disability challenge in Kansas

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2008Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D.

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2008A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him "`into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.'" Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ). "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .

2005Casco claims the secondary disability rule set forth in Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637 , 493 P.2d 264 (1972), allows him compensation under K.S.A. 44-510e.

2005Casco claims the secondary disability rule set forth in Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637 , 493 P.2d 264 (1972), allows him compensation under K.S.A. 44-510e.

2005The court held that the Board’s finding that the employee’s injuiy to her left arm resulted from a new and separate accident foreclosed the application of the secondary disability principle. 23 Kan.

2005The court held that the Board’s finding that the employee’s injuiy to her left arm resulted from a new and separate accident foreclosed the application of the secondary disability principle. 23 Kan.

2002In Brown , the court found no acquiescence, even though the insurer paid the undisputed portion of the disability claim and appealed the remainder of the judgment; the parties involved in the payment were the same parties litigating the appeal. 226 Kan. at 231 . *139 Reliance’s settlement with the plaintiffs is not inconsistent with its claims against Zurich on appeal.

1997The secondary disability principle was applied in Reese v. Gas Engineering & Construction Co., 219 Kan. 536 , 548 P.2d 746 (1976).

1997The secondary disability principle was applied in Reese v. Gas Engineering & Construction Co., 219 Kan. 536 , 548 P.2d 746 (1976).

1997“An injury is a natural and probable result of an accident where a claimant’s disability gradually increased as a result of a primary accidental injury, but not when the increased disability resulted from a new and separate accident.” Wietharn v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 16 Kan.

1993I agree with the district court that the rationale and result of Goff, 1 Kan.

1993I agree with the district court that the rationale and result of Goff, 1 Kan.

1981A party rests under a disability to claim damages which he might have presented." In Osborn v. Grego, 226 Kan. 212, 217 , 596 P.2d 1233 (1979), the doctrine is stated again: "Damages are not recoverable for harm that a party should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort without undue risk, expense or humiliation.

1981A party rests under a disability to claim damages which he might have presented." In Osborn v. Grego, 226 Kan. 212, 217 , 596 P.2d 1233 (1979), the doctrine is stated again: "Damages are not recoverable for harm that a party should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort without undue risk, expense or humiliation.

1981Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 212 Kan. 301 , Syl. ¶ 8." Despite the foregoing, we find in Kansas decisions: "It is a long-standing rule in this state that where a tenant, under contract to pay rent on real property, abandons the property and notifies the landlord of that abandonment, it is the duty of the landlord to make a reasonable effort to secure a new tenant for the property and obtain rent therefrom before he can recover rent from the old tenant under the contract.

1981Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 212 Kan. 301 , Syl. ¶ 8.” Despite the foregoing, we find in Kansas decisions: “It is a long-standing rule in this state that where a tenant, under contract to pay rent on real property, abandons the property and notifies the landlord of that abandonment, it is the duty of the landlord to make a reasonable effort to secure a new tenant for the property and obtain rent therefrom before he can recover rent from the old tenant under the contract.

1978In United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to apply the Walder theory to permit admission of statements obtained in violation of the Miranda warnings.

1938In the recent case of Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Co., 300 U. S. 435 , 57 S. Ct. 607 , 81 L.

1938In the recent case of Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Co., 300 U. S. 435 , 57 S. Ct. 607 , 81 L.

1932Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307 , the court had before it a disability clause substantially the same as in the policy under consideration, and the court, after referring to the cases above cited, said: “We think there is a manifest distinction between that class of cases and this.