followed rule in Connecticut

1994The court followed the principle set forth in Serrani in the case of Dawson v. Farr , 227 Conn. 780 , 632 A.2d 41 (1993).

1994The court followed the principle set forth in Serrani in the case of Dawson v. Farr , 227 Conn. 780 , 632 A.2d 41 (1993).

1980In Carney v. DeWees, 136 Conn. 256 , 70 A.2d 142 (1949), this court followed the principle expressed in Restatement, 4 Torts §876 that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.” The Restatement comment on this principle states “ [i]f the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible f

1980In Carney v. DeWees, 136 Conn. 256 , 70 A.2d 142 (1949), this court followed the principle expressed in Restatement, 4 Torts §876 that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.” The Restatement comment on this principle states “ [i]f the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible f

1977See State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 597-99 , 18 A.2d 895; State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 515 , 131 A. 429 ; Dutton v. Evans, supra; Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra; Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir.), citing State v. Torello, supra; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 252.

1977See State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 597-99 , 18 A.2d 895; State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 515 , 131 A. 429 ; Dutton v. Evans, supra; Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra; Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir.), citing State v. Torello, supra; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 252.

1965In rejecting the claims of Breithaupt and upholding the admissibility of the results of the blood test, the court followed the rule set forth in Wolf *39 v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (decided in 1949), which holds that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.

1965Following the Breithaupt decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and again in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (decided in 1963), held unequivocally that the fourth amendment is enforceable against the state when the state court is passing upon the reasonableness of a state search and seizure.

1965Following the Breithaupt decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and again in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (decided in 1963), held unequivocally that the fourth amendment is enforceable against the state when the state court is passing upon the reasonableness of a state search and seizure.

1931J., in Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 37 , 81 Atl. 1013 , to the effect that the damages recoverable are limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumes as a natural and proximate result of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73, 78 , 17 *582 Atl. 362; such as his damaged reputation; his injured feelings; the humiliation, insult and disgrace to which he was subjected, by the defendant’s false charges, in view of the time; manner and language in which they were made; and for his expenses of litigation, less the recoverable costs.

1931J., in Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 37 , 81 Atl. 1013 , to the effect that the damages recoverable are limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumes as a natural and proximate result of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73, 78 , 17 *582 Atl. 362; such as his damaged reputation; his injured feelings; the humiliation, insult and disgrace to which he was subjected, by the defendant’s false charges, in view of the time; manner and language in which they were made; and for his expenses of litigation, less the recoverable costs.

1931J., in Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 37 , 81 Atl. 1013 , to the effect that the damages recoverable are limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumes as a natural and proximate result of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73, 78 , 17 *582 Atl. 362; such as his damaged reputation; his injured feelings; the humiliation, insult and disgrace to which he was subjected, by the defendant’s false charges, in view of the time; manner and language in which they were made; and for his expenses of litigation, less the recoverable costs.