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6 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1929–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jewison v. Frerichs Construction
green
1 sentence1994That standard is as follows: “ ‘In a case where an employee’s preexisting condition is aggravated to the point of a disability by an independent occurrence, we believe that the evidence must show both: (1) that the employee’s disability arose out of a reasonably foreseeable accident or job related activity which in and of itself, in the absence of a preexisting condition, would not have caused the employee to become disabled, and (2) that the employee’s preexisting condition substantially increased the risk that the employee would become disabled from a reasonably foreseeable accident or job-r | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. Downey
green
2 sentences1989Only by the elimination of all variables except the injury itself can a reasonably accurate estimate be made of the impairment of earning capacity to be attributed to that injury.’ ” 266 Ala. at 348 , 96 So.2d at 281 -82 (quoting 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 57.21). 1989Only by the elimination of all variables except the injury itself can a reasonably accurate estimate be made of the impairment of earning capacity to be attributed to that injury.’ ” 266 Ala. at 348 , 96 So.2d at 281 -82 (quoting 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 57.21). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Mobley v. New York Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1936Ed. 1621 , 99 A.L.R. 1166 , note p. 1172; 1 Restatement of Contracts, supra. And that principle was referred to in discussing such a policy as this in that case, by further observing: “Mere refusal, upon mistake or' misunderstanding as to matters of fact or upon an erroneous construction of the disability clause, to pay a monthly benefit when due is sufficient to constitute a breach of that provision, but it does not amount to a renunciation or repudiation of the policy.” And such is the rule elsewhere declared. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Hale
neutral
2 sentences1936Co. v. Hale, 230 Ala. 323 , 161 So. 248, 252 , construing a disability clause of like import as that here presented, our former decisions were reviewed by the full court. 1936Co. v. Hale, 230 Ala. 323 , 161 So. 248, 252 , construing a disability clause of like import as that here presented, our former decisions were reviewed by the full court. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
McGifford v. Protective Life Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1935Co., 227 Ala. 588 , 151 So. 349 , and reaffirmed in the McCutcheon Case, supra. Count A of the complaint, on which the case was tried, after setting out in hsee verba said total disability clause, avers: “That on, to-wit, the 5th day of June, 1932, while plaintiff was a member of said Pioneer Insurance Club, and while plaintiff was one of the members of said Club, insured under said policy of insurance, and while plaintiff was, to-wit, 42 years of age, and while said policy of insurance was in force and effect as to the plaintiff by reason of the payment of the premiums due thereon for plainti 1935Co., 227 Ala. 588 , 151 So. 349 , and reaffirmed in the McCutcheon Case, supra. Count A of the complaint, on which the case was tried, after setting out in hsee verba said total disability clause, avers: “That on, to-wit, the 5th day of June, 1932, while plaintiff was a member of said Pioneer Insurance Club, and while plaintiff was one of the members of said Club, insured under said policy of insurance, and while plaintiff was, to-wit, 42 years of age, and while said policy of insurance was in force and effect as to the plaintiff by reason of the payment of the premiums due thereon for plainti | 1 | 1935–1935 |
McMillan v. Aiken
green
2 sentences1929“If, while this policy is in full force and effect and while there is no default in the payment of. premium beyond the four weeks’ grace period, the insured shall lose by severance both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot, or lose permanently the sight of both eyes, total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist, and one-half of the amount of insurance then payable in the event of death shall be paid immediately upon receipt by -the Company of due proof of such loss and surrender of this Policy.” Counsel for appellant, contending for reversible error, in refusing the general 1929“If, while this policy is in full force and effect and while there is no default in the payment of. premium beyond the four weeks’ grace period, the insured shall lose by severance both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot, or lose permanently the sight of both eyes, total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist, and one-half of the amount of insurance then payable in the event of death shall be paid immediately upon receipt by -the Company of due proof of such loss and surrender of this Policy.” Counsel for appellant, contending for reversible error, in refusing the general | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.