followed rule in Indiana

2017See Shenefield, 716 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A03-1704-CT-747 | December 13, 2017 Page 14 of 22 at 3; Lusk, 753 N.E.2d at 752 ; Burns, 786 N.E.2d at 1183 .

2017See Shenefield, 716 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A03-1704-CT-747 | December 13, 2017 Page 14 of 22 at 3; Lusk, 753 N.E.2d at 752 ; Burns, 786 N.E.2d at 1183 .

2005They first considered «whether the statute of repose is reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that define the distinction." Id. at 981 .

1997Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987), as applied by Castelli v. Steele, 700 F.Supp. 449 (S.D.Ind.1988), and concluded that Missouri substantive law applied to this action.

1997Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987), as applied by Castelli v. Steele, 700 F.Supp. 449 (S.D.Ind.1988), and concluded that Missouri substantive law applied to this action.

1991In First National Bank of Osakis v. Flynn (1933), 190 Minn. 102 , 250 N.W. 806 , the court followed the rule that “one who has voluntarily chosen and carried into effect an appropriate legal remedy, with knowledge of the facts, and of his rights, will not, in general be allowed to afterwards resort to an inconsistent remedy, involving a contradiction of the grounds upon which he proceeded.” Id. 250 N.W. at 807 .

1991In First National Bank of Osakis v. Flynn (1933), 190 Minn. 102 , 250 N.W. 806 , the court followed the rule that “one who has voluntarily chosen and carried into effect an appropriate legal remedy, with knowledge of the facts, and of his rights, will not, in general be allowed to afterwards resort to an inconsistent remedy, involving a contradiction of the grounds upon which he proceeded.” Id. 250 N.W. at 807 .

1980In Corey v. Smith, (1954) 233 Ind. 452 , 120 N.E.2d 410 , this Court followed that rule of law in affirming a judgment against defendant Corey.

1980In Corey v. Smith, (1954) 233 Ind. 452 , 120 N.E.2d 410 , this Court followed that rule of law in affirming a judgment against defendant Corey.

1961The only case decided in Indiana where the question of apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax was involved and exhaustively discussed is the case of Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Company (1951), 121 Ind. App. 136 , 96 N. E. 2d 918 , a decision by the Appellate Court not involving the marital deduction as the decedent in that case died in 1947, but in that case this Court followed the principle of equitable apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, and the reasoning and conclusions of the court in that case are, we think, decisive of this case.

1961The only case decided in Indiana where the question of apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax was involved and exhaustively discussed is the case of Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Company (1951), 121 Ind. App. 136 , 96 N. E. 2d 918 , a decision by the Appellate Court not involving the marital deduction as the decedent in that case died in 1947, but in that case this Court followed the principle of equitable apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, and the reasoning and conclusions of the court in that case are, we think, decisive of this case.

1959Co. v. Owens, supra. Appellee in the case at bar cites and relies upon Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Young (1919), 70 Ind. App. 172 , 121 N. E. 94 .

1959Co. v. Owens, supra. Appellee in the case at bar cites and relies upon Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Young (1919), 70 Ind. App. 172 , 121 N. E. 94 .

1950The foregoing evidence was held sufficient to sustain the award. *322 In the case of Magazine v. Shull et al. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 79 , 60 N. E. 2d 611 (Transfer denied), this court followed the rule announced in the above cases, and, speaking through Judge Crumpacker, said: .

1950The foregoing evidence was held sufficient to sustain the award. *322 In the case of Magazine v. Shull et al. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 79 , 60 N. E. 2d 611 (Transfer denied), this court followed the rule announced in the above cases, and, speaking through Judge Crumpacker, said: .

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1935Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 560, 562 , where the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a plea in abatement was questioned, the court said: “Moreover, it was not proposed to prove .that the action was pending at the time the plea was filed, and the docket entry which was offered showed that the first suit was dismissed on the same day on which the last was commenced.” Citing in support of this pronouncement Moore v. Kessler, supra. In the case of Hale v. Miller (1891), 131 Ind. 80 , 30 N. E. 884 , the court followed the rule as stated in Lee v. Hefly, supra. In the case of Brown v. Doak Co. (1921), 77

1921This court followed this rule by an application of the doctrine of stare decisis, based on its prior decision in the case of Kinney v. Heuring, supra, and recognized its duty to do so in proper cases in Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Knote, supra. For the reasons stated, and following the cases last cited, we adhere to our conclusion that we would be fully justified in applying the doctrine of stare decisis in this case, based on the former decision of this court in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra. Judgment affirmed. *442 Enloe, C.

1921This court followed this rule by an application of the doctrine of stare decisis, based on its prior decision in the case of Kinney v. Heuring, supra, and recognized its duty to do so in proper cases in Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Knote, supra. For the reasons stated, and following the cases last cited, we adhere to our conclusion that we would be fully justified in applying the doctrine of stare decisis in this case, based on the former decision of this court in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra. Judgment affirmed. *442 Enloe, C.

1921This court followed this rule by an application of the doctrine of stare decisis, based on its prior decision in the case of Kinney v. Heuring, supra, and recognized its duty to do so in proper cases in Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Knote, supra. For the reasons stated, and following the cases last cited, we adhere to our conclusion that we would be fully justified in applying the doctrine of stare decisis in this case, based on the former decision of this court in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra. Judgment affirmed. *442 Enloe, C.

1917In this instruction, in defining malice, the court followed the instruction used by the court and approved by this court in the case of Kelso v. Kelso (1908), 43 Ind. App. 115 , 86 N. E. 1001 .

1917In this instruction, in defining malice, the court followed the instruction used by the court and approved by this court in the case of Kelso v. Kelso (1908), 43 Ind. App. 115 , 86 N. E. 1001 .