disability clause in Tennessee

1954Ed. 971 , and particularly upon the following language from the Moberly case: “Repudiation by one party, to be sufficient in any case to entitle the other to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken and to recover damages as upon total breach, must at least amount to an unqualified refusal, or declaration of inability, substantially to perform according to the terms of his obligation. * * * Mere refusal, upon mistake or misunderstanding as to matters of fact or upon an erroneous construction of the disability clause, to pay a monthly benefit when due is sufficient to constitute a br

1954Ed. 971 , and particularly upon the following language from the Moberly case: “Repudiation by one party, to be sufficient in any case to entitle the other to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken and to recover damages as upon total breach, must at least amount to an unqualified refusal, or declaration of inability, substantially to perform according to the terms of his obligation. * * * Mere refusal, upon mistake or misunderstanding as to matters of fact or upon an erroneous construction of the disability clause, to pay a monthly benefit when due is sufficient to constitute a br

1935In Koeberl v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 190 Minn., 477 , 252 N. W., 419 , the court held that insured, who was able to do much farm work, notwithstanding one arm had been amputated as a result of an accident, was not permanently and totally disabled within the disability clause of the life policy.

1935In Koeberl v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 190 Minn., 477 , 252 N. W., 419 , the court held that insured, who was able to do much farm work, notwithstanding one arm had been amputated as a result of an accident, was not permanently and totally disabled within the disability clause of the life policy.

1934The point was expressly made and determined against the contention of the insurer in Fitzgerald v. Globe Indemnity Co. (California District Court of Appeals; hearing denied by the Supreme Court), 84 Cal. App., 689 , 258 Pac., 458, 461 , wherein the court said: “No logical reason appears, however, 'why the same rule should not be applied where the policy provides for both total and partial disability in order to make the total disability clause ‘operative and to prevent a forfeiture’ of the indemnity provided by that clause.

1934The point was expressly made and determined against the contention of the insurer in Fitzgerald v. Globe Indemnity Co. (California District Court of Appeals; hearing denied by the Supreme Court), 84 Cal. App., 689 , 258 Pac., 458, 461 , wherein the court said: “No logical reason appears, however, 'why the same rule should not be applied where the policy provides for both total and partial disability in order to make the total disability clause ‘operative and to prevent a forfeiture’ of the indemnity provided by that clause.

1930Defining “permanent,” Bouvier’s Dictionary says, “This word does not always embrace the idea of absolute perpetuity; 8 Barb., 185 ; or forever or lasting forever, or existing forever; 136 U. S., 393 ; 2 N. J.