followed principle in Pennsylvania

2002Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake United Methodist Church v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 71 , 558 A.2d 611 (1989), Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 655 , 651 A.2d 542 (1994) and Rosing v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 690 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in licensing appeals.

2002Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake United Methodist Church v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 71 , 558 A.2d 611 (1989), Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 655 , 651 A.2d 542 (1994) and Rosing v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 690 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in licensing appeals.

2015See Pa.R.Crim.P. 121; El, 977 A.2d at 1163 .

2002Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake United Methodist Church v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 71 , 558 A.2d 611 (1989), Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 655 , 651 A.2d 542 (1994) and Rosing v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 690 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in licensing appeals.

2002Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake United Methodist Church v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 71 , 558 A.2d 611 (1989), Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 655 , 651 A.2d 542 (1994) and Rosing v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 690 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in licensing appeals.

2002Graves, 668 A.2d at 609 .

2002Graves, 668 A.2d at 609 .

2002Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake United Methodist Church v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 71 , 558 A.2d 611 (1989), Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 655 , 651 A.2d 542 (1994) and Rosing v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 690 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in licensing appeals.

1999The Supreme Court has apparently signaled that its holding in Pennsylvania State Police v. Cantina Gloria’s Lounge, Inc., 536 Pa. 254 , 639 A.2d 14 (1994), is to be applied without limitation in all licensing appeals under Section 464 of the Liquor Code, as well as in citation/enforcement appeals under Section 471, 47 P.S. § 4-471. 4 Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake, Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc., v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), and Rosing line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in

1999The Supreme Court has apparently signaled that its holding in Pennsylvania State Police v. Cantina Gloria’s Lounge, Inc., 536 Pa. 254 , 639 A.2d 14 (1994), is to be applied without limitation in all licensing appeals under Section 464 of the Liquor Code, as well as in citation/enforcement appeals under Section 471, 47 P.S. § 4-471. 4 Heretofore, this Court followed the standard enunciated in the Beach Lake, Ball Park’s Main Course, Inc., v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 636 , 641 A.2d 713 (1994), and Rosing line of cases for the appropriate scope of review to be applied in

1992Id.

1992Id.

1988Co., 288 Pa. 240 , 135 A. 755 (1927).

1988Co., 288 Pa. 240 , 135 A. 755 (1927).

1981Super. 503 , 351 A.2d 409 (1976), the court followed the principle that wanton miscon duct is different in kind from negligence and that therefore the comparative negligence statute should not apply.

1975In making this distinction, the Court followed the principle which it had established in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 , 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) and reaffirmed in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 , 90 S.Ct. 355 , 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), “that one who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself.” 396 U.S. at 79, 90 S.Ct. at 365, 24 L.Ed.2d at 279.

1975In making this distinction, the Court followed the principle which it had established in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 , 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) and reaffirmed in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 , 90 S.Ct. 355 , 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), “that one who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself.” 396 U.S. at 79, 90 S.Ct. at 365, 24 L.Ed.2d at 279.

1975In making this distinction, the Court followed the principle which it had established in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 , 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) and reaffirmed in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 , 90 S.Ct. 355 , 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), “that one who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself.” 396 U.S. at 79, 90 S.Ct. at 365, 24 L.Ed.2d at 279.

1975In making this distinction, the Court followed the principle which it had established in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 , 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) and reaffirmed in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 , 90 S.Ct. 355 , 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), “that one who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself.” 396 U.S. at 79, 90 S.Ct. at 365, 24 L.Ed.2d at 279.

1950It is, in legal effect, equivalent to several and distinct devises to different classes [Cattlin v. Brown].” In Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530 , 18 N. E. 412 (1888), where the facts were strikingly similar to the facts in the instant case, the court followed the rule laid down in the English case of Cattlin v. Brown.

1950It is, in legal effect, equivalent to several and distinct devises to different classes [Cattlin v. Brown].” In Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530 , 18 N. E. 412 (1888), where the facts were strikingly similar to the facts in the instant case, the court followed the rule laid down in the English case of Cattlin v. Brown.

1950The same rule has been applied in the following cases: Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627 , 138 A. *462 809 (1927); Lowry v. Muldrow, 8 Rich Eq. 241 (S. C. 1856).

1944In Gordon, Secretary of Banking, v. Northern Trust Co. et al., 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 79, 183 A. 352 , this court followed that principle.

1944In Gordon, Secretary of Banking, v. Northern Trust Co. et al., 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 79, 183 A. 352 , this court followed that principle.

1936Thus if the judgments are both founded on contract, prima facie the set-off should be allowed, . . . each case is to be determined on its own circumstances and merits viewed with the eyes of a chancellor in equity.” See also Hazelhurst v. Bayard, 3 Yeates 152 ; Ehrhart v. Esbenshade, 53 Pa. Superior Ct. 258 .

1936In reaching its determination the court followed the doctrine set forth in Leitz v. Hohman, 207 Pa. 289 , 291: “The set-off of one judgment against another is not a legal right even under our Defalcation Act, but is allowed by the courts under their inherent powers in the administration of justice and is governed by the principles of equity. . . .

1936Thus if the judgments are both founded on contract, prima facie the set-off should be allowed, . . . each case is to be determined on its own circumstances and merits viewed with the eyes of a chancellor in equity.” See also Hazelhurst v. Bayard, 3 Yeates 152 ; Ehrhart v. Esbenshade, 53 Pa. Superior Ct. 258 .

1930The court there *137 said, in part (page 426) : “The same reasons which authorize such action by a city are sufficient to justify a similar course by a county, where the legislature has not prescribed otherwise; and the county may protect the corporations and persons furnishing labor and material to its work either by requiring a separate bond,...... or by making them the use parties to its own bond and sharing with them its protection and benefit, as was done here.” It is true that if a statute grants to a municipality a limited right to exact a bond to protect materialmen covering only certa

1930The court there *137 said, in part (page 426) : “The same reasons which authorize such action by a city are sufficient to justify a similar course by a county, where the legislature has not prescribed otherwise; and the county may protect the corporations and persons furnishing labor and material to its work either by requiring a separate bond,...... or by making them the use parties to its own bond and sharing with them its protection and benefit, as was done here.” It is true that if a statute grants to a municipality a limited right to exact a bond to protect materialmen covering only certa

1923Evidence whs taken, and the court below, limiting itself to a consideration of so much thereof as was applicable to the questions raised by the petitions and answers (as should always be done both below and here: Fisher v. King, 153 Pa. 3 ; Bauer v. Hill, 267 Pa. 559, 564-5 ) sustained the judgment for the amount of the rent, but struck it off so far as it related to the ejectment, and disposed of the two rules accordingly.

1923Evidence whs taken, and the court below, limiting itself to a consideration of so much thereof as was applicable to the questions raised by the petitions and answers (as should always be done both below and here: Fisher v. King, 153 Pa. 3 ; Bauer v. Hill, 267 Pa. 559, 564-5 ) sustained the judgment for the amount of the rent, but struck it off so far as it related to the ejectment, and disposed of the two rules accordingly.

1921The tendency of our legislation is in this direction, and such is also the fair effect of Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80 .’ In Kohler v. Smith, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 176 , this court followed the doctrine of the cases just cited, and in the opinion by our Brother Beaver adopted the following statement of the principle taken from the treatise of Mr. Washburn on The American Law of Easements, page *195: ‘It seems to be now settled that, if the landowner is not restrained by the terms of the grant of a right-of-way across his lands for agricultural purposes, he may maintain fences across such way, if

1921The tendency of our legislation is in this direction, and such is also the fair effect of Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80 .’ In Kohler v. Smith, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 176 , this court followed the doctrine of the cases just cited, and in the opinion by our Brother Beaver adopted the following statement of the principle taken from the treatise of Mr. Washburn on The American Law of Easements, page *195: ‘It seems to be now settled that, if the landowner is not restrained by the terms of the grant of a right-of-way across his lands for agricultural purposes, he may maintain fences across such way, if