followed rule in Oklahoma

1974In Cody v. State, Okl.Cr., 376 P.2d 625, 630 (1962), the Court followed the rule in Grimes v. State, Okl.Cr., 365 P.2d 739 , by stating: “ ‘Ordinarily error cannot be predicated upon mere unexplained excerpts from the remarks of counsel to the jury.

1974In Cody v. State, Okl.Cr., 376 P.2d 625, 630 (1962), the Court followed the rule in Grimes v. State, Okl.Cr., 365 P.2d 739 , by stating: “ ‘Ordinarily error cannot be predicated upon mere unexplained excerpts from the remarks of counsel to the jury.

1935“In the case of Hurie v. Quigg, 121 Okla. 80 , 247 P. 677 , this court followed the rule as set out in the syllabus of that case, as follows: “ ‘Where a motion for judgment upon the pleadings is filed by a defendant, it searches the entire record, it tests the sufficiency of the petition filed by plaintiff, and seeks1 a judgment in favor of either parity entitled thereto.

1935“In the case of Hurie v. Quigg, 121 Okla. 80 , 247 P. 677 , this court followed the rule as set out in the syllabus of that case, as follows: “ ‘Where a motion for judgment upon the pleadings is filed by a defendant, it searches the entire record, it tests the sufficiency of the petition filed by plaintiff, and seeks1 a judgment in favor of either parity entitled thereto.

1984However, in the present case, we are unable to determine whether the trial court followed that standard because, unlike Bennett v. Shumate, supra, the record before us is insufficient for this Court to determine the issue.

1974Enough must appear of record to advise the appellant court of what preceded the alleged objectionable remarks and their meaning to be de duced from the context, and whether or not they were invited or provoked by remarks made by opposing counsel.’ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ “But again, since defense counsel did not designate in the record his own closing argument, he cannot allege error on the prosecuting attorney’s remarks alone.” In addition, we refer to Stucker v. State, Okl.Cr., 493 P.2d 84 (1972), where we noted that it is the responsibility of the defense counsel to protect his own record.

1973In Duncan v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 325 , 207 P.2d 324 (1949), the Court followed the rule that where a peace officer voluntarily states a matter which should not be introduced in evidence and the trial court promptly excludes the matter, such voluntary testimony of the witness, although improper, will not ordinarily be ground for the reversal of a conviction.

1973In Duncan v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 325 , 207 P.2d 324 (1949), the Court followed the rule that where a peace officer voluntarily states a matter which should not be introduced in evidence and the trial court promptly excludes the matter, such voluntary testimony of the witness, although improper, will not ordinarily be ground for the reversal of a conviction.

1963In the case of Eaton v. Allen, Okl., 362 P.2d 93 , wherein was involved the matter of dismissal of a suit for personal injuries and there was a question between the parties as to whether the dismissal effected settlement of another action in another county between the same parties, the Court held that extrinsic evidence should be considered.

1963In the case of Eaton v. Allen, Old., 362 P.2d 93 , wherein was involved the matter of dismissal of a suit for personal injuries and there was a question between the parties as to whether the dismissal effected settlement of another action in another county between the same parties, the Court held that extrinsic evidence should be considered.

1963Based upon that evidence, this Court followed the rule set forth in Miller v. Steelman Construction Company, supra, and held that the relationship of principal and independent contractor existed between the parties rather than that of master and servant.

1959In Ex parte Cornell, 87 Okl.Cr. 2 , 193 P.2d 904 , this Court followed the rule announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 : “When this right (to counsel) is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.

1959In Ex parte Cornell, 87 Okl.Cr. 2 , 193 P.2d 904 , this Court followed the rule announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 : “When this right (to counsel) is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.

1959In Ex parte Cornell, 87 Okl.Cr. 2 , 193 P.2d 904 , this Court followed the rule announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 : “When this right (to counsel) is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.

1959In Ex parte Cornell, 87 Okl.Cr. 2 , 193 P.2d 904 , this Court followed the rule announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 : “When this right (to counsel) is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.

1958Lewis v. Schafer, 163 Okl. 94 , 20 P.2d 1048 .

1958Lewis v. Schafer, 163 Okl. 94 , 20 P.2d 1048 .

1958In Lackey v. Quigley, 181 Okl. 492 , 74 P.2d 927 , this Court followed the stated rule that: “Equity, when once attached in a proper proceeding, will administer complete relief on all issues properly raised by the evidence regardless of whether they were specifically raised by the pleadings.” And in the body of the opinion it was said: “ * * * It is a fundamental rule that equity, having once attached in a proper proceeding, will administer complete relief on all questions raised by the evidence, regardless of whether or not such questions or issues are specifically raised by the pleadings, as

1958In Lackey v. Quigley, 181 Okl. 492 , 74 P.2d 927 , this Court followed the stated rule that: “Equity, when once attached in a proper proceeding, will administer complete relief on all issues properly raised by the evidence regardless of whether they were specifically raised by the pleadings.” And in the body of the opinion it was said: “ * * * It is a fundamental rule that equity, having once attached in a proper proceeding, will administer complete relief on all questions raised by the evidence, regardless of whether or not such questions or issues are specifically raised by the pleadings, as

1951“In such case, the fact that such mortgage was not filed for record in the school land department until after his purchase of the certificates does not constitute him an innocent purchaser for value without notice.” In the Winter case, the court followed the rule announced in First National Bank of Butler v. Welch, supra, and quoted from that case as follows: “It is clear from these provisions of the statute that the purchaser of school lands becomes the owner subject to the *481 state’s lien for deferred payments, and the registration of the certificate of purchase is notice of such ownership

1951“In such case, the fact that such mortgage was not filed for record in the school land department until after his purchase of the certificates does not constitute him an innocent purchaser for value without notice.” In the Winter case, the court followed the rule announced in First National Bank of Butler v. Welch, supra, and quoted from that case as follows: “It is clear from these provisions of the statute that the purchaser of school lands becomes the owner subject to the *481 state’s lien for deferred payments, and the registration of the certificate of purchase is notice of such ownership

1947This writing being the only evidence of the acknowledgment of paternity permitted by the statute, and it being insufficient, it follows that there was no evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court that Luther McCormick was the heir of Leonard McCormick and entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the allotment of Lucinda McCormick. . . .” In the more recent case of Doty v. Vensel, 190 Okla. 461 , 124 P. 2d 982 , this court followed the rule announced in the Holloway Case and held that the instrument involved, by reason of certain erasures therein, did not disclose within its four

1947This writing being the only evidence of the acknowledgment of paternity permitted by the statute, and it being insufficient, it follows that there was no evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court that Luther McCormick was the heir of Leonard McCormick and entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the allotment of Lucinda McCormick. . . .” In the more recent case of Doty v. Vensel, 190 Okla. 461 , 124 P. 2d 982 , this court followed the rule announced in the Holloway Case and held that the instrument involved, by reason of certain erasures therein, did not disclose within its four

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1943In so holding the court followed the rule as promulgated by this court in Deneen v. Gillespie, 180 Okla. 342 , 70 P. 2d 1078 ; Schulte v. Herndon, 184 Okla. 77 , 84 P. 2d 607 ; and Thompson v. Yates, 184 Okla. 86 , 85 P. 2d 415 ; Parks v. Lyons, 183 Okla. 529 , 83 P. 2d 573 .

1941He is not presumed to engage for extraordinary skill or for extraordinary diligence or care, nor can he be made responsible in damages for errors in judgment; or mere mistakes in matters of reasonable doubt or uncertainty.” In this holding the court followed the rule expressed in Champion v. Kieth, 17 Okla. 204 , 87 P. 845 .

1941He is not presumed to engage for extraordinary skill or for extraordinary diligence or care, nor can he be made responsible in damages for errors in judgment; or mere mistakes in matters of reasonable doubt or uncertainty.” In this holding the court followed the rule expressed in Champion v. Kieth, 17 Okla. 204 , 87 P. 845 .

1938In deciding that this act was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power, the court followed the rule stated in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 36 L.

1938In deciding that this act was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power, the court followed the rule stated in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 36 L.

1934Unlike a writ of error or proceedings at common law in the nature of appeals, in which only the precise point decided is carried up for revision, the whole cause is brought before the appellate court as if it had been originally commenced there.” In the case of Garvin County v. Lindsey Bridge Co., 32 Okla. 784 , 124 P. 324 , this court in the first syllabus paragraph held that: “An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a district court in a case appealed to it from a decision of a board of county commissioners.” In the case of Giles v. Shaw, 146 Okla. 28 , 293 P. 1103 , this co

1934Unlike a writ of error or proceedings at common law in the nature of appeals, in which only the precise point decided is carried up for revision, the whole cause is brought before the appellate court as if it had been originally commenced there.” In the case of Garvin County v. Lindsey Bridge Co., 32 Okla. 784 , 124 P. 324 , this court in the first syllabus paragraph held that: “An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a district court in a case appealed to it from a decision of a board of county commissioners.” In the case of Giles v. Shaw, 146 Okla. 28 , 293 P. 1103 , this co

1934The court followed the rule announced in the case of Stonebraker-Zea Cattle Co. v. Hilton, 34 Okla. 225 , 124 P. 1062 , which is as follows: “ ‘Motions presented in the trial court, the rulings thereon, and exceptions are not properly part of the record, and can only be preserved and presented for review on appeal by incorporating the same, into a bill of exceptions or case-made.

1934The court followed the rule announced in the case of Stonebraker-Zea Cattle Co. v. Hilton, 34 Okla. 225 , 124 P. 1062 , which is as follows: “ ‘Motions presented in the trial court, the rulings thereon, and exceptions are not properly part of the record, and can only be preserved and presented for review on appeal by incorporating the same, into a bill of exceptions or case-made.

1934Unlike a writ of error or proceedings at common law in the nature of appeals, in which only the precise point decided is carried up for revision, the whole cause is brought before the appellate court as if it had been originally commenced there.” In the case of Garvin County v. Lindsey Bridge Co., 32 Okla. 784 , 124 P. 324 , this court in the first syllabus paragraph held that: “An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a district court in a case appealed to it from a decision of a board of county commissioners.” In the case of Giles v. Shaw, 146 Okla. 28 , 293 P. 1103 , this co

1934Unlike a writ of error or proceedings at common law in the nature of appeals, in which only the precise point decided is carried up for revision, the whole cause is brought before the appellate court as if it had been originally commenced there.” In the case of Garvin County v. Lindsey Bridge Co., 32 Okla. 784 , 124 P. 324 , this court in the first syllabus paragraph held that: “An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a district court in a case appealed to it from a decision of a board of county commissioners.” In the case of Giles v. Shaw, 146 Okla. 28 , 293 P. 1103 , this co

1932The mere fact that the contract has the form of a contingency will not exempt it from the scrutiny of the court, which is bound to exercise its judgment in determining whether the contingency be a real one, or a mere shift and device to cover usury.” In Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okla. 295 , 7 P. (2d) 132 , this court followed the principle of law’ laid down in Porter v. Rott, 116 Okla. 3 , 243 P. 160 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus: “Where a claim is made that usury lias been charged, and that the usurious charge 'is evidenced by a collateral agreement intended as a cloak for s

1932The mere fact that the contract has the form of a contingency will not exempt it from the scrutiny of the court, which is bound to exercise its judgment in determining whether the contingency be a real one, or a mere shift and device to cover usury.” In Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okla. 295 , 7 P. (2d) 132 , this court followed the principle of law’ laid down in Porter v. Rott, 116 Okla. 3 , 243 P. 160 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus: “Where a claim is made that usury lias been charged, and that the usurious charge 'is evidenced by a collateral agreement intended as a cloak for s

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932The mere fact that the contract has the form of a contingency will not exempt it from the scrutiny of the court, which is bound to exercise its judgment in determining whether the contingency be a real one, or a mere shift and device to cover usury.” In Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okla. 295 , 7 P. (2d) 132 , this court followed the principle of law’ laid down in Porter v. Rott, 116 Okla. 3 , 243 P. 160 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus: “Where a claim is made that usury lias been charged, and that the usurious charge 'is evidenced by a collateral agreement intended as a cloak for s

1932The mere fact that the contract has the form of a contingency will not exempt it from the scrutiny of the court, which is bound to exercise its judgment in determining whether the contingency be a real one, or a mere shift and device to cover usury.” In Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okla. 295 , 7 P. (2d) 132 , this court followed the principle of law’ laid down in Porter v. Rott, 116 Okla. 3 , 243 P. 160 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus: “Where a claim is made that usury lias been charged, and that the usurious charge 'is evidenced by a collateral agreement intended as a cloak for s

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee

1932S. 1921.” And it is further said in Reeder v. Mitchell, supra: “A party attacking the sufficiency of proceeding leading up to a judicial sale has the burden of proving the insufficiency thereof.” In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okla. 220 , 4 P. (2d) 23 , in an elaborate and well-considered opinion by Tice Chief Justice Clark, this court followed the rule announced in Brazell v. Brockins, 95 Okla. 38 , 217 P. 847 , and Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180 , 269 P. 1052 , as follows: “On motion to confirm sale of real estate made under execution, the court should confine itself to the regularity of the procee