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8 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1923–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jett v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Prior to the adoption of the Rules, this Court followed the principle that the “matter of consolidating separate indictments for trial is procedural[,] and generally this is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” See Bruce v. State, 213 Tenn. 666, 667 , 378 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1964). *246 The discretion of the trial courts to consolidate several offenses in a single trial was very broad, and although such discretion was not absolute, this Court usually only required that the consolidated offenses contain some “connecting link.” Id. at 669 , 378 S.W.2d at 759 ; see also Jett v. State, 1999The discretion of the trial courts to consolidate several offenses in a single trial was very broad, and although such discretion was not absolute, this Court usually only required that the consolidated offenses contain some “connecting link.” Id. at 669 , 378 S.W.2d at 759 ; see also Jett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Prior to the adoption of the Rules, this Court followed the principle that the “matter of consolidating separate indictments for trial is procedural[,] and generally this is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” See Bruce v. State, 213 Tenn. 666, 667 , 378 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1964). 1999Prior to the adoption of the Rules, this Court followed the principle that the “matter of consolidating separate indictments for trial is procedural[,] and generally this is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” See Bruce v. State, 213 Tenn. 666, 667 , 378 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Copelandgreen1 sentence2014Accordingly, the court established a procedure for questioning the defendant regarding this decision at his trial designed to “protect the fundamental right of the accused to testify in a criminal trial and to ensure that any waiver of that right was personal, knowing, and voluntary.” State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 304 (Tenn. 2007). -12- In the present case, the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court followed the waiver procedure set forth in Momon. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Companygreen2 sentences2006After an extensive discussion of the facts and the law, the court followed the rule laid down in Moore v. Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 47 Tenn.App. 461 , 339 S.W.2d 29, 35 (1959) and held: In summary, we hold that the issuance of a COA was prerequisite to the issuance of a valid building permit; that Far Tower’s failure to obtain a COA before seeking the permit renders the issued permit invalid and inoperative; and that Far Tower acquired no vested property right in and under the invalidly-issued permit. 126 S.W.3d at 66 . 2006After an extensive discussion of the facts and the law, the court followed the rule laid down in Moore v. Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 47 Tenn.App. 461 , 339 S.W.2d 29, 35 (1959) and held: In summary, we hold that the issuance of a COA was prerequisite to the issuance of a valid building permit; that Far Tower’s failure to obtain a COA before seeking the permit renders the issued permit invalid and inoperative; and that Far Tower acquired no vested property right in and under the invalidly-issued permit. 126 S.W.3d at 66 . | 1 | 1 |
Bullard v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Prior to the adoption of the Rules, this Court followed the principle that the “matter of consolidating separate indictments for trial is procedural[,] and generally this is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” See Bruce v. State, 213 Tenn. 666, 667 , 378 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1964). *246 The discretion of the trial courts to consolidate several offenses in a single trial was very broad, and although such discretion was not absolute, this Court usually only required that the consolidated offenses contain some “connecting link.” Id. at 669 , 378 S.W.2d at 759 ; see also Jett v. State, 1999Prior to the adoption of the Rules, this Court followed the principle that the “matter of consolidating separate indictments for trial is procedural[,] and generally this is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” See Bruce v. State, 213 Tenn. 666, 667 , 378 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1964). *246 The discretion of the trial courts to consolidate several offenses in a single trial was very broad, and although such discretion was not absolute, this Court usually only required that the consolidated offenses contain some “connecting link.” Id. at 669 , 378 S.W.2d at 759 ; see also Jett v. State, | 1 | 1 |
Unaka National Bank v. Butler ex rel. Davisgreen1 sentence1923Bank v. Butler, 113 Tenn., 574, 582, 583 , 83 S. W., 655 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Posey
green
1 sentence2014Usually, the proper remedy for such a complete failure would be to “remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant personally waived his right to testify.” Page, 2004 WL 3352994 , at *16 (citing Posey, 99 S.W.3d at 149 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Far Tower Sites, LLC v. Knox County
green
1 sentence2006After an extensive discussion of the facts and the law, the court followed the rule laid down in Moore v. Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 47 Tenn.App. 461 , 339 S.W.2d 29, 35 (1959) and held: In summary, we hold that the issuance of a COA was prerequisite to the issuance of a valid building permit; that Far Tower’s failure to obtain a COA before seeking the permit renders the issued permit invalid and inoperative; and that Far Tower acquired no vested property right in and under the invalidly-issued permit. 126 S.W.3d at 66 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. King
green
1 sentence1999App., N ashville, O ct. 12, 1998) (for pu blication), this Court followed the instruction of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586 (T enn. 1 998), o n this iss ue. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In re Estate of Gray
green
1 sentence1997This rule appears to have been altered by the statute under consideration here, which directs the trial court to take “into account the condition of the estate of the deceased spouse.” T.C.A. § 30-2-102(a) (Supp. 1988). 8 In doing so, this court followed the rule “that only the personal property and not the real property of the deceased is chargeable with a year’s support.” Gray, 729 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Cate v. Cate, 43 S.W. 365 (Tenn. Ch. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
City of Nashville v. Brown
green
2 sentences1950“Ye, therefore, think the trial judge correctly declined to charge those requests which had the effect of instructing the jury to credit the defendant interurban company with the amount received by the plaintiff from the telephone company upon the covenant not to sue. ’ ’ See City of Nashville v. Brown, 25 Tenn. App. 340 , 157 S. W. (2d) 612 , where this court followed the rule, citing the Gregory case as authority for so doing. 1950“Ye, therefore, think the trial judge correctly declined to charge those requests which had the effect of instructing the jury to credit the defendant interurban company with the amount received by the plaintiff from the telephone company upon the covenant not to sue. ’ ’ See City of Nashville v. Brown, 25 Tenn. App. 340 , 157 S. W. (2d) 612 , where this court followed the rule, citing the Gregory case as authority for so doing. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.