34 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1935–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zechmann v. Canisteo Volunteer Fire Departmentgreen2 sentences2022Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a (1-a) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o application by a self-insured employer or an insurance carrier for transfer of liability of a claim to the [Special Fund] shall be accepted by the [B]oard on or after [January 1, 2014] except that the [B]oard may make a finding after such date pursuant to [Workers' Compensation Law § 23] upon a timely application for review." The Court of Appeals has made clear that "'a claim for death benefits is a separate and distinct legal proceeding brought by the beneficiary's dependents and is not equated [*2]with the benefici 2022The Court reasoned that "a death benefits claim accrues at the time of death and 'is a separate and distinct legal proceeding' from the worker's original disability claim" ( id. at 392, quoting Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept. , 85 NY2d 747, 751 [1995]). | 5 | 7 |
Claim of Mace v. Owl Wire & Cable Co.green2 sentences2009Because the right to death benefits does not accrue prior to death (see Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept., 85 NY2d at 753 ; Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co., 284 AD2d 672, 675 [2001]), the Workers’ Compensation Board assigned the death benefits case a separate claim number from the underlying disability claim and a new date of accident, namely the date of the employee’s death. 2009While “a claim for death benefits ... is a separate and distinct legal proceeding brought by the beneficiary’s dependents and is not equated with the beneficiary’s original disability claim” (id. at 751; see Matter of Arena v Crown Asphalt Co., 292 AD2d 743, 746 [2002]; Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co., 284 AD2d at 675 ), the character of the administrative proceedings does not define the contractual relationship between the insured and insurer under a workers’ compensation insurance policy. | 3 | 3 |
Graham v. New York State Office of Mental Healthgreen2 sentences2025As plaintiff states on appeal that she is not claiming pregnancy "in the context of a disability claim" at all, there are no grounds to support a claim that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for a disability ( see Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d 141, 145-147 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d 1214, 1217-1218 [3d Dept 2017]). 2025As plaintiff states on appeal that she is not claiming pregnancy "in the context of a disability claim" at all, there are no grounds to support a claim that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for a disability ( see Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d 141, 145-147 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d 1214, 1217-1218 [3d Dept 2017]). | 2 | 2 |
Pimentel v. Citibank, N.A.green2 sentences2025As plaintiff states on appeal that she is not claiming pregnancy "in the context of a disability claim" at all, there are no grounds to support a claim that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for a disability ( see Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d 141, 145-147 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d 1214, 1217-1218 [3d Dept 2017]). 2025As plaintiff states on appeal that she is not claiming pregnancy "in the context of a disability claim" at all, there are no grounds to support a claim that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for a disability ( see Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d 141, 145-147 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d 1214, 1217-1218 [3d Dept 2017]). | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Fitzgerald v. Berkshire Farm Center & Services for Youthgreen2 sentences2012Accordingly, because the death benefit claim is premised on a new occupational disease, separate and distinct from the occupational disease established in the underlying disability claim, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision releasing the Special Fund from liability (compare Matter of Fitzgerald v Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. for Youth, 87 AD3d 353, 354-355 [2011]). 2012Accordingly, because the death benefit claim is premised on a new occupational disease, separate and distinct from the occupational disease established in the underlying disability claim, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision releasing the Special Fund from liability (compare Matter of Fitzgerald v Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. for Youth, 87 AD3d 353, 354-355 [2011]). | 2 | 2 |
Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Hallmark Operating, Inc.green1 sentence2017Fund v Hallmark Operating, Inc., 61 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2009]; Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co., 284 AD2d 672, 675 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Imbriani v. Berkar Knitting Millsgreen1 sentence2009Moreover, on a claim to recover death benefits, “the work-related illness need not be the sole or even the most direct cause of death, provided that the claimant demonstrates that the compensable illness was a contributing factor in the decedent’s demise” (Matter of Imbriani v Berkar Knitting Mills, 277 AD2d 727, 730 [2000]; see Matter of Altes v Petrocelli Elec. | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Arena v. Crown Asphalt Co.green1 sentence2009While “a claim for death benefits ... is a separate and distinct legal proceeding brought by the beneficiary’s dependents and is not equated with the beneficiary’s original disability claim” (id. at 751; see Matter of Arena v Crown Asphalt Co., 292 AD2d 743, 746 [2002]; Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co., 284 AD2d at 675 ), the character of the administrative proceedings does not define the contractual relationship between the insured and insurer under a workers’ compensation insurance policy. | 1 | 1 |
Ashley v. New York Policemen's & Firemen Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2003With the burden now shifted to petitioner to establish the disability claim (see Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 156 AD2d 775, 775 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 710 [1990]; Matter of Ashley v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 132 AD2d 90, 92 [1987]), he alleged that the presumption was not adequately rebutted since the Retirement System did not conclusively eliminate all methods by which he could have contracted hepatitis C. | 1 | 1 |
Nerney v. New York State Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2003With the burden now shifted to petitioner to establish the disability claim (see Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 156 AD2d 775, 775 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 710 [1990]; Matter of Ashley v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 132 AD2d 90, 92 [1987]), he alleged that the presumption was not adequately rebutted since the Retirement System did not conclusively eliminate all methods by which he could have contracted hepatitis C. | 1 | 1 |
McComb v. Regangreen1 sentence2003We disagree, finding substantial evidence to support the determination that the presumption was overcome (see Matter of Shannon v Regan, 180 AD2d 862, 862 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 756 [1992]; Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., supra at 776; cf. Matter of Skae v Regan, 208 AD2d 1028, 1029 [1994]). | 1 | 1 |
Skae v. Regangreen1 sentence2003We disagree, finding substantial evidence to support the determination that the presumption was overcome (see Matter of Shannon v Regan, 180 AD2d 862, 862 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 756 [1992]; Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., supra at 776; cf. Matter of Skae v Regan, 208 AD2d 1028, 1029 [1994]). | 1 | 1 |
Poggi v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1995Aside from the fact that she never applied for benefits, she does not set forth arguments to meet her burden of demonstrating that the legislative scheme governing such benefits is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that no reasonable basis whatsoever exists for excluding police officers from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Law, which allows a disability claim after discharge, while granting them coverage under the Police Pension Fund, Article II, which does not (Lighthouse Shores v Islip, 41 NY2d 7 , 11-12; see also, Poggi v City of New York, 109 AD2d 265, 273 , affd 6 | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Keenholts v. Bayer Co.green1 sentence1995This principle has been recognized since the early days of workers’ compensation law (see, e.g., 1934 Atty Gen [Inf Opns] 509, 510; see also, Matter of Keenholts v Bayer Co., 263 NY 77, 78 [implying legal distinction in granting claimant both death benefits and disability payments accrued to date of death]; Matter of Lutz v Huffman & Co., 231 NY 622 ; Matter of Iannone v Radory Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Poggi v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1995Aside from the fact that she never applied for benefits, she does not set forth arguments to meet her burden of demonstrating that the legislative scheme governing such benefits is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that no reasonable basis whatsoever exists for excluding police officers from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Law, which allows a disability claim after discharge, while granting them coverage under the Police Pension Fund, Article II, which does not (Lighthouse Shores v Islip, 41 NY2d 7 , 11-12; see also, Poggi v City of New York, 109 AD2d 265, 273 , affd 6 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences1989Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v Kulis, supra, at 323 .) In People v Rivera ( 58 AD2d 147 , affd 45 NY2d 989 ), Justice Silverman, writing for the majority and also quoting Walder v United States (supra, at 65), said, " '[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reli anee on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.’ ” (People v Rivera, supra, at 151.) Rivera, however, involved use of an affidavit of a former 1989Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v Kulis, supra, at 323 .) In People v Rivera ( 58 AD2d 147 , affd 45 NY2d 989 ), Justice Silverman, writing for the majority and also quoting Walder v United States (supra, at 65), said, " '[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reli anee on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.’ ” (People v Rivera, supra, at 151.) Rivera, however, involved use of an affidavit of a former | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hospital Corp.
green
2 sentences2018While defendant claims that it did not know about this, its H.R. officer admitted during her deposition that, in response to her inquiry, the Hartford acknowledged that it would tell an employee that he or she could call at a later date when they needed to obtain the necessary information in order to file a claim. [FN1] Furthermore, one may reasonably question how advising plaintiff to file for private disability benefits to get paid would fulfill defendant's legal obligation to "hold a constructive dialogue about the possibility of a reasonable accommodation" ( Jacobsen, 22 NY3d at 838 n2) an 2018While defendant claims that it did not know about this, its H.R. officer admitted during her deposition that, in response to her inquiry, the Hartford acknowledged that it would tell an employee that he or she could call at a later date when they needed to obtain the necessary information in order to file a claim. [FN1] Furthermore, one may reasonably question how advising plaintiff to file for private disability benefits to get paid would fulfill defendant's legal obligation to "hold a constructive dialogue about the possibility of a reasonable accommodation" ( Jacobsen, 22 NY3d at 838 n2) an | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Walder v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility’ ” (United States v Caron, supra, p 509, quoting Walder v United States, 347 US 62, 65 ). 1977As the United States Supreme Court in Walder v United States ( 347 US 62, 65 ), quoted with approval in Harris v New York ( 401 US 222, 224 ), said: "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Goverment’s disability to challenge his credibility.” The judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Bloom, J.), rendered June 2, 1975, convicting defendant after jury trial of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law, §§ 220 | 2 | 1977–1986 |
Filonuk v. Rhea
green
1 sentence2016Matter of Filonuk v Rhea, 84 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2011]); rather, he is challenging NYCHA’s denial of his application for RFM status. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Curley v. Dilworth
green
1 sentence2006Accordingly, the Town’s delegation of the disability hearing to a hearing officer, and its adoption of the hearing officer’s findings and recommendations requiring the petitioner to return to work, were appropriate (see Matter of Curley v Dilworth, 96 AD2d 903 [1983]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Di Maio v. State
green
1 sentence2005This court does have jurisdiction to hear claims based on allegations that an employee of the SDVA was negligent in carrying out a ministerial duty in the course of providing services to a veteran (Di Maio v State of New York, 135 Misc 2d 1021 [Ct Cl 1987]; Di Maio v State of New York, 128 Misc 2d 101 [Ct Cl 1985] [allegations that an employee failed to forward a disability claim to the Veterans’ Administration and then hid the fact]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Di Maio v. State
neutral
1 sentence2005This court does have jurisdiction to hear claims based on allegations that an employee of the SDVA was negligent in carrying out a ministerial duty in the course of providing services to a veteran (Di Maio v State of New York, 135 Misc 2d 1021 [Ct Cl 1987]; Di Maio v State of New York, 128 Misc 2d 101 [Ct Cl 1985] [allegations that an employee failed to forward a disability claim to the Veterans’ Administration and then hid the fact]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Matter of Lutz v. . Theo. P. Huffman Co.
neutral
1 sentence1995This principle has been recognized since the early days of workers’ compensation law (see, e.g., 1934 Atty Gen [Inf Opns] 509, 510; see also, Matter of Keenholts v Bayer Co., 263 NY 77, 78 [implying legal distinction in granting claimant both death benefits and disability payments accrued to date of death]; Matter of Lutz v Huffman & Co., 231 NY 622 ; Matter of Iannone v Radory Constr. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dicocco v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992Defendant maintains that plaintiff was fired for misconduct, which precludes recovery under the Human Rights Law (see, e.g., Dicocco v Capital Area Community Health Plan, 135 AD2d 308, 309-310 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Claim of Solomon v. Cohn, Glickstein, Lurie, Ostrin & Lubell
neutral
1 sentence1991In our view, claimant failed to meet her burden of proving that decedent’s discharge was in retaliation for his saying that he intended to file a disability claim (see, Matter of Solomon v Cohn, Glickstein, Lurie, Ostrin & Lubell, 97 AD2d 561 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Weeks v. United States
red
1 sentence1989Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v Kulis, supra, at 323 .) In People v Rivera ( 58 AD2d 147 , affd 45 NY2d 989 ), Justice Silverman, writing for the majority and also quoting Walder v United States (supra, at 65), said, " '[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reli anee on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.’ ” (People v Rivera, supra, at 151.) Rivera, however, involved use of an affidavit of a former | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Kulis
green
1 sentence1989Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v Kulis, supra, at 323 .) In People v Rivera ( 58 AD2d 147 , affd 45 NY2d 989 ), Justice Silverman, writing for the majority and also quoting Walder v United States (supra, at 65), said, " '[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reli anee on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.’ ” (People v Rivera, supra, at 151.) Rivera, however, involved use of an affidavit of a former | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Rivera
green
1 sentence1989Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v Kulis, supra, at 323 .) In People v Rivera ( 58 AD2d 147 , affd 45 NY2d 989 ), Justice Silverman, writing for the majority and also quoting Walder v United States (supra, at 65), said, " '[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reli anee on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.’ ” (People v Rivera, supra, at 151.) Rivera, however, involved use of an affidavit of a former | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Molina v. Wave Crest Motel
green
1 sentence1988The Board’s decision must be affirmed since "claims for disability and death benefits are clearly separate and distinct assertions of rights and thus separate claims for reimbursement are required” (Matter of Molina v Wave Crest Motel, 46 AD2d 957, 958 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Rossi v. Hartford Fire Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1986The conduct complained of in the case at bar, viz., intentional misrepresentations concerning the status and filing of the plaintiff’s disability claim, does not rise to a level of "extreme outrage”, nor does it exceed "all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 12, at 60 [5th ed]; cf. Sherbak v Doughty, 72 AD2d 548 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Claim of Williams v. Julius Klein, Inc. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Claim of Ward v. Merritt neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Claim of Nallan v. Motion Picture Studio Mechanics Union, Local No. 52 green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Claim of Nallan v. Motion Picture Studio Mechanics Union, Local No. 52 green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Harris v. New York green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Hall v. Celebrezze green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Ihnen v. Celebrezze green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Crowder v. Gardner green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Agnello v. United States green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Williams v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Kress v. Central Trust Co. neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Vernon v. Vernon green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Krause v. Krause green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Home Life Insurance v. Allison neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Cornell v. . Travelers' Insurance Company neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Cornell v. Travelers' Insurance Co. of Hartford neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Lobdell v. Broome County Farmers' Fire Relief Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.