followed rule in Arkansas

1927Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 . ” See also Murray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; and Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Scriber, 162 Ark. 349 , 258 S. W. 353 .

1918In reaching ■that conclusion the court followed the rule which had been repeatedly announced here that the lien of a mechanic or material furnisher ‘ ‘ springs out of the appropriation and use by the land owner of the mechanic’s labor or the furnisher’s materials, and not from the taking of those formal steps which the statute enjoins for the preservation and assertion of the lien and for giving notice to others of its existence and extent;” that the statute is highly remedial in its nature and that “when’ the controversy is between the holder of the lien and the proprietor of the land, an exa

2002In Dodrill , this court followed the rule set forth in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 87 S.Ct. 534 , 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), where the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection precluded recovery upon a false-light cause of action by a private individual against a publishing company in the absence of proof that the defendant published the information with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.

2002In Dodrill , this court followed the rule set forth in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 87 S.Ct. 534 , 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), where the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection precluded recovery upon a false-light cause of action by a private individual against a publishing company in the absence of proof that the defendant published the information with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.

2002The commentary to the Restatement notes the effect of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), a later case that restricted the requirement of showing actual malice to public officials and public figures.

2002The commentary to the Restatement notes the effect of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), a later case that restricted the requirement of showing actual malice to public officials and public figures.

1996P. 24.5 requires that where there is a plea of guilty the trial court shall determine whether the plea is the result of a plea agreement and, if it is, “the court shall require that the agreement be stated.” The Arkansas Supreme Court has said that this requirement is “mandatory,” Zoller v. State, 282 Ark. 380, 385 , 669 S.W.2d 434 (1984), and I would assume that the trial court followed the rule.

1996P. 24.5 requires that where there is a plea of guilty the trial court shall determine whether the plea is the result of a plea agreement and, if it is, “the court shall require that the agreement be stated.” The Arkansas Supreme Court has said that this requirement is “mandatory,” Zoller v. State, 282 Ark. 380, 385 , 669 S.W.2d 434 (1984), and I would assume that the trial court followed the rule.

1987In Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993 , 227 S.W.2d 842 (1955), the court followed the rule announced in A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844 , 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950), to govern withdrawal of consent by a parent.

1987In Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993 , 227 S.W.2d 842 (1955), the court followed the rule announced in A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844 , 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950), to govern withdrawal of consent by a parent.

1987In Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993 , 227 S.W.2d 842 (1955), the court followed the rule announced in A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844 , 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950), to govern withdrawal of consent by a parent.

1947Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for the court in First National Bank of Fort Smith v. Thompson, Administrator, 124 Ark. 161 , 186 S. W. 826 , said: “The case was tried below on an agreed statement of facts, which was merely filed with the clerk and referred to in the judgment of the court, but is not brought in the record by a bill of exceptions.

1947Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for the court in First National Bank of Fort Smith v. Thompson, Administrator, 124 Ark. 161 , 186 S. W. 826 , said: “The case was tried below on an agreed statement of facts, which was merely filed with the clerk and referred to in the judgment of the court, but is not brought in the record by a bill of exceptions.

1947The state of the record in the instant case is almost identical with that involved in the case of Coonrod v. Anderson, 55 Ark. 354 , 18 S. W. 373 , where the court followed the rule announced in the early case of Lawson v. Hayden, 13 Ark. 316 , as follows: “An agreed statement of facts, signed by the counsel of the parties, filed in the cause, and the filing noted of record, does not thereby become part of the record, not being made so by bill of exceptions or order of the court; and the court below, sitting as a jury, having determined the case upon such agreed statement, and it not having be

1947The state of the record in the instant case is almost identical with that involved in the case of Coonrod v. Anderson, 55 Ark. 354 , 18 S. W. 373 , where the court followed the rule announced in the early case of Lawson v. Hayden, 13 Ark. 316 , as follows: “An agreed statement of facts, signed by the counsel of the parties, filed in the cause, and the filing noted of record, does not thereby become part of the record, not being made so by bill of exceptions or order of the court; and the court below, sitting as a jury, having determined the case upon such agreed statement, and it not having be

1929Reversal of the judgment is also sought on the ground that the court adopted an incorrect rule for the measure of damages on account of the breach of the contract. ■ The court followed the rule announced in the case of Mutual Relief Assn. v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9 , 292 S. W. 396 , as follows: ‘ ‘Where an assessment benefit association wrongfully repudiated its contract, the insured may treat the contract as rescinded and recover all assessments paid with interest from the date of payment of each assessment.” The rule is applicable to premiums paid by the insured on account of any breach of a contrac

1929Reversal of the judgment is also sought on the ground that the court adopted an incorrect rule for the measure of damages on account of the breach of the contract. ■ The court followed the rule announced in the case of Mutual Relief Assn. v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9 , 292 S. W. 396 , as follows: ‘ ‘Where an assessment benefit association wrongfully repudiated its contract, the insured may treat the contract as rescinded and recover all assessments paid with interest from the date of payment of each assessment.” The rule is applicable to premiums paid by the insured on account of any breach of a contrac

1927Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 . ” See also Murray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; and Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Scriber, 162 Ark. 349 , 258 S. W. 353 .

1927Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 . ” See also Murray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; and Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Scriber, 162 Ark. 349 , 258 S. W. 353 .

1927Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 . ” See also Murray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; and Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Scriber, 162 Ark. 349 , 258 S. W. 353 .

1927Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 . ” See also Murray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; and Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Scriber, 162 Ark. 349 , 258 S. W. 353 .

1918It is argued that the decision in Wood v. King, supra, relates to a controversy between a material furnisher under contract with the owner himself, and that the statute ought not to be given that effect in a controversy between a sub-contractor and the owner.

1905Co. v. Stephens, 72 Ark. 127 , the court followed the rule as laid down and construed, in St.

1903In Texarkana v. Leach, 66 Ark. 40 , this court followed the rule announced by 'Judge Dillon.