12 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1935–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc.green2 sentences2017Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 16 ); see also Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 597 (rejecting a plaintiff's disability claim because there was no expert medical evidence he was an alcoholic). 2017Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 16 ); see also Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 597 (rejecting a plaintiff's disability claim because there was no expert medical evidence he was an alcoholic). | 2 | 3 |
Herd v. Herdgreen2 sentences1999See Herd v. Herd, 307 N.J.Super. 501, 503 , 704 A. 2d 1340 (App.Div.1998); R. 5:6A; Pressler, Current N.J. 1999See Herd v. Herd, 307 N.J.Super. 501, 503 , 704 A. 2d 1340 (App.Div.1998); R. 5:6A; Pressler, Current N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Walder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury____ Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully____”); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (“there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to peijurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.”). 1995But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury____ Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully____”); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354, 356 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (“there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to peijurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.”). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1995And see State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 234 , 337 A.2d 36 (1975) (“[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”) (quoting Har ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 646 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1971)). 1995And see State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 234 , 337 A.2d 36 (1975) (“[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”) (quoting Har ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 646 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1971)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences1995And see State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 234 , 337 A.2d 36 (1975) (“[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”) (quoting Har ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 646 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1971)). 1995And see State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 234 , 337 A.2d 36 (1975) (“[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”) (quoting Har ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643, 646 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1971)). | 1 | 1 |
Maffatone v. WOODSONgreen1 sentence1969In Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967), it was stated: "* * * where a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by the lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law." (at p. 229) *596 See also Franco v. Davis, 51 N.J. 237, 239 (1968); Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Franco v. Davisgreen1 sentence1969In Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967), it was stated: "* * * where a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by the lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law." (at p. 229) *596 See also Franco v. Davis, 51 N.J. 237, 239 (1968); Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mellk v. Sarahson
green
2 sentences2006Where a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law. [ Ibid. ] The Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible, governmental interest analysis in addressing choice-of-law issues, expressly holding that "[c]hoice-of-law determinations are made on an issue-by-issue basis, with each issue receiving separate analysis 1999Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 36 , 417 A.2d 488 (1980). “[W]here a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties [or] to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law.” Mellk, supra, 49 N.J. at 229 , 229 A.2d 625 . | 3 | 1969–2006 |
Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 16 ); see also Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 597 (rejecting a plaintiff's disability claim because there was no expert medical evidence he was an alcoholic). 2017Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 16 ); see also Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 597 (rejecting a plaintiff's disability claim because there was no expert medical evidence he was an alcoholic). | 2 | 2015–2017 |
County of Camden v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS)
neutral
2 sentences2002Thus, the County elected to condition its obligation on the decision of a third party. *162 The County's decision does not confer upon it the right to review PERS decisions which the County finds unfavorable. [ Camden County, supra, 334 N.J.Super. at 629 , 760 A. 2d 808 .] Although the panel did not reach the merits of Simon's disability claim, it noted its "reservations about the Board's decision." Ibid. 2002Thus, the County elected to condition its obligation on the decision of a third party. *162 The County's decision does not confer upon it the right to review PERS decisions which the County finds unfavorable. [ Camden County, supra, 334 N.J.Super. at 629 , 760 A. 2d 808 .] Although the panel did not reach the merits of Simon's disability claim, it noted its "reservations about the Board's decision." Ibid. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Robin B. Wojtkowiak v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission and New Jersey Division on Civil Rights
green
2 sentences2017"Similarly, a plaintiff has the burden to show the extent of the mental disability if the extent is relevant to the accommodations requested or offered." Wojtkowiak, supra, 439 N.J. 2017"Similarly, a plaintiff has the burden to show the extent of the mental disability if the extent is relevant to the accommodations requested or offered." Wojtkowiak, supra, 439 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Erny v. Estate of Merola
green
2 sentences2006Where a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law. [ Ibid. ] The Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible, governmental interest analysis in addressing choice-of-law issues, expressly holding that "[c]hoice-of-law determinations are made on an issue-by-issue basis, with each issue receiving separate analysis 2006Where a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law. [ Ibid. ] The Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible, governmental interest analysis in addressing choice-of-law issues, expressly holding that "[c]hoice-of-law determinations are made on an issue-by-issue basis, with each issue receiving separate analysis | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Veazey v. Doremus
green
2 sentences1999Thus, New Jersey abandoned the rigid common-law approach, see ibid, and now follows “the more flexible governmental-interest analysis in choice-of-law decisions,” according to which “the determinative law is that of the state with the greatest interest in governing the particular issue.” Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247-48 , 510 A.2d 1187 (1986). 1999Thus, New Jersey abandoned the rigid common-law approach, see ibid, and now follows “the more flexible governmental-interest analysis in choice-of-law decisions,” according to which “the determinative law is that of the state with the greatest interest in governing the particular issue.” Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247-48 , 510 A.2d 1187 (1986). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Estate of Simmons
green
2 sentences1999Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 36 , 417 A.2d 488 (1980). “[W]here a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties [or] to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law.” Mellk, supra, 49 N.J. at 229 , 229 A.2d 625 . 1999Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 36 , 417 A.2d 488 (1980). “[W]here a foreign state has no real interest in having its law applied to a particular right or liability of parties [or] to an event which occurred within its borders, a mechanical application of a disability or immunity imposed by lex loci delicti may work an unjust result having no relation to the purposes and policies behind the foreign law.” Mellk, supra, 49 N.J. at 229 , 229 A.2d 625 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
NJ STATE PBA v. Morristown
green
1 sentence1976State PBA v. Morristown, 65 N.J. 160 (1974). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Foglesong v. Modern Brotherhood of America
green
1 sentence1935Rep. 872 ." And summed up its construction of the disability clause in this language: "If an insured has totally lost his ability to earn money in the only way he can, if he is totally unfit and unable to do the only work he knows, he is totally disabled, at least until some new ability to earn his living is created." In the same case, the court points out that it might be that the insured would be able to sell pencils, "and yet a reasonable mind would reject as absurd the denial that such a person is totally disabled in the ordinary sense of those words as used in this policy," and so in the | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.