disability challenge in District of Columbia

2017Respondent’s counsel opposed the motion on the grounds that Respondent did not seek to assert a disability claim tinder In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987), and Respondent’s physical condition was factual information pertinent to the determination of whether Respondent’s actions were seriously improper.

2017Respondent’s counsel opposed the motion on the grounds that Respondent did not seek to assert a disability claim tinder In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987), and Respondent’s physical condition was factual information pertinent to the determination of whether Respondent’s actions were seriously improper.

2026Servs., 170 A.3d 170 , 177-79 (D.C. 2017) (describing the “relevant time-frame” for a total disability claim as the period for which the claimant requested benefits).

2016The ALJ in this case deviated from both principles — it employed the AMA Guides in the disability analysis and did so without notice to the parties even though the AMA Guides were not admitted into evidence — relying upon the following passage in Negussie, supra, 915 A.2d at 397 (quoting Getson v. WM (continued . . .) 22 disability‘s impact on personal or social activities should be beyond the scope of compensation offered for work-related injuries,‖ but it affirmed because such a restriction ―is shortsighted‖ since non-work activities could still ―demonstrate an effect on the ability to perfo

2016The ALJ in this case deviated from both principles — it employed the AMA Guides in the disability analysis and did so without notice to the parties even though the AMA Guides were not admitted into evidence — relying upon the following passage in Negussie, supra, 915 A.2d at 397 (quoting Getson v. WM (continued . . .) 22 disability‘s impact on personal or social activities should be beyond the scope of compensation offered for work-related injuries,‖ but it affirmed because such a restriction ―is shortsighted‖ since non-work activities could still ―demonstrate an effect on the ability to perfo

2016Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 952 A.2d 168 ,173 (D.C.2008)).

2016In Brown , this court affirmed the CRB’s ruling in part but remanded for the Board to address two questions: (1) whether the Board broke its own procedural rule when it denied a disability claim on a ground that had not been raised before the ALJ; and (2) whether the CRB’s interpretation of D.C.Code § 32-1507(d) — that is, when a claimant’s eligibility for benefits is suspended under this provision, the claimant’s only recourse is to modify the suspension based on a change of conditions pursuant to D.C.Code § 32-1524(a), which imposes a time bar on modification — is inconsistent with either th

1997The court held that his untimely filing could be “excused because of the disability from which the claim arose and until a reasonable time after the disability cease[d].” Id. at 37 .

1990Having voluntarily taken the stand, appellant was under an obligation to "testify truthfully or suffer the consequences," United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from the government's case-in-chief cannot serve as "a justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Bourn, supra, 567 A.2d at 1316 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. *704 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503

1990Having voluntarily taken the stand, appellant was under an obligation to "testify truthfully or suffer the consequences," United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from the government's case-in-chief cannot serve as "a justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Bourn, supra, 567 A.2d at 1316 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. *704 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503

1990Having voluntarily taken the stand, appellant was under an obligation to "testify truthfully or suffer the consequences," United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from the government's case-in-chief cannot serve as "a justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Bourn, supra, 567 A.2d at 1316 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. *704 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503

1990Having voluntarily taken the stand, appellant was under an obligation to "testify truthfully or suffer the consequences," United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from the government's case-in-chief cannot serve as "a justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Bourn, supra, 567 A.2d at 1316 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. *704 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503

1986Pol. & Firefighters’ Retirement, 485 A.2d 212, 215 (D.C.1984); District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512 , 523 n. 19 (D.C.1982).

1986Pol. & Firefighters' Retirement, 485 A.2d 212, 215 (D.C.1984); District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512 , 523 n. 19 (D.C.1982).

1985The act of dishonesty by appellant is misconduct even in the absence of an employer rule such as the one cited in his employer’s letter to him. 1 Harmon v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board, 66 Pa. Commw. 320 , 444 A.2d 806 (1982).

1985The act of dishonesty by appellant is misconduct even in the absence of an employer rule such as the one cited in his employer’s letter to him. 1 Harmon v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board, 66 Pa. Commw. 320 , 444 A.2d 806 (1982).

1985Oullette v. Employment Division, 34 Or.App. 591 , 579 P.2d 301, 302-303 (1978) (reversed and remanded on other grounds); Sain v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 564 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.1978).

1983For, "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 645 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954).

1983For, "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 645 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954).

1980Any disability plan which would grant pensions to persons for injuries not diminishing their ability to continue to do such work would not only be totally unrelated to job qualifications but would be a tremendous waste of public funds. [2] The following statements in Jones, supra, have caused confusion in light of Coakley, supra : The statute under which petitioner has invoked a disability claim does not require the Board to determine whether she is physically fit to perform every conceivable kind of police assignment, but merely whether she is still capable of handling the duties required by

1980The following statements in Jones, supra, have caused confusion in light of Coakley, supra : The statute under which petitioner has invoked a disability claim does not require the Board to determine whether she is physically fit to perform every conceivable kind of police assignment, but merely whether she is still capable of handling the duties required by the kind of position to which she was regularly assigned prior to her injury.

1980Any disability plan which would grant pensions to persons for injuries not diminishing their ability to continue to do such work would not only be totally unrelated to job qualifications but would be a tremendous waste of public funds. [2] The following statements in Jones, supra, have caused confusion in light of Coakley, supra : The statute under which petitioner has invoked a disability claim does not require the Board to determine whether she is physically fit to perform every conceivable kind of police assignment, but merely whether she is still capable of handling the duties required by

1980The following statements in Jones, supra, have caused confusion in light of Coakley, supra : The statute under which petitioner has invoked a disability claim does not require the Board to determine whether she is physically fit to perform every conceivable kind of police assignment, but merely whether she is still capable of handling the duties required by the kind of position to which she was regularly assigned prior to her injury.

1956While it is true, as we said in George Washington Life Insurance Co. v. Morgan, D.C.Mun.App., 118 A.2d 685, 687 , that any “* * * coverage for sickness originating while the policy is in force is limited by the reinstatement provision where there has been a subsequent lapse”, there the disability for which the claim was made occurred within the ten-day period following reinstatement when the policy was not in force.