disability challenge in California

2017It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." ( Id . at p. 65, 74 S.Ct. 354 .) The high court explained that a contrary conclusion "would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment" because "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." ( Ibid . ) In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 22

2017It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." ( Id . at p. 65, 74 S.Ct. 354 .) The high court explained that a contrary conclusion "would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment" because "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." ( Ibid . ) In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 22

2017It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." ( Id . at p. 65, 74 S.Ct. 354 .) The high court explained that a contrary conclusion "would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment" because "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." ( Ibid . ) In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 22

2000It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. . . . fl[] . . . [T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” (Id. at p. 65 [ 74 S.Ct. at p. 356 ].) In Harris , the court found no “difference in principle” between Walder and the circumstances before it.

2025Even with additional time at trial, there is no reasonable likelihood Husband would have been able to overcome that damning evidence.1 (See Garcia v. Rehrig Internat., Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 869, 875 [prejudicial error is the basis for a new trial].) Finally, Husband’s reliance on Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340 to support his argument that the family court could consider 1 Husband also withdrew his claim for need-based attorney fees, making the issue of his claimed disability (and his argument he did not have a fair opportunity to support his claim) moot. 8 declarations to whi

2021Singh Alleged Sufficient Facts To Constitute a Cause of Action for Violation of FEHA Singh also alleged the Medical Board discriminated against him based on a disability in violation of FEHA, specifically, Government Code section 12944, subdivision (b), which provides: “It shall be unlawful for a licensing board to fail or refuse to make reasonable accommodation to an individual’s mental or physical disability or medical condition.” Arguing FEHA and 21 “interrelated” state law “incorporate[ ] the protections of Title II for State-sponsored programs and activities” (see Cuiellette v. City of Lo

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2003Appeals Bd., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 557, fn. 5 , citing § 1063, subd. (a).) Accordingly, CIGA may not guarantee a disability claim when a solvent workers’ compensation insurer is otherwise jointly and severally liable for the claim.

2000(See, e.g., *256 Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ] [employee with diabetes and heart condition terminated after incidents of insubordination]; Pensigner v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 719 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 ] [employee with developmental reading disorder terminated from position as sales representative after refusing to take reading evaluation tests].) Jensen’s claim is different.

2000(See, e.g., *256 Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ] [employee with diabetes and heart condition terminated after incidents of insubordination]; Pensigner v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 719 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 ] [employee with developmental reading disorder terminated from position as sales representative after refusing to take reading evaluation tests].) Jensen’s claim is different.

2000(See, e.g., *256 Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ] [employee with diabetes and heart condition terminated after incidents of insubordination]; Pensigner v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 719 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 ] [employee with developmental reading disorder terminated from position as sales representative after refusing to take reading evaluation tests].) Jensen’s claim is different.

2000(See, e.g., *256 Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ] [employee with diabetes and heart condition terminated after incidents of insubordination]; Pensigner v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 719 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 ] [employee with developmental reading disorder terminated from position as sales representative after refusing to take reading evaluation tests].) Jensen’s claim is different.

1999(Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 950, 955-960 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ]; see also Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [Holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not tak

1999(Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 950, 955-960 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ]; see also Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [Holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not tak

1999(Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 950, 955-960 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ]; see also Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [Holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not tak

1999(Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 950, 955-960 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ]; see also Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [Holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not tak

1998Indeed, as the court in John Hancock stated: "Whether Hancock is precluded from denying benefits for a disability claim based on a condition which may have manifested prior to the issuance of the policy is a question not before us and therefore not addressed by this opinion." ( 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 881, fn. 2 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) [3] Appellant correctly points out that the incontestability clauses in the cited cases had somewhat different wording and were not imposed by statutory mandate.

1998Indeed, as the court in John Hancock stated: "Whether Hancock is precluded from denying benefits for a disability claim based on a condition which may have manifested prior to the issuance of the policy is a question not before us and therefore not addressed by this opinion." ( 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 881, fn. 2 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) [3] Appellant correctly points out that the incontestability clauses in the cited cases had somewhat different wording and were not imposed by statutory mandate.

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997(People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 54 [50 Cal.Rptr. 215J; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 215 ] [“A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of all inquiries which would be proper on cross-examination and is subject to impeachment the same as any other witness.”]; People v. Shea (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1267 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ] [I

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1997Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Walder has been accepted by California courts. ( People v. Taylor (1972) 8 Cal.3d 174, 182-184 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 , 501 P.2d 918 ]; People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 108 ; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 51, 54 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]; see also People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 577, 581 [ 229 Cal. Rptr. 215 ] ["A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives

1988Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 821-822 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 691 , 620 P.2d *172 141] [punitive damage award supported by evidence that insurance representative knew the plaintiff’s claim of injury was bona fide, and yet called plaintiff a fraud, and told plaintiff he had a sickness not a disability even though there was no reason to deny the disability claim].) Although one may view an insurer’s act of denying an undisputably valid claim as reprehensible, extensive case precedent flatly holds even an insurer’s allegedly bad faith refusal to pay a workers’ compensation claim is not conduct outside the ex

1981(Mathews v. Eldridge (1975) 424 U.S. 319, 348 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 41 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ].) PERS should be allowed to independently challenge a disability claim without the need to evaluate all the underlying merits of an application.

1981(Mathews v. Eldridge (1975) 424 U.S. 319, 348 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 41 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ].) PERS should be allowed to independently challenge a disability claim without the need to evaluate all the underlying merits of an application.