disability claim in Louisiana

2015Similarly, the case of Brown v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 95-1172 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/96) , 671 So.2d 1049 , cited by Ford, involved cross-examination using the plaintiffs prior workers’ compensation claim as impeachment after the plaintiff testified he had never before filed a disability claim.

2015Similarly, the case of Brown v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 95-1172 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/96) , 671 So.2d 1049 , cited by Ford, involved cross-examination using the plaintiffs prior workers’ compensation claim as impeachment after the plaintiff testified he had never before filed a disability claim.

2011He told her he would “take care of her later.” Id. at 181 .

2009Baker v. Conagra Broiler Co., 93-1230 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94) , 640 So.2d 494 , writ denied, 94-1435 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1289 .

2009Baker v. Conagra Broiler Co., 93-1230 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94) , 640 So.2d 494 , writ denied, 94-1435 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1289 .

2009Baker v. Conagra Broiler Co., 93-1230 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94) , 640 So.2d 494 , writ denied, 94-1435 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1289 .

2006Miller v. Roger Miller Sand, Inc., 646 So.2d 330 (La. 11/30/94), Baullion v. Old American Pottery Company, 801 So.2d 567 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/01).

2006Miller v. Roger Miller Sand, Inc., 646 So.2d 330 (La. 11/30/94), Baullion v. Old American Pottery Company, 801 So.2d 567 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/01).

2000Fisher v. Lincoln Timber Company, supra ; Taylor v. Garrett, 28,729 (La.App.2d Cir.10/30/96), 682 So.2d 831 .

1998Significantly, Smith distinguished Faciane v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., supra, because a tort claim arises with injury whereas a compensation claim arises with disability.

1994In the very recent case of Dempster v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 643 So.2d 1316 (La.App. 5 Cir.1994), a panel of this Court had before it the question which we entertain in this appeal.

1984The issue presented is identical to that presented in Condoll v. Johns-Manville Sale Corporation, La.App., 448 So.2d 169 , opinion rendered on March 13, 1984; i.e., whether a compromised settlement of an injured worker’s disability claim settles the dependent spouse’s claim for death benefits under LSA-R.S. 23:1061, even though the dependent spouse was not a party to the injured spouse’s disability settlement and received no consideration whatsoever.

1980That the insured may engage in some other occupation does not disqualify him insofar as concerns policies of this character. * * * ” Boes also contends that, regarding a disability claim under the Social Security Act, the fact that a claimant has engaged in some work activity or the fact he is not completely helpless will not necessarily disprove his disability, citing Sharbino v. Richardson, 334 F.Supp. 107 (D.C.La.1971), and Prestigiacomo v. Celebrezze, 234 F.Supp. 999 (D.C.La.1964).

1980That the insured may engage in some other occupation does not disqualify him insofar as concerns policies of this character. * * * ” Boes also contends that, regarding a disability claim under the Social Security Act, the fact that a claimant has engaged in some work activity or the fact he is not completely helpless will not necessarily disprove his disability, citing Sharbino v. Richardson, 334 F.Supp. 107 (D.C.La.1971), and Prestigiacomo v. Celebrezze, 234 F.Supp. 999 (D.C.La.1964).

1978Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co., 318 So.2d 37 (La. 1975)." However, plaintiff still bears the burden of proving a connection between the condition causing the disability and factors related to his employment.

1971The residual pain or discomfort in such a circumstance will be considered as being disabling only if it is substantial or appreciable pain.” (Emphasis added.) In discussing the doctrine of disability, our Supreme Court said in Glidden v. Alexandria Concrete Co., Inc., et al., 242 La. 626 , 137 So.2d 894 (1962), “* * * The pain must be substantial enough to be disabling in that it either prevents the worker from carrying out some of the functions of his job or, where the pain is not so intense as to hinder the worker’s fulfillment of his duties, it must be shown that performance of the work wou

1971The residual pain or discomfort in such a circumstance will be considered as being disabling only if it is substantial or appreciable pain.” (Emphasis added.) In discussing the doctrine of disability, our Supreme Court said in Glidden v. Alexandria Concrete Co., Inc., et al., 242 La. 626 , 137 So.2d 894 (1962), “* * * The pain must be substantial enough to be disabling in that it either prevents the worker from carrying out some of the functions of his job or, where the pain is not so intense as to hinder the worker’s fulfillment of his duties, it must be shown that performance of the work wou

1937Lumber Company, 183 La. 1013 , 165 So. 185 , no doubt our judgment therein would have been one awarding compensation for a period not exceeding 400 weeks, under the total disability clause of the statute, as prayed for by plaintiff; for the cited case clearly expresses the view that an employee is entitled to be compensated under the total disability provisions of the statute for an injury to a specific member of the body which totally disables him from doing work of any reasonable character, and the evidence in the record of the former suit showed that plaintiff was wholly incapacitated to wo

1937Lumber Company, 183 La. 1013 , 165 So. 185 , no doubt our judgment therein would have been one awarding compensation for a period not exceeding 400 weeks, under the total disability clause of the statute, as prayed for by plaintiff; for the cited case clearly expresses the view that an employee is entitled to be compensated under the total disability provisions of the statute for an injury to a specific member of the body which totally disables him from doing work of any reasonable character, and the evidence in the record of the former suit showed that plaintiff was wholly incapacitated to wo