disability challenge (Colorado) · Go Syfert
← Colorado issues

disability challenge in Colorado

10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
McDonald v. Com. of Mass.green
mad · 1995 · cited in 2 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1997–2004
2 sentences

2004Ass'n, 955 P2d 578 (Colo.App. 1997)(claim for benefits due because of a disability is not a claim for actionable discrimination under the ADA); accord McDonald v. Massachusetts, 901 F.Supp. 471 (D.Mass.1995)(workers' compensation claimant failed to state a claim under ADA where he argued entitlement to benefits on account of his disability).

1997McDonald v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 901 F.Supp. 471 (D.Mass.1995).

12

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Walder v. United States green
scotus · 1954
2 sentences

2021The Court held that the protection of the defendant 's Fourth Amendment right did not provide "justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Id. ¶23 The Supreme Court revisited the impeachment exception in Havens .

2021The Court held that the protection of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right did not provide “justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” Id. ¶23 The Supreme Court revisited the impeachment exception in Havens.

42014–2021
United States v. Havens green
scotus · 1980
2 sentences

2021After stressing the “importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions,” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , the Court held that “a defendant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt,” id. at 627–28. 11 ¶24 While Havens

2021After stressing the “importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions,” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , the Court held that “a defendant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt,” id. at 627–28. 11 ¶24 While Havens

22021–2021
James v. Illinois green
scotus · 1990
1 sentence

2019In James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990), the defendant, a suspect in a murder, was arrested while sitting under a hair dryer in his mother’s beauty parlor.

12019–2019
Altamirano v. Industrial Commission green
arizctapp · 1974
2 sentences

1990“The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables, to determine the wage that would have been paid in the open labor market under normal employment conditions to claimant as injured, taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant’s age and state of training as of exactly the same period used for calculating actual wages earned before the injury.” (emphasis added) See also Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Altamirano v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz.App. 379 , 527 P.2d 1096 (1974); Coty v. Town of Millinocket, 423 A.2d 524 (Me.1980).

1990“The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables, to determine the wage that would have been paid in the open labor market under normal employment conditions to claimant as injured, taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant’s age and state of training as of exactly the same period used for calculating actual wages earned before the injury.” (emphasis added) See also Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Altamirano v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz.App. 379 , 527 P.2d 1096 (1974); Coty v. Town of Millinocket, 423 A.2d 524 (Me.1980).

11990–1990
Coty v. Town of Millinocket green
me · 1980
1 sentence

1990“The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables, to determine the wage that would have been paid in the open labor market under normal employment conditions to claimant as injured, taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant’s age and state of training as of exactly the same period used for calculating actual wages earned before the injury.” (emphasis added) See also Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Altamirano v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz.App. 379 , 527 P.2d 1096 (1974); Coty v. Town of Millinocket, 423 A.2d 524 (Me.1980).

11990–1990
Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey green
alacivapp · 1986
1 sentence

1990“The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables, to determine the wage that would have been paid in the open labor market under normal employment conditions to claimant as injured, taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant’s age and state of training as of exactly the same period used for calculating actual wages earned before the injury.” (emphasis added) See also Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Altamirano v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz.App. 379 , 527 P.2d 1096 (1974); Coty v. Town of Millinocket, 423 A.2d 524 (Me.1980).

11990–1990
Richardson v. Perales green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1989Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 , 91 S.Ct. at 1428 .

1989Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 , 91 S.Ct. at 1428 .

11989–1989
Kuckler v. Whisler green
colo · 1976
1 sentence

1978But the exception "specifically applies to all limitations of time contained in any of the statutes of the State of Colorado." Ball v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo.App. 583 , 503 P.2d 1040 (1972), partially overruled on other grounds, Kuckler v. Whisler, Colo., 552 P.2d 18 (1976).

11978–1978
Ball v. Industrial Commission green
coloctapp · 1972
2 sentences

1978But the exception "specifically applies to all limitations of time contained in any of the statutes of the State of Colorado." Ball v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo.App. 583 , 503 P.2d 1040 (1972), partially overruled on other grounds, Kuckler v. Whisler, Colo., 552 P.2d 18 (1976).

1978But the exception "specifically applies to all limitations of time contained in any of the statutes of the State of Colorado." Ball v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo.App. 583 , 503 P.2d 1040 (1972), partially overruled on other grounds, Kuckler v. Whisler, Colo., 552 P.2d 18 (1976).

11978–1978
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America v. McMurry neutral
colo · 1939
2 sentences

1961The benefits of these provisions shall not be allowed * * * if during any period for which such benefits are claimed the Insured has been engaged in any business or occupation for remuneration or profit.” In Guardian Life Insurance Company of America v. McMurry, 105 Colo. 11 , 94 P. (2d) 1086 , the court considered a provision of an insurance policy which conferred benefits upon the insured in the event of total and permanent disability, by which the insured was prevented “from performing any work or from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit * * * .” The court there s

1961The benefits of these provisions shall not be allowed * * * if during any period for which such benefits are claimed the Insured has been engaged in any business or occupation for remuneration or profit.” In Guardian Life Insurance Company of America v. McMurry, 105 Colo. 11 , 94 P. (2d) 1086 , the court considered a provision of an insurance policy which conferred benefits upon the insured in the event of total and permanent disability, by which the insured was prevented “from performing any work or from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit * * * .” The court there s

11961–1961

Where else courts name it

IL 36 (1917–2025) NY 34 (1935–2025) WA 31 (1929–2015) CA 25 (1930–2025) OH 23 (1930–2026) DC 19 (1956–2026) PA 18 (1938–2025) MS 14 (1932–2006) LA 13 (1937–2015) AR 13 (1933–2023) MD 12 (1945–2011) MI 12 (1914–2013) NJ 12 (1935–2017) GA 12 (1932–2007) FL 11 (1935–2013) TX 11 (1925–2021) MO 11 (1930–2023) CO 10 (1961–2021) KS 10 (1932–2008) OK 8 (1919–2003) NC 8 (1950–2020) IN 8 (1971–2019) RI 8 (1989–2011) SC 7 (1927–2017) WV 7 (1933–1985) KY 7 (1935–2024) TN 7 (1930–2006) OR 6 (1960–2004) AL 6 (1929–1994) NE 5 (1923–2016) CT 5 (1991–2004) IA 5 (1958–2022) MT 4 (1984–2000) WI 4 (1978–2012) VA 4 (1977–1996) MN 3 (1983–1989) MA 3 (1943–2007) NM 3 (1954–2005) ND 3 (1971–2009) UT 3 (1931–2021) AZ 3 (1990–2012) ME 3 (1996–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check