher
green
2 sentences2016The Court clarified its understanding of the distinction elucidated in Youngblood, stating “the applicability of the bad-faith requirement in Youngblood depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s case, but on the distinction between ‘materially exculpatory’ evidence and ‘potentially useful’ evidence.” Id. at 549 . 2009The Court reaffirmed that the critical distinction for purposes of the Constitutional right to preservation of evidence was be tween “potentially useful evidence”-—evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 , 109 S.Ct. 388—and “materially exculpatory evidence.” The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘essential to and determinative of the out | 3 | 2008–2016 |
Nelson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2001Bad faith is more akin to the former than to the latter because it is precisely such an exogenous standard.” 988 F. Supp. at 533 . (citations omitted) Nelson also noted that punitive damages are not available in Pennsylvania breach of contract actions and that the availability of such damages for a bad faith claim suggests a tort-like nature. 988 F. Supp. at 529 (citing AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield, 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 (1990), and Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa. Super. 135 , 476 A.2d 928 (1984)). 2001Bad faith is more akin to the former than to the latter because it is precisely such an exogenous standard.” 988 F. Supp. at 533 . (citations omitted) Nelson also noted that punitive damages are not available in Pennsylvania breach of contract actions and that the availability of such damages for a bad faith claim suggests a tort-like nature. 988 F. Supp. at 529 (citing AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield, 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 (1990), and Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa. Super. 135 , 476 A.2d 928 (1984)). | 3 | 1998–2001 |
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
green
2 sentences2023She noted that, while the court in Sierra Club generally supported the Board’s discretion to adopt standards, it also observed that “[s]uch standards . . . must be consistent with ‘Pennsylvania’s strong public policy to justly compensate parties that challenge agency actions by liberally interpreting fee shifting provisions.’” 69 A bad-faith requirement, she opined, “does not square with the public policy purpose underpinning Section 307(b)’s fee-shifting language.” 70 Moreover, it would be unfair to expose DEP to fees arising from actions involving “inadvertent mistakes or good faith, negotia 2023She noted that, while the court in Sierra Club generally supported the Board’s discretion to adopt standards, it also observed that “[s]uch standards . . . must be consistent with ‘Pennsylvania’s strong public policy to justly compensate parties that challenge agency actions by liberally interpreting fee shifting provisions.’” 69 A bad-faith requirement, she opined, “does not square with the public policy purpose underpinning Section 307(b)’s fee-shifting language.” 70 Moreover, it would be unfair to expose DEP to fees arising from actions involving “inadvertent mistakes or good faith, negotia | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2005Appellant concludes the Commonwealth committed a bad faith violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), ignored Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, and this Court must overturn his conviction. 2005Appellant concludes the Commonwealth committed a bad faith violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), ignored Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, and this Court must overturn his conviction. | 2 | 2005–2016 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2009The Court reaffirmed that the critical distinction for purposes of the Constitutional right to preservation of evidence was be tween “potentially useful evidence”-—evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 , 109 S.Ct. 388—and “materially exculpatory evidence.” The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘essential to and determinative of the out 2009The Court reaffirmed that the critical distinction for purposes of the Constitutional right to preservation of evidence was between "potentially useful evidence" — evidence "of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant," Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 , 109 S.Ct. 333 — and "materially exculpatory evidence." The Court explicitly rejected the argument that " Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant's `only hope for exoneration' and is `essential to and determinative of the | 2 | 1992–2009 |
Brown v. Candelora
green
2 sentences2003We reasoned that “[a]n unliquidated claim for breach of contract is not a debt owed or property and such a claim may not be attached as if it were the debtor’s property in the garnishee’s hands.” Brown, 708 A.2d at 108 (quoting In Re J. 1999On January 30, 1998, AIIC filed a Petition to Set Aside Writ of Execution, arguing that the Luszczynskis had no basis under Pennsylvania law on which to bring a bad faith claim against AIIC. 3 At a hearing on February 6, 1998, the trial court, in light of this Court’s January 30, 1998 decision in Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104 (Pa.Super.1998), 4 asked the parties whether Turner and/or Bradley had assigned their bad faith claim against AIIC to the Luszczynskis. | 2 | 1999–2003 |
| E. Menkowitz, M.D., Aplt. v. Peerless Publications green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia v. Bagwell green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Richards, R. v. Ameriprise Financial green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Hutchinson v. Farm Family Casualty Insurance green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Herrera v. City of Espanola green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Scampone, R. v. Grane Healthcare Co. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Kosierowski v. Allstate Insurance green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Virgo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Thompson v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Sommer v. Workingmen's Building & Loan Ass'n neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Gorski v. Smith green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Gunn v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Insurance green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Romine v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Parker v. Philadelphia green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Moore Motors, Inc. v. Beaudry green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Bolmgren v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cresswell v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hughes v. Chaplin green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ash v. Continental Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.