7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1933–1985 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985It would make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell. "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503, 507 (1954). 1985It would make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell. "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503, 507 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
neutral
2 sentences1961Va. 323 , 171 S. E. 824 , was decided, an action based upon the disability clause of a life insurance policy. 1940Va. 323 , 171 S. E. 824 , involved a disability clause in a life insurance policy similar to the one now before the Court. | 3 | 1936–1961 |
Jenkins v. New York Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1961Equally it is clear that an accident policy contemplates a disability which has already occurred and which, in many cases, would pre *418 vent the assured from filing a proof of claim within any limited time.” In the dissenting opinion, Judge Hatcher sáid: “I see not why the majority opinion classifies one condition precedent, the other subsequent.” In Jenkins v. New York Life Insurance Company, 122 W. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Greenbrier Laundry Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
green
2 sentences1961That instruction told the jury that if it found for the plaintiff it could consider, in arriving at its verdict, “any premiums he may have paid, if any, since the defendant had notice of said disability, and disability benefits at the rate of $50.00 per month from the date of his disability to the time of the institution of this action and assess his damages accordingly. * * *” The 2nd Syllabus Point reads: “Where a disability clause of a life insurance policy provides that ‘the first monthly payment shall be made immediately upon receipt by the company of due proof of such disability,’ the fu 1961Va. 88 , 178 S. E. 631 , was an action of debt on a bond indemnifying an employer against loss of money or personal property due to the fraud, dishonesty, et cetera, of an employee. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Neill v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1940The case of Neill v. Insurance Co., 119 W. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Cody v. Insurance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1940Va. 518 , 163 S. E. 4 , 86 A. L. 1940A total disability clause, we stated in Cody v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 111 W. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Jones v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1938Jones v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 114 W. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Life Casualty Ins. Co. v. Peacock
neutral
1 sentence1933Co. of Tennessee v. Peacock, 124 So. 229 (Ala.), involved a disability clause providing that the loss “by severance of both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot”, or the permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, should constitute total and permanent disability within the meaning of the policy. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.