disability challenge in Arkansas

1994The Supreme Court of the United States held that, while such evidence would generally be unconstitutionally inadmissible, “there [was] hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” Id.

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. at 356 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

2023He denied that he “put disability waivers in place.” He further claimed that even if his rating had changed since the divorce, Linzy failed to cite the proper caselaw governing the issue in this case, referring to Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214 (2017), which he claimed arguably overturned Nesbitt and its class of cases.

2003Horticare Landscape Management v. McDonald, 80 Ark.App. 45 , 89 S.W.3d 375 (2002).

2003Horticare Landscape Management v. McDonald, 80 Ark.

1987Co., 13 Ark.App. 59 , 679 S.W.2d 222 (1984): The concept or doctrine of current total disability, a term not to be found in the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act itself, has been sanctioned several times in recent years by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. (citations omitted) ...

1987Co., 13 Ark.App. 59 , 679 S.W.2d 222 (1984): The concept or doctrine of current total disability, a term not to be found in the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act itself, has been sanctioned several times in recent years by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. (citations omitted) ...

1986Cf. State v. Johnson, 94 Ariz. 303 , 383 P.2d 862 (1963).

1986Cf. State v. Johnson, 94 Ariz. 303 , 383 P.2d 862 (1963).

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. at 356 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. at 356 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. at 356 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. at 356 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

1986Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility. [ 347 U.S. at 65 , footnote omitted.] See also, People v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 489 , 190 P.2d 9 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746 , 137 P.2d 133 (1943).

1983Only by the elimination of all variables except the injury itself can a reasonably accurate estimate be made of the impairment of earning capacity to be attributed to that injury.” Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 57.21. 244 Ark. at 552 and 553.

1946One of the latest decisions of this court in which the question of disability under a policy with language similar to the policy here involved is that of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Orr, 205 Ark. 566 , 169 S. W. 2d 651 .

1946One of the latest decisions of this court in which the question of disability under a policy with language similar to the policy here involved is that of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Orr, 205 Ark. 566 , 169 S. W. 2d 651 .

1946In the recent case of North American Accident Insurance Company v. Branscum, ante, p. 579, 191 S. W. 2d 597 , we again announced the following rule: ‘ ‘ The rule prevailing in most jurisdictions is that the ‘total disability’ contemplated by a sickness or accident insurance policy, or the disability clause of a life insurance, policy, does not mean, as its literal construction would require, a state of absolute helplessness, but contemplates rather such a disability as renders the insured unable to perform all the substantial and material acts necessary to the prosecution of his business or oc

1942This court said in the case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Jordan, 190 Ark. 941 , 82 S. W. 2d 250 , (quoting Syllabus b) that: “In an action on a policy of disability insurance, to recover past-due installments of disability benefits, services of attorneys in establishing disability, as affecting future rights and liabilities under the contract, involved a substantial right which should be considered in fixing their fees.” It is true the recovery in this ease was not very large, but the effect of the decision herein will establish total and permanent disability for a long period o

1942This court said in the case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Jordan, 190 Ark. 941 , 82 S. W. 2d 250 , (quoting Syllabus b) that: “In an action on a policy of disability insurance, to recover past-due installments of disability benefits, services of attorneys in establishing disability, as affecting future rights and liabilities under the contract, involved a substantial right which should be considered in fixing their fees.” It is true the recovery in this ease was not very large, but the effect of the decision herein will establish total and permanent disability for a long period o

1941Appellee was bound by the disability clause contained in the policy, and that clause, in almost exact words, was before this court for construction in the case of Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Snow, 185 Ark. 335 , 47 S. W. 2d 600 .

1941Appellee was bound by the disability clause contained in the policy, and that clause, in almost exact words, was before this court for construction in the case of Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Snow, 185 Ark. 335 , 47 S. W. 2d 600 .

1938Co. v. Wells, 187 Ark. 979 , 63 S. W. 2d 533 , we held that the rights of the parties had become fixed at a time when no premium was due; that while the canse of action had not accrued, yet the liability existed, and all premiums that became due after the time fixed for payment under the disability clause in the policy, are by the express terms of the policy waived; that premiums that became due after the liability attached, but before the time fixed in the policy for a waiver of premiums, are not waived.

1938Co. v. Wells, 187 Ark. 979 , 63 S. W. 2d 533 , we held that the rights of the parties had become fixed at a time when no premium was due; that while the canse of action had not accrued, yet the liability existed, and all premiums that became due after the time fixed for payment under the disability clause in the policy, are by the express terms of the policy waived; that premiums that became due after the liability attached, but before the time fixed in the policy for a waiver of premiums, are not waived.

1933Co. v. Phifer, 160 Ark. 98 , 254 S. W. 335 , the appellant contended that, under a total disability clause, liability did not begin until six months after final proof of the injury and disability, but we there held that liability attached when disability occurred.

1933Co. v. Phifer, 160 Ark. 98 , 254 S. W. 335 , the appellant contended that, under a total disability clause, liability did not begin until six months after final proof of the injury and disability, but we there held that liability attached when disability occurred.

1933The facts in the case of Burkheiser v. Mutual Accident Association, etc., 61 Fed. 816 , 26 L.

1933In the case of Ætna Life Insurance Company v. Spencer, 182 Ark. 496 , 32 S. W. (2d) 310 , this court said, in construing a disability clause not materially different from the definition of the clauses in these policies: ‘ ‘ Total disability is generally regarded as a relative matter which depends largely upon the occupation and employment in which the party insured is engaged.

1933In the case of Ætna Life Insurance Company v. Spencer, 182 Ark. 496 , 32 S. W. (2d) 310 , this court said, in construing a disability clause not materially different from the definition of the clauses in these policies: ‘ ‘ Total disability is generally regarded as a relative matter which depends largely upon the occupation and employment in which the party insured is engaged.